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AbstractPolitical scientists and policy scholars have traditionally looked at the role of welfare and tax policies in shaping income inequality. Less attention has been paid to the key policy area of economic development. But states spend billions on economic development incentives each year to encourage firms to locate in their state. The few studies that have examined the impact of economic development policy on inequality have found mixed results, and have not considered who shapes and benefits from economic development policy when identifying possible causal mechanisms. I argue that increased incentive spending leads to increased inequality through either a market conditioning effect (incentives disproportionately boost the incomes of top earners prior to taxes) or a redistributive effect (incentives allow wealthy firms, investors, and employees to keep income that would otherwise be taxed and transferred). These mechanisms are tested using data on incentive spending and inequality across the 50 states from 1999 to 2014. The findings demonstrate that incentives increase income inequality via a redistributive effect only. This effect, though, is relatively large, long-lasting, and robust to different measures of incentive spending. Despite using economic development incentives to try to generate greater prosperity, state governments may be inadvertently exacerbating inequality.

States have empowered economic development organizations (EDOs) to administer incentive programs. But EDOs are fundamentally oriented toward client service, which can lead to client group dominance. Client group dominance can undermine the legitimacy, accountability, and efficacy of incentives. Case studies of economic development administration in North Carolina, Nevada, and Oregon demonstrate that EDOs were more likely to solicit and prioritize client group input, and that they established practices that barred competing group input. The article provides theoretical and practical implications, including potential reforms to bring EDOs closer to established good governance principles.

AbstractIn the study of the policy diffusion process, scholars have found that states adopt policies to remain competitive with one another over economic resources. But the rapid spread of Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) policies, which treat college athletes as professionals, is not readily explained by economic competition nor other diffusion mechanisms. The NIL phenomenon points to a new dimension of competition between the states, which is more closely tied to states protecting or enhancing their reputations than it is to directly accruing economic resources. To test if NIL spread as the result of athletic reputation competition, we model the adoption of NIL legislation as a function of internal characteristics (i.e. number, value, and ranking of college football programs) and interstate dynamics (i.e. actions of football, conference, and Power 5 competitors). We test the effect of these measures alongside traditional diffusion indicators, finding that both internal and interstate indicators of athletic competition drive states to adopt and implement NIL. NIL is important to study as it has changed the landscape of amateur sports, as well as our scholarly understanding of policy diffusion in the American federal system, specifically broadening our conceptualization of the competition mechanism and developing customized measures of it.

Previous scholarship has linked increased representation of women, racial/ethnic minorities, the LGB community, and the working class to more representative legislative agendas and roll call voting. But it is unclear if descriptive representation of historically excluded groups also affects policy innovativeness. Borrowing from interdisciplinary research, we argue that diverse legislatures are more innovative, so long as legislators operate in a quality deliberative environment. We measure the descriptive representation of seven different underrepresented groups in state legislatures from 1984 to 2016. We find that representation of women is a key predictor of innovation, operationalized as the tendency for states to adopt new policies early. We also find the effect of women is not dependent on critical mass, is undermined by high levels of polarization, and helps boost the capacity of legislatures to produce unique policy language. Some models are suggestive of a relationship between racial/ethnic minority (Black, Latinx, Native American) representation and innovation, but the results are inconsistent. The study provides insights into how representation of women can enhance legislative capacity to innovate in public policy.

ABSTRACTWithin-semester shifts in course modality in response to pandemics, weather, or accommodation for travel and health are increasingly common and can interrupt student learning. We tracked temporary modality changes across 10 sections of "Introduction to American Government" to examine the extent to which instructors have tools to help students successfully navigate such changes and mitigate learning loss. We find that students rated instructors' handling of shifts well if they made course material engaging, communicated clearly, and effectively used technology. The analysis suggests that instructors can mitigate the impact of unplanned changes to modality on students' learning when there are three or fewer shifts during a semester.

Scholars and journalists have shown that US state legislators often copy and paste policy text from other sources. This 'policy plagiarism' is perceived by critics as symptomatic of process failures and likely to undermine policy success. To proponents, copy and paste legislation stems from an efficient learning process likely to guarantee policy success. The authors test competing hypotheses by measuring success and plagiarism across three areas of US state policy: organ donation legislation, e-cigarette/vaping bans for minors and anti-bullying legislation. They find that higher levels of plagiarism result in significantly less success at reducing youth vaping rates and increasing organ donor registrations. They also find a negative, though not significant, relationship between copying and success for antibullying policy. The evidence favours opponents: legislators risk harming policy success by copying from others. This study of policy plagiarism advances knowledge by moving beyond the simple demonstration of the phenomenon to investigate the potential link between the copying of legislative text and the extent to which the policies studied achieved their goals.

AbstractDo states copy or reinvent language from complex policies as they diffuse, and does this depend on legislative resources? We argue that states will more frequently reinvent more complex policies, but that states with high-resource legislatures will reinvent more than their low-resource counterparts for more complex policies. We test the theory using the bill texts from 18 policies that diffused across the 50 states from 1983 to 2014, measuring reinvention and complexity using text analysis tools. In line with expectations, we find that complex policies are reinvented more than simple policies and that high-resource legislatures reinvent bills more than low-resource legislatures on average. However, we also find that low-resource legislatures reinvent complex policies at about the same rate as high-resource legislatures. The results indicate that even legislatures with limited resources work to adapt complex policies during the diffusion process.

AbstractWhat leads states to adopt more restrictive labour policies? The conventional wisdom is that unified Republican states, with help from conservative political networks, are more likely to adopt restrictions on labour unions. We argue that party control of government matters but is constrained by voter preferences and the power of organised labour. We create new estimates of state-level public support for unions by income thirds using dynamic multilevel regression and poststratification. Using this measure, we predict the adoption of restrictive labour policies, such as right-to-work and minimum wage preemption laws. We find that Republican governments are less likely to adopt restrictive policies when unions are strong and when union support among middle- and low-income earners is high. Interestingly, these results run contrary to much of the literature on the unequal representation of the wealthy in public policy.

This article examines whether labor unions punish incumbent Democrats who vote for free-trade bills in Congress. We theorize that punishment is a risky strategy for interest groups that prefer one party over the other. Therefore, interest groups must be substantially affected by decline in party support to punish. Consistent with our theory, we find important differences between public- and private-sector unions in their willingness to punish. Although public-sector unions articulate opposition to free trade, they do not follow through with either deterrence (withholding contributions to send a signal) or incapacitation (withholding contributions to replace the wayward candidate with a more supportive one). Private-sector unions, specifically unions that organize trade-vulnerable industrial workers, do attempt to punish Democrats via deterrence. The estimated deterrence effect is a 6 percent reduction in contributions. This study improves on previous studies by modeling punishment across several congressional sessions and multiple trade votes. The results reveal new insights into labor's approach to declining protectionism among congressional Democrats.

How do states differ in how difficult they make voter registration, and what effect does this have on voters? We propose and validate a new Difficulty of Registration Index (DORI) calculated via an item response theory (IRT) model of five key dimensions of registration (automaticity, portability, deadline, mode, and preregistration) for each state from 2004 to 2020. Since 2004, most states eased registration processes, with Democratic statehouses in racially diverse and young states leading the way. Using CCES data, we find that DORI is associated with increased probability that voters experience problems registering and failing to turnout (in both self-reported and validated turnout data). These effects are pronounced for young voters. This study holds lessons for how restrictive registration procedures can change the shape of the electorate and make it harder to achieve political equality.

Research on policy reinvention tends to focus on whether policies become more or less comprehensive over time while neglecting to explain copying policy language verbatim. We argue that the extent to which lawmakers reinvent policy depends on the resources available to them. Lawmakers serving in more professional state legislatures have greater capacity to reinvent policies. In contrast, lawmakers serving in less professional settings are more likely to copy policy language. As evidence, we gather bill texts of 12 policies that diffused across the 50 states between 1982 and 2014. Using cosine similarity scores to measure language copying, we find that less professional legislatures copy more text from previous adopters, and that the likeliest culprit is a lack of funding for staff assistance. The findings have implications for states' ability to amend policies to suit their own citizens' needs.