Search results

We study the relationship between trust and vaccination. We show theoretically that vaccination rates are higher in countries with more transparent and accountable governments. The mechanism that generates this result is the lower probability of a transparent and accountable government to promote an unsafe vaccine. Empirical evidence supports this result. We find that countries perceived as less corrupt and more liberal experience higher vaccination rates. Furthermore, they are less likely to adopt a mandatory vaccination policy. One unit of the Corruption Perception Index (scaled from 0 to 10) is associated with a vaccination rate that is higher by one percentage point (pp) but with a likelihood of compulsory vaccination that is lower by 10 pp. In addition, Google Trends data show that public interest in corruption is correlated with interest in vaccination. The insight from our analysis is that corruption affects not only the supply but also the demand for public services.

We study the relationship between trust and vaccination. We show theoretically that vaccination rates are higher in countries with more transparent and accountable governments. The mechanism that generates this result is the lower probability of a transparent and accountable government to promote an unsafe vaccine. Empirical evidence supports this result. We find that countries perceived as less corrupt and more liberal experience higher vaccination rates. Furthermore, they are less likely to adopt a mandatory vaccination policy. One unit of the Corruption Perception Index (scaled from 0 to 10) is associated with a vaccination rate that is higher by one percentage point (pp) but with a likelihood of compulsory vaccination that is lower by 10 pp. In addition, Google Trends data show that public interest in corruption is correlated with interest in vaccination. The insight from our analysis is that corruption affects not only the supply but also the demand for public services.

In this article, we empirically study the survival of the ruling party in parliamentary democracies using a hazard rate model. We define survival of a crisis as being successful in a critical vote in the parliament. We develop a general probabilistic model of political crises and test it empirically. We find that during crises, parties in the parliament are likely to vote independently of each other. Thus, we receive as an empirical result what the previous voting power literature assumed.

Abstract
Why do some couples marry, while others prefer cohabitation? The proposed model does not assume utility differences between these two states but assumes separation frictions in marriage and not in cohabitation. We show that high expectations from the relationship lead to marriage even though the utility is drawn from the same distribution as in cohabitation. Moreover, mutual agreement on marriage may take place when the expected utility in partnership is both a private and a common knowledge, although for different sets of expected utility values. Surprisingly, when the expected utility is relatively low, marriage may take place only in the common knowledge environment.

Altres ajuts: COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice ; This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1-5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.

This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1-5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.

Abstract
This article deals with circumstances leading to the dismissal of a soccer coach. It is based on the performance of the top four professional soccer leagues in England over the past 12 years. We find that dismissals of coaches take place after losses, but not after draws. This is true even when the draw is disappointing and was unexpected. The scoring method in soccer leagues is biased in favor of wins, but we find that dismissals are linked with losses. The present article questions whether the aim of a dismissal is in line with the objective function of maximizing a soccer club's league points.
JEL classifications: Z22, Z20, J50
Keywords: Soccer Coach, Risk Aversion, Performance, Dismissal