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Health inequities are well-documented, but their economic dimensions have received less attention. In this report, we describe four economic dimensions of health inequi­ties in the United States. First, we describe an economic conceptual framework that connects poverty and health inequities at both individual and population levels and conveys the concept of reverse causality, where poverty worsens health inequi­ties and health inequities worsen poverty. This framework can help us understand the key elements of health inequity and its drivers. Second, we describe economic measurements used for quantifying the economic burden of health inequalities and summarize the empirical findings from studies. Third, we review the evidence on the return-on-investment of economic interventions that are aimed at reducing health inequities. Finally, we highlight the importance of cross disciplinary perspec­tives from economics and implementation research in effectively delivering interven­tions that can mitigate health inequities. Ethn Dis.2019;29(Suppl 1):103-112; doi:10.18865/ed.29.S1.103.

This paper reports the results of an investigation on citizens' attitudes and concerns regarding privacy and security on the Web, in general, and on the government websites they may visit, in particular. We examine to what extent those concerns can be alleviated by using a Secure Private Portal that protects citizen's personally identifying information when accessing government websites. The research project had two main goals: (a) to develop a comprehensive psychological instrument to assess citizens' attitudes and concerns regarding privacy and security on the Web; (b) to test the impact a Secure Private Portal may have on those concerns and on the way citizens use Government Websites. In order to accomplish these goals researchers from Columbia Business School and from Columbia departments of Computer Science and Psychology, developed and ran a web based survey. Participants were recruited using online advertising through Google.com and provided their responses on the web. Early analyses of the results indicate a very high level of citizens' concerns regarding privacy and security of their personal data. Some of the concerns can appropriately be addressed only by fundamental policy changes. Furthermore, the results suggest that citizens perceive those sites which use secure portals as much safer and are more likely to visit them again. The results may indicate a new strategy for the presentation and design of government websites.

Cover -- Contents -- List of figures and tables -- Notes on authors -- Acknowledgements -- I: MARKETS AND MARKET FAILURE IN HEALTH CARE -- 1 Health Care Financing Reforms: Moving into the New Millenium -- Introduction -- The changing world of health care financing -- Outline of the book -- 2 Markets and Health Care: Introducing the Invisible Hand -- Introduction -- What is a market and how does it work? -- Markets: the panacea for health care ills? -- The crucial assumptions -- Consumer is sovereign? -- Conclusions -- 3 Market Failure In Health Care: Justifying the Visible Hand -- Introduction -- Market failure and the UK NHS: Williams' tale of the duck-billed platypus -- Risk, uncertainty and the failure of voluntary health care insurance -- Externalities -- Licensure and asymmetry of information -- Relevance of economics to government intervention -- Conclusions -- II: HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS AND THEIR OBJECTIVES -- 4 Methods of Funding Health Care -- Introduction -- Public/private mix in finance and provision -- Rewarding the providers -- Private health care insurance -- Direct tax system -- Public health care insurance -- Other financing mechanisms -- Conclusions -- 5 ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES OF HEALTH CARE -- Introduction -- Efficiency -- Equity -- Confronting the confusion: what do we mean by equity? -- The economics and philosophy interface - theories of equity -- Towards some operational equity goals -- Interaction between equity and efficiency -- Conclusions -- III: A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS -- 6 Countering Consumer Moral Hazard -- Introduction -- Policy responses to consumer moral hazard -- Evidence on countering consumer moral hazard -- Conclusions -- 7 Countering Doctor Moral Hazard -- Introduction -- Methods of paying doctors -- Fee for service: does supplier inducement really exist? -- Alternatives to fee for service -- Conclusions.

BACKGROUND: The World Health Organization recommends that community health workers (CHWs) receive a mix of financial and non-financial incentives, yet notes that there is limited evidence to support the use of one type of incentive (i.e. financial or non-financial) over another. In preparation for a larger scale trial, we investigated the acceptability and feasibility of two different forms of incentives for CHWs in Malang District, Indonesia. METHODS: CHWs working on a cardiovascular disease (CVD) risk screening and management programme in two villages were assigned to receive either a financial or non-financial incentive for 6 months. In the financial incentives village, CHWs (n = 20) received 16,000 IDR (USD 1.1) per patient followed up or 500,000 IDR (USD 34.1) if they followed up 100% of their assigned high-risk CVD patients each month. In the non-financial incentive village, CHWs (n = 20) were eligible to receive a Quality Care Certificate for following up the highest number of high-risk CVD patients each month, awarded in a public ceremony. At the end of the 6-month intervention period, focus group discussions were conducted with CHWs and semi-structured interviews with programme administrators to investigate acceptability, facilitators and barriers to implementation and feasibility of the incentive models. Data on monthly CHW follow-up activity were analysed using descriptive statistics to assess the preliminary impact of each incentive on service delivery outcomes, and CHW motivation levels were assessed pre- and post-implementation. RESULTS: Factors beyond the control of the study significantly interrupted the implementation of the financial incentive, particularly the threat of violence towards CHWs due to village government elections. Despite CHWs reporting that both the financial and non-financial incentives were acceptable, programme administrators questioned the sustainability of the non-financial incentive and reported CHWs were ambivalent towards them. CHW service delivery outcomes increased 17% ...

Abstract Background Chronic kidney disease (CKD) poses a financial burden on patients and their households. This descriptive study measures the prevalence of economic hardship and out-of-pocket costs in an Australian CKD population. Methods A cross-sectional study of patients receiving care for CKD (stage III-V) in Western Sydney, Australia using a structured questionnaire. Data collection occurred between November 2010 and April 2011. Multivariate analyses assessed the relationships between economic hardship and individual, household and health system characteristics. Results The study included 247 prevalent CKD patients. A mean of AUD$907 per three months was paid out-of-pocket resulting in 71% (n=153) of participants experiencing financial catastrophe (out-of-pocket costs exceeding 10% of household income). Fifty-seven percent (n=140) of households reported economic hardship. The adjusted risk factors that decreased the likelihood of hardship included: home ownership (OR: 0.32, 95% CI: 0.14-0.71), access to financial resources (OR: 0.24, 95% CI: 0.11-0.50) and quality of life (OR: 0.12, 95% CI: 0.02-0.56). The factors that increased the likelihood of hardship included if income was negatively impacted by CKD (OR: 4.80, 95% CI: 2.17-10.62) and concessional status (i.e. receiving government support) (OR: 3.09, 95% CI: 1.38-6.91). Out-of-pocket costs and financial catastrophe were not found to be significantly associated with hardship in this analysis. Conclusions This study describes the poorer economic circumstances of households affected by CKD and reinforces the inter-relationships between chronic illness, economic well-being and quality of life for this patient population.

Abstract Background Chronic illness and disability can have damaging, even catastrophic, socioeconomic effects on individuals and their households. We examined the experiences of people affected by chronic heart failure, complicated diabetes and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease to inform patient centred policy development. This paper provides a first level, qualitative understanding of the economic impact of chronic illness. Methods Interviews were conducted with patients aged between 45 and 85 years who had one or more of the index conditions and family carers from the Australian Capital Territory and Western Sydney, Australia (n = 66). Content analysis guided the interpretation of data. Results The affordability of medical treatments and care required to manage illness were identified as the key aspects of economic hardship, which compromised patients' capacity to proactively engage in self-management and risk reduction behaviours. Factors exacerbating hardship included ineligibility for government support, co-morbidity, health service flexibility, and health literacy. Participants who were on multiple medications, from culturally and linguistically diverse or Indigenous backgrounds, and/or not in paid employment, experienced economic hardship more harshly and their management of chronic illness was jeopardised as a consequence. Economic hardship was felt among not only those ineligible for government financial supports but also those receiving subsidies that were insufficient to meet the costs of managing long-term illness over and above necessary daily living expenses. Conclusion This research provides insights into the economic stressors associated with managing chronic illness, demonstrating that economic hardship requires households to make difficult decisions between care and basic living expenses. These decisions may cause less than optimal health outcomes and increased costs to the health system. The findings support the necessity of a critical analysis of health, social and welfare policies to identify cross-sectoral strategies to alleviate such hardship and improve the affordability of managing chronic conditions. In a climate of global economic instability, research into the economic impact of chronic illness on individuals' health and well-being and their disease management capacity, such as this study, provides timely evidence to inform policy development.

The posting and transfer of health workers and managers receives little policy and research attention in global health. In Nigeria, there is no national policy on posting and transfer in the health sector. We sought to examine how the posting and transfer of frontline primary health care (PHC) workers is conducted in four states (Lagos, Benue, Nasarawa and Kaduna) across Nigeria, where public sector PHC facilities are usually the only form of formal health care service providers available in many communities. We conducted in‐depth interviews with PHC workers and managers, and group discussions with community health committee members. The results revealed three mechanisms by which PHC managers conduct posting and transfer: (1) periodically moving PHC workers around as a routine exercise aimed at enhancing their professional experience and preventing them from being corrupted; (2) as a tool for improving health service delivery by assigning high‐performing PHC workers to PHC facilities perceived to be in need, or posting PHC workers nearer their place of residence; and (3) as a response to requests for punishment or favour from PHC workers, political office holders, global health agencies and community health committees. Given that posting and transfer is conducted by discretion, with multiple influences and sometimes competing interests, we identified practices that may lead to unfair treatment and inequities in the distribution of PHC workers. The posting and transfer of PHC workers therefore requires policy measures to codify what is right about existing informal practices and to avert their negative potential. © 2016 The Authors The International Journal of Health Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Since the mid-1980s, the national health policy in Nigeria has sought to inspire community engagement in primary health care by bringing communities into partnership with service providers through community health committees. Using a realist approach to understand how and under what circumstances the committees function, we explored 581 meeting minutes from 129 committees across four states in Nigeria (Lagos, Benue, Nasarawa and Kaduna). We found that community health committees provide opportunities for improving the demand and supply of health care in their community. Committees demonstrate five modes of functioning: through meetings (as 'village square'), reaching out within their community (as 'community connectors'), lobbying governments for support (as 'government botherers'), inducing and augmenting government support (as 'back-up government') and taking control of health care in their community (as 'general overseers'). In performing these functions, community health committees operate within and through the existing social, cultural and religious structures of their community, thereby providing an opportunity for the health facility with which they are linked to be responsive to the needs and values of the community. But due to power asymmetries, committees have limited capacity to influence health facilities for improved performance, and governments for improved health service provision. This is perhaps because national guidelines are not clear on their accountability functions; they are not aware of the minimum standards of services to expect; and they have a limited sense of legitimacy in their relations with sub-national governments because they are established as the consequence of a national policy. Committees therefore tend to promote collective action for self-support more than collective action for demanding accountability. To function optimally, community health committees require national government or non-government organization mentoring and support; they need to be enshrined in law to ...

One of the consequences of ineffective governments is that they leave space for unlicensed and unregulated informal providers without formal training to deliver a large proportion of health services. Without institutions that facilitate appropriate health care transactions, patients tend to navigate health care markets from one inappropriate provider to another, receiving sub-optimal care, before they find appropriate providers; all the while incurring personal transaction costs. But the top-down interventions to address this barrier to accessing care are hampered by weak governments, as informal providers are entrenched in communities. To explore the role that communities could play in limiting informal providers, we applied the transaction costs theory of the firm which predicts that economic agents tend to organise production within firms when the costs of coordinating exchange through the market are greater than within a firm. In a realist analysis of qualitative data from Nigeria, we found that community health committees sometimes seek to limit informal providers in a manner that is consistent with the transaction costs theory of the firm. The committees deal not through legal sanction but by subtle influence and persuasion in a slow and faltering process of institutional change, leveraging the authority and resources available within their community, and from governments and NGOs. First, they provide information to reduce the market share controlled by informal providers, and then regulation to keep informal providers at bay while making the formal provider more competitive. When these efforts are ineffective or insufficient, committees are faced with a 'make-or-buy' decision. The 'make' decision involves coordination to co-produce formal health services and facilitate referrals from informal to formal providers. What sometimes results is a quasi-firm-informal and formal providers are networked in a single but loose production unit. These findings suggest that efforts to limit informal providers should seek to, among other things, augment existing community responses.