Suchergebnisse

The French Economy During the Presidency of General de Gaulle Jean-Marcel Jeanneney From 1949 to 1957, the growth of the French economy has been about as strong as that of the other western economies, but it has beer characterized by disequilibra which had led, in 1958, to great difficulties.
From 1958 to 1969, economic growth was faster in France than in any other western economy, excepted for Germany where it was slightly stronger, and for Japan where it was almost double. Gross investment grew faster than everywhere else in Europe without however reaching the same share of GDP as that observed for our main competitors. The inflation rate on consumption prices remained high : on average 4,2 % a year. Real hourly wages grew at 3,6 % a year and total real wage bill at 6,3 % a year.
From a cyclical point of view four subperiods ought to be distinguished. In 1958, France endured a severe recession ; from the beginning of 1959 till the beginning of 1964, it enjoyed a 8,1 % yearly GDP growth ; from the first quarter of 1964 to the first quarter of 1968, the growth rate decelerated to 5,4 % ; from June 1968 to April 1969, France had to adapt to the shock induced by the events of May 1968 but the growth rate from 1968. I to 1969. I was still 4,7 %.
After general de Gaulle had left power at the end of April 1969, the economy still performed brillantly untill 1973, but in a more risky way.

The merit of economic models is that they make interdependencies explicit, and measure their effects quantitatively, thereby making it possible to make conditional projections, if not to make true predictions. They also permit retrospective analysis, which can be rich in information.
It is always necessary to take account of their limitations. The recent past, the point of departure for their projections, is often not well known. The unavoidable introduction of exogenous data restricts the extent of their explanatory power and renders uncertain the projections they make. The relationships on which they are based do not take into account likely structural changes, which are usually slow but which can be sudden.
On the basis of these considerations, it could be that growth will be significantly more lively than is suggested by the models. Nevertheless, there is the possibility of accidents, which could reduce growth.

A european currency would increase the mobility of the factors of production between the countries involved. It would also offset the power of the dollar and the yen. It is, therefore, desirable.
The ecu must not be just another currency being used at the same time as national currencies, whose values would probably take different courses. It must take their place and be unique. It will be defined neither as a permanently weighted average of the national currencies nor as a weight of gold. Its value will be determined once and for all on the basis of the national currencies just before they vanish. As it will be legal tender, it will be used as a means of payment. Furthermore it will be accepted as a reserve currency if the European central bank managed it adequately. This Bank must be independent of governments and unable to grant loans to the states. It must enforce identical short-term credit conditions in all the countries using its currency.
Creating the écu as a genuine currency is a matter of urgency. The EMS certainly has advantages, but its drawbacks are considerable as exchange rates can be reviewed and the French franc is subordinated to the DM. The alternative solution consists recurrent devaluations of the franc either in the frame work of the EMS or out of it would be counterproductive for the french economy.
It is true that accepting the ecu on the face of it implies giving up national monetary sovereignty. But this sovereignty has always been more or less illusory, and would in fact be stronger should it be delegated and shared in the Framework of a European institution.