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Falling in-between the category of employers and employees, solo self-employed persons are poorly accommodated by the traditional system of corporatist interest representation through which the interests of employers are represented in employers' associations, and the interests of employees are represented by trade unions. For business associations 'micro businesses' with no employees are difficult to reach and serve, as their interests are considered distinct from companies with employees. Trade unions in many countries even resisted the emergence of solo self-employment, fearing that these and other flexible arrangements would undermine not only secure working conditions but also union solidarity. This study examines differences in membership of interest organizations among solo self-employed workers. Various types of organizations are investigated, not only trade unions and business associations, but also new freelancer associations. Theoretically, three categories of determinants are examined to explain differences in membership: economic explanations, social explanations, and political explanations. Empirically, survey data are used from the Netherlands, a country with an increase in self-employment and a diverse supply of interest organizations. It is concluded that economic determinants explain both 'generic' membership (of any organization), as well as membership of specific organizations. Social and political determinants do not explain generic membership, but instead help to explain why some self-employed workers join particular types of organizations.

Abstract
It is often held that the self-employed are an economically conservative, political right-wing class. Previous studies, however, have primarily dealt with self-employed workers as a relatively monolithic social class with shared interests as entrepreneurs and (potential) employers. But, with its recent rise, self-employment has developed into a heterogeneous employment type, with a growing number of dependent and precarious self-employed. In this article, the political preferences of people in self-employment are compared to the preferences of employees on temporary contracts. In doing so, hypotheses are tested from both classic theories on class voting, as well as theories on job precariousness and labor market vulnerabilities. For this purpose, European Social Survey Round 4 (ESS-4) data on eight West European countries are analyzed. The findings suggest that particular segments of self-employment share the characteristics of other forms of 'atypical' work, not only with respect to labor market insecurities, but also regarding the political orientations associated with such insecurities.

It is often held that the self-employed are an economically conservative, political right-wing class. Previous studies, however, have primarily dealt with self-employed workers as a relatively monolithic social class with shared interests as entrepreneurs and (potential) employers. But, with its recent rise, self-employment has developed into a heterogeneous employment type, with a growing number of dependent and precarious self-employed. In this article, the political preferences of people in selfemployment are compared to the preferences of employees on temporary contracts. In doing so, hypotheses are tested from both classic theories on class voting, as well as theories on job precariousness and labor market vulnerabilities. For this purpose, European Social Survey Round 4 (ESS-4) data on eight West European countries are analyzed. The findings suggest that particular segments of selfemployment share the characteristics of other forms of 'atypical' work, not only with respect to labor market insecurities, but also regarding the political orientations associated with such insecurities.

The author reinvestigates the relationship between the organizational power of trade unions and strikes based on data from the European Company Survey 2009 (ECS-2009) and the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database, which include more than 5,000 firms across all 27 European Union (EU) member states. He shows that the incidence of strikes is higher in companies for which workplace union membership is high, the number of workplace unions is high, and unions dominate establishment-level works councils. These factors interact to affect strike incidence. In addition, the company-level effects of union organization on strike incidence vary across countries. These country differences can partially be explained by differences in national trade union systems, such as decentralization and membership density.

Although studies have signaled a gap in trade union representation between workers with secure employment (i.e., 'insiders') and those without (i.e., 'outsiders'), this gap has rarely been empirically analyzed at the micro-level. With recent micro-level data from the Netherlands, this study addresses two questions. First, to what extent do insiders and outsiders, measured through individuals' employment status and self-perceived social risk, differ in their willingness/probability to join trade unions? Second, to what extent can these differences in trade union membership be explained as resulting from perceptions of interest representation and/or workplace social cohesion? The results suggests a clear insider–outsider gap in trade union membership related to employment status, but not to social risk. Furthermore, this gap can be explained by differences in perceptions of representation, but not workplace social cohesion.

"Searching for paid tasks via digital labour platforms, such as Uber, Deliveroo and Fiverr, has become a global phenomenon and the regular source of income for millions of people. In the advent of digital labour platforms, this insightful book sheds new light on familiar questions about tensions between competition and cooperation, short-term gains and long-term success, and private benefits and public costs. Drawing on a wealth of knowledge from a range of disciplines, including law, management, psychology, economics, sociology and geography, it pieces together a nuanced picture of the societal challenges posed by the platform economy. Chapters present a comprehensive, multidisciplinary overview of the rise of gig work, reflecting on long-term developments in the gig economy and incorporating contemporary developments into the rich theoretical and empirical literature on the topic. Charting new research territory, the book addresses key academic and policy challenges, arming readers with relevant analytical tools and practical solutions to face common problems. This book comprises a key reference for future research on the topic as well as critical policy measures for addressing challenges relating to gig work. Offering an integrated outline of the latest insights, this book is crucial reading for scholars and researchers of the platform economy and gig work, outlining academic insights and empirical research, and illustrating a research agenda for future scholarship. The book's comprehensive approach will also benefit policy makers, managers and workers as they confront the platform economy's wide variety of legal, economic and management challenges"--

La différenciation des attitudes de confiance politique se produit lorsque les citoyens font la distinction entre différentes institutions politiques en termes de fiabilité. Cet article explore les modèles de (non-)différenciation des citoyens entre les niveaux de gouvernance local, national et de l'Union européenne en ce qui concerne la confiance politique. Grâce à des données néerlandaises inédites, nous constatons que les appréciations en termes de confiance de chaque paire de gouvernements (local-national/ national-Union européenne/local-Union européenne) suivent un schéma distinct. Cela veut dire que les citoyens : (1) forment plus d'une attitude de confiance politique ; et (2) utilisent différents mécanismes cognitifs (comme la proximité cognitive et la rationalité subjective) pour comprendre les complexités politiques dans les systèmes de gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux. Bien que les schémas généraux observés au niveau de la population aient été largement reproduits au niveau des sous-groupes, c'est-àdire que les groupes à faiblement et fortement avertis politiquement ont produit des schémas similaires de (non-) différenciation, les citoyens fortement avertis politiquement ont eu tendance à davantage différencier – ils sont plus susceptibles d'évaluer chaque niveau de gouvernance « sur ses propres mérites ». Nos résultats sont particulièrement pertinents à une époque où la confiance décline, où les gouvernements veulent regagner la confiance des citoyens mais ne savent pas vraiment quel niveau de gouvernement (le cas échéant) est le principal coupable. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Les citoyens, en particulier ceux qui ont un intérêt politique plus élevé, une plus grande exposition à l'information politique et un niveau d'éducation plus élevé, ont tendance à différer dans leurs orientations de confiance envers les différents gouvernements. Cela veut dire que les citoyens, dans une certaine mesure, jugent les différents gouvernements du système à plusieurs niveaux « sur leurs propres mérites ». Par conséquent, les politiciens et les gestionnaires publics confrontés à une baisse de la confiance dans leur juridiction devraient sérieusement se demander si une telle tendance négative ne reflète pas le mécontentement des citoyens face au manque de réactivité de leur gouvernement aux demandes spécifiques de ses citoyens.

Differentiation in political trust attitudes occurs when citizens distinguish between different political institutions in terms of their trustworthiness. This article explores patterns of citizens' (non-)differentiation between the local, national and European Union governance levels with regard to political trust. With unique Dutch data, we find that trust evaluations of each pair of governments (local–national/national–European Union/local–European Union) follows a distinct pattern. This suggests that citizens: (1) form more than one political trust attitude; and (2) use different cognitive mechanisms (like cognitive proximity and subjective rationality) to make sense of the political complexities in multilevel governance systems. Although general patterns found at the population level were largely reproduced at the subgroup level, that is, low and high political sophistication groups produced similar patterns of (non-)differentiation, highly politically sophisticated citizens tended to differentiate more – they are more likely to evaluate each governance level 'on its own merits'. Our results are especially relevant in an era of declining trust, where governments want to regain citizens' trust but are very much in the dark about which government level (if any) is the main culprit. Points for practitioners Citizens, particularly those with higher political interest, more exposure to political information and higher education, tend to differentiate in their trust orientations towards different governments. This suggests that citizens, to some extent, judge different governments in the multilevel system 'on their own merits'. Therefore, politicians and public managers confronted with declining trust in their jurisdiction should seriously consider whether such a negative trend might not reflect citizens' dissatisfaction with their governments' lack of responsiveness to the specific demands of its citizens.

AbstractAlthough the debate on roots of political trust is ongoing, many scholars agree on the relevance of such political factors as political/ideological distance between citizens and incumbents, political responsiveness and perceptions of performance. Less clear is to what extent such trust evaluations are generalized or specific for the three main political arenas in the European multilevel governance system (EU, national, local). With new data from the Netherlands, we demonstrate that trust in local, national and EU governments (1) is largely level-specific (i.e. is based on citizens' perceptions of incumbents at a particular governance level) (2) and—at all three levels—is explained by level-specific political factors. This shows that political trust is a subjectively rational evaluation and that citizens develop meaningful political orientations vis-à-vis governments at different levels. Therefore, trust spillovers may be less relevant for explaining political trust in multilevel governance than assumed in previous research as executive governments at local, national and EU levels are judged "on their own turf".