Suchergebnisse

Cet article porte sur le projet européen de créer une politique énergétique commune visant la libéralisation des marchés, la lutte aux changements climatiques et la sécurité de l'approvisionnement. Nous montrons comment la Commission européenne a développé un cadrage cognitif et normatif ( frame ) qui lie la sécurité énergétique et les changements climatiques aux compétences de l'Union européenne en matière de marché intérieur et de concurrence. Ceci lui permet de justifier son intervention dans un domaine, l'énergie, longtemps considéré comme relevant des États membres. Ce cadrage a rencontré un certain succès sur le plan institutionnel et il est maintenant largement admis par les gouvernements nationaux. À partir d'une comparaison des cas allemand et polonais, il est toutefois démontré que son effectivité relève principalement de son caractère hétéroclite combinant le vocabulaire du libéralisme avec les préoccupations géopolitiques et environnementales. Cette stratégie a ses limites puisque l'hétérogénéité des interprétations met à jour les contradictions internes du cadre, ce qui fait obstacle à sa mise en œuvre. Il convient de s'interroger sur les conditions institutionnelles et structurelles qui expliquent l'échec ou la réussite des processus de cadrage.

I argue that two factors explain transatlantic differences in the framing of energy security. First, the institutional structures of the EU and NAFTA diverge: whereas the former enjoys highly institutionalized, regulatory competencies, the latter is loosely institutionalized and market-driven. Second, the nature of dependence in these two free trade agreements differs: NAFTA is characterized by a hegemonic power approach that ensures security of supply for the US and security of demand for Canada. In contrast, energy security for the EU is both an external problem of dependence and an internal power game with regard to authority distribution in the energy policy sector. Three key dimensions of energy security are examined in developing this argument: competition, climate change, and external relations. For each dimension, I argue that both institutional factors and the nature of energy dependence need to be taken into account to understand how energy security is framed. More specifically, I show that the EU's exclusive supranational competence in competition policy and shared (with the member-states) competence in environmental policy help explain why energy security has been framed as a liberalization and environmental issue. Adapted from the source document.

The European Union establishes external relations with third countries in different ways. Network governance is considered as an organisational opening that provides for more cooperative flexibility and inclusion. In this article, I examine to what extent network governance enables Switzerland's inclusion in the European energy sector. I argue that, as the network governance of EU energy policy becomes more institutionalized – from the regulatory forums of Florence and Madrid to the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) – Switzerland tends to be excluded. I further argue that this lack of political inclusion is partly compensated by patterns of market governance that favor Swiss firms. Neither network nor market governance, however, is a sufficient form of coordination and traditional options such as bilateral agreements (electricity) and autonomous adaptation (gas) seem inevitable.

The European Union establishes external relations with third countries in different ways. Network governance is considered as an organisational opening that provides for more cooperative flexibility and inclusion. In this article, I examine to what extent network governance enables Switzerland's inclusion in the European energy sector. I argue that, as the network governance of EU energy policy becomes more institutionalized -- from the regulatory forums of Florence and Madrid to the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) -- Switzerland tends to be excluded. I further argue that this lack of political inclusion is partly compensated by patterns of market governance that favor Swiss firms. Neither network nor market governance, however, is a sufficient form of coordination and traditional options such as bilateral agreements (electricity) and autonomous adaptation (gas) seem inevitable. Adapted from the source document.

This article explores the paradox of constructive ambiguity. Based on a focused, longitudinal comparison of the European Union's energy and defence policies, it analyses the role played by strategies of ambiguity in European integration. Ambiguity is found to be an attractive strategy for political entrepreneurs when member state preferences are heterogeneous and the EU's legal basis is weak. It is likely to be effective, however, only if it is embedded in an institutional opportunity structure -- that is, a formal-legal context -- that entrepreneurs can fold into their strategic repertoire of ideas. While ambiguity can be strategic in circumstances where clarity would create strong opposition, it is not sufficient to entrench a European policy if it does not rest on an institutional basis. This suggests that European political entrepreneurs should be wary of relying on coalition building by ambiguity only. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract. In the actor–centered institutionalist approach of Fritz Scharpf (1997), 'actorconstellations' constitute the crucial link between substantive policy analysis and interactionoriented policy research. This paper presents an attempt to conceptualize the 'actor constellation' in a given policy domain and to analyze it empirically with network analysis. The empirical context is provided by the Swiss energy policy elite in the late 1990s— an example of a policy domain in transition between two policy equilibria. Based on interviews with 240 of the core actors in this policy elite, the results show a characteristic antagonism between a pro–ecology and a pro–growth coalition. On the national level, the two coalitions are of comparable size and power, which explains the current impasse in the policy domain in question. Moreover, in a federalist state like Switzerland, the energy policy elite is not concentrated at the center, but the basic antagonism is reproduced in each region nationwide. Confirming the consensus character of Swiss politics, the different components of the two antagonist coalitions not only cooperate within, but also across coalitions. These cooperative ties and the presence of honest brokers, policy enterpreneurs, and heterogeneous interests within eachm coalition provide opportunities for new alliances, which may lead out of the current impasse in the more or less near future.