Suchergebnisse

Straipsnyje siekiama paaiskinti, kodel Andriaus Kubiliaus vyriausybes partijos (TS-LKD, LRLS ir LiCS), nepaisant nepalankiu aplinkybiu ir prognoziu, sugebejo gerai pasirodyti 2012 m. Seimo rinkimuose ir tapti daugiausia balsu gavusia valdanciaja koalicija nuo Lietuvos Nepriklausomybes atkurimo. Naudojamos dvi pagrindines teorijos: partines tapatybes ir ekonominio balsavimo. Atitinkamai pagal jas straipsnyje iskeliamos ir tikrinamos dvi hipotezes, kuriu pirmoji numato lemiama partines tapatybes vaidmeni, o antroji teigia, kad A. Kubiliaus vyriausybes partijos pritrauke ir nauju, racionalia ekonominio balsavimo logika besiremianciu rinkeju. 2012 m. porinkimines apklausos duomenu individo lygmeniu analize suteikia paramos abiem hipotezems. Straipsnyje daroma isvada, kad partine tapatybe buvo butina, taciau nepakankama gero vyriausybes pasirodymo 2012 m. Seimo rinkimuose salyga: dalis ekonomika vertinusiu kaip blogejancia istikimu rinkeju buvo prarasta, taciau siuos praradimus kompensavo nauju ekonomika retrospektyviai teigiamai vertinusiu rinkeju dalis This article aims to explain why the parties of Andrius Kubilius' government (HU-LCD, LRLM and LCU), notwithstanding the unfavourable circumstances and corresponding forecasts, managed to perform well in 2012 Seimas elections and became the first governing coalition according to the joint received vote share since the restoration of Lithuania's independence. Two main theories are employed: party identification and economic voting. Corresponding to them, two hypotheses are raised and tested in this article: first hypothesis anticipates a decisive role of party identification and the second one asserts that the parties in A. Kubilius' government attracted new voters according to the logic of economic voting. Analysis of individual level data from the 2012 post-electoral survey provides support for both hypotheses. The article concludes that party identification was necessary, though not sufficient condition of good government performance in the 2012 Seimas elections: a part of the faithful voters was lost, but these losses were compensated by new voters that positively (and retrospectively) evaluated the economy of Lithuania. Adapted from the source document.

This paper argues that economic voting is not limited to first-order elections and also can be observed in local elections (usually considered as second-order). Though local governments do not have the power to shape the macro-economic policy of the state, they may have some instruments to influence the well-being of their regions. Moreover, voters may perceive them as accountable for the state of the economy in the region and punish or reward them in local elections on basis of the economic trends. Lithuania appears to be a quite interesting case in which to test these theoretical arguments. Party identification and cleavages are quite weak here: therefore economic voting can be expected to provide at least some explanation of voting (it should not be shadowed by other social factors). Six local municipal council elections were held in Lithuania since the transition to democracy: the first were held in 1995 and the last in 2011. While controlling for important political-contextual factors, this paper strives to compare the impact of economic voting at Lithuania's municipal elections across time five separate time periods. Results of the empirical analysis reveal that Lithuanians are learning the economic vote with unemployment being more significant as a factor in explaining changes in votes for dominant parties in the municipal councils in the more recent period than in the first several elections. A referendum effect is also observed: parties that belong to the national government parties are punished more during economic downturns. Adapted from the source document.

This article presents macro-level study of voting in Lithuania's local elections, with emphasis on changing electoral support for the incumbent parties. Presented statistical analysis of vote change in two periods between municipal elections (year 1997-2000 and 2002-2007) aims to explain the success (and failure) of dominant parties in national government and municipal councils (two separate cases). Article is mainly oriented into the search of economic voting, but hypotheses related to other, political-institutional factors are also tested. It is discovered that dynamics of unemployment change helps to explain vote change for the party that is dominant in the municipal council, but it is not important when state of economy is worsening. The dominant party in the national government is unanimously punished when unemployment is rising, but when the state of economy is improving, average vote change for such party is not outstanding. The dispersion of vote change in both cases (when dependent variable is vote change for the dominant party in the national government) is better explained by the political-institutional variables (firstly, turnout change). Adapted from the source document.

This article is focused on the relation between the political institutional conditions (regime properties) and collective violence. Relying on works of Charles Tilly, two most important properties of regimes (political institutional conditions) that could affect the occurrence and intensity of collective violence are discerned: regime (governmental) capacity and democracy level. Empirical-graphical analysis finds no relation between the democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence. However, statistically significant relationship between the governmental capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence is found. Moreover, higher levels of collective violence are observed in the low capacity- undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis). Adapted from the source document.

Adapted from the source document.