Suchergebnisse

This four-year project, funded by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, explores the role of local actors and institutions in mitigating political violence in the South African province KwaZulu Natal. In South Africa, democracy has been introduced successfully, but the transition from apartheid was not at all peaceful. In the run-up to the first democratic elections in 1994, all major parties participated in threats and intimidation and large-scale violence raged throughout the country. After the 1994 election, political violence ceased in most regions, but in KwaZulu Natal there are still outbursts of violence, in particular in relation to elections. At the national level, the power sharing agreement played an important role in facilitating the transition from apartheid towards democratic governance. The project explores the local dynamics in KwaZulu Natal by comparing societies with different types of mechanisms for conflict management -- such as local peace agreements and power sharing -- and different outcomes in terms of reduction of political violence. The research includes the development of a theory on local power sharing. This project will complement previous research on national and internationally mediated power sharing agreements where former enemies agree to share power in joint government. The results of the project will be useful in improving the design and implementation of future peace missions to also improve democratic capacity in societies shattered by war. Adapted from the source document.

Why are some elections followed by armed conflict, while others are not? This article begins to explore this question by mapping the prevalence of power-sharing agreements and patterns of post-election peace in states shattered by civil war. While democracy builds on the notion of free political competition and uncertain electoral outcomes, power-sharing reduces the uncertainty by ensuring political power for certain groups. Nevertheless, new data presented in this article - the Post-Accord Elections (PAE) data collection - shows that the issues of peace, power-sharing and democracy have become intertwined as the vast majority of contemporary peace agreements provide for both power-sharing and elections. First, in contrast to previous research which has suggested that power-sharing is a tool for ending violence, this study shows that conflict often continues after an agreement has been signed, even if it includes provisions for power-sharing. Second, this investigation shows no evidence of power-sharing facilitating the holding of elections. On the contrary, it is more common that elections are held following a peace process without power-sharing. Third, a period of power-sharing ahead of the elections does not seem to provide for post-election peace. Rather, such elections are similarly dangerous as post-accord elections held without a period of power-sharing. The good news is that power-sharing does not seem to have a negative effect on post-election peace. Adapted from the source document.

Power sharing is increasingly recognized as an important tool for creating sustainable peace in war‐torn societies. However, we have limited knowledge concerning why political, territorial, and military power‐sharing pacts are reached and implemented. This article addresses this gap by providing a global study examining the signing and implementation of power‐sharing pacts in intrastate armed conflicts. We focus on how the type of political regime can influence these choices and theorize about the strategic incentives for warring parties in different types of regimes to sign and implement different pacts. Our large‐N analysis is based on data on power‐sharing provisions in eighty‐three peace accords in forty intrastate armed conflicts between 1989 and 2004. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that political and military pacts are more likely to be signed in autocracies, whereas territorial pacts are more common in democracies. Somewhat surprisingly, we find no difference in the implementation patterns across regimes.