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Empirical research on donor behavior infers from donations being negatively related to overhead ratios (or indicators based on these ratios) that donors give more to more "efficient" organizations. This relation is proved to be at least partly driven by a purely mechanical link between donations and overhead ratios, which therefore should be isolated when studying empirically the behavioral effect of overhead ratio–based indicators on donors' giving decisions.

AbstractThe economics‐based theoretical and related empirical literature on the governance of nonprofit organizations is brought together and integrated in a way easily accessible for noneconomists. This literature is scattered in academic journals covering economics, health economics, management, and accounting, and in the more nonprofit‐geared research publications. After defining corporate governance, I present in a nontechnical way the most appropriate economic framework for studying governance problems: the principal‐agent theory. Most of the economic literature deals with the role and influence of the board and its relation to the organization's management and performance. This is reflected in the article's structure. The board's functioning, composition, and committee structure are first discussed, followed by a review of the literature on incentive‐based remuneration schemes, disclosure of financial information, and the use of debt to mitigate agency problems between the board and management. The literature dealing with donors and subsidizing authorities in governance relations is then presented. The article concludes with a number of practical implications of the scholarly obtained results to date, as well as some suggestions for further theoretical and empirical research.

An agency based economic theory of non profit accounting and auditing is presented, resulting in thirteen empirically testable hypotheses on their presence, nature and quality. The central agency relation analysed is the board–management relation.

The contribution of Kingma (1993) to NPO theory is discussed and enlarged. Portfolio theory in interaction with utility theory is shown to be a very useful instrument to model nonprofit organization (NPO) financing. Furthermore, it is suggested that portfolio theory is partially useful to model the NPO investment decision. Some essential elements of such a theory are presented.

ABSTRACTThe majority of research concentrates exclusively on the objectives of governments, profit entities or non‐profit organizations, while a significant number of organizations are hybrids. One form of these hybrids is the social enterprise. This paper theoretically describes social enterprises taking into consideration their main aims. Based on the 'earned income' school of thought, the principal‐agent theory and considering the nature of social enterprises' activities we propose the objective functions of their owners (principals) and managers (agents). The maximization problem of the social enterprise is defined as the weighted average of the utilities of two groups of stakeholders who have an influence on the degree of the realization of the social mission and business orientations. We point out the direction which social enterprises should follow in order to obtain the highest value of their objective functions. The desired state for social enterprises should be one in which they reinvest all surpluses in the process of their mission realization and their profit is slightly higher than the required level by the principal's contract.

Empirical research in the literature on accountability of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) toward their beneficiaries is scarce, and the available studies have a number of limitations. Our study attempts to overcome some of them and focuses on one specific component of accountability toward beneficiaries: beneficiary impact on organizational decision making and output. Data were collected by surveying general managers of 790 Belgian NPOs in fourteen industries. Results show that most NPOs implement some mechanisms to involve beneficiaries and their representatives in organizational policy making, mechanisms that vary between and within industries. Despite the existence of such mechanisms, their perceived association with impact on policy making and associated potential organizational effects is weak, though positive.

In the first international study of this kind, we analyze the capital structure of 364 nongovernmental development organizations (NGDOs) from three different countries: Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom. We observe lower debt ratio values in the United Kingdom, and significant differences between countries were found by testing an econometric model with the five classical determinants of leverage, considering total debt and both long‐ and short‐term debt. We find support for the pecking order theory, and we broadly discuss some possible reasons for the obtained differences.

In the present security environment, the capabilities of the European defense industry and the impact of restructuring over the years have become issues of concern. Researchers have found considerable consolidation when looking at the overall industry, but have failed to consider that this might understate the loss of national capabilities in subsectors. This article investigates the effect that restructuring has had on twenty subsectors of the defense industry in thirty one European countries from 1960 to 2022. It finds that since the 1960s, the number of major European defense firms has contracted by between 29% and 80% across subsectors, implying the loss of a range of capabilities. It suggests that while Europeanization is inevitable, it is likely be accompanied by further diminishing capabilities at the national level.