Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004–2017) was an unprecedented effort of Latin American peacekeeping. Nine countries contributed the majority of troops to the mission in which regional governments sought to handle a security crisis in their neighbourhood rather than leaving the lead to western countries. However, when the mission came to an end after thirteen years, peacekeeping faded from the regional and national security agendas, with the exception of Uruguay. How and why did MINUSTAH impact the region's current hesitation to engage in peace operations? To answer this question, the article draws on assemblage theory and uses data from policy documents, academic literature and previous research on peacekeeping in Latin America. I argue that contrary to what Latin America's current, limited peacekeeping engagement suggests, MINUSTAH produced significant changes in the region's political landscape. While these could have paved the way to greater involvement in peace operations, however, parallel developments shaped Latin American security policies and military planning at the expense of the region's future participation in UN peacekeeping. The article adds to existing scholarship by probing the conditions that drive the temporality of assemblages and provides a new perspective on Latin American peacekeeping.

This article is concerned with narratives about the relation between the military and civilians. Narratives, dominant institutionalized discourses, influence how individuals learn by providing frames of reference which moderate the acquisition of new knowledge. Although the importance of narratives for institutional behavior has been recognized in the field of security studies, little attention has been paid to how they influence learning. This article presents a framework to analyze narratives in the context of learning based on the case of peace operations. Using qualitative case studies for theory-building, I argue that narratives on the closeness between the military and "the people" ease pressures to improve the military's engagement with civilians and render peacekeepers less inclined to learn. All else equal, the absence of entrenched ideas about military–society relations facilitates the acquisition of new knowledge and skills in civil–military cooperation.

It is widely recognized that UN peace operations have been critically influenced by their leadership personnel in the field since the first UN peacekeepers were deployed in 1948. But who exactly are the people that lead peace operations and decide how these are implemented on the ground? This special data feature introduces a new dataset on leadership positions in UN peace operations from its interception in 1948 up to 2019. The relevance of different authorities in peace operations is discussed, followed by an examination of general trends in the data with regards to the duration of term in different leadership positions, the national and regional origin of peace operations authorities, and the distribution of gender. It is shown that scholars studying a variety of topics, including policymaking at the UN, the use of force in peace operations, international responsibilities, and the role of the global south in international politics, can benefit from paying closer attention to the question of who occupies leadership positions in UN peace operations.

It is widely recognized that UN peace operations have been critically influenced by their leadership personnel in the field since the first UN peacekeepers were deployed in 1948. But who exactly are the people that lead peace operations and decide how these are implemented on the ground? This special data feature introduces a new dataset on leadership positions in UN peace operations from its interception in 1948 up to 2019. The relevance of different authorities in peace operations is discussed, followed by an examination of general trends in the data with regards to the duration of term in different leadership positions, the national and regional origin of peace operations authorities, and the distribution of gender. It is shown that scholars studying a variety of topics, including policymaking at the UN, the use of force in peace operations, international responsibilities, and the role of the global south in international politics, can benefit from paying closer attention to the question of who occupies leadership positions in UN peace operations.

This article is concerned with narratives about the relation between the military and civilians. Narratives, dominant institutionalized discourses, influence how individuals learn by providing frames of reference which moderate the acquisition of new knowledge. Although the importance of narratives for institutional behavior has been recognized in the field of security studies, little attention has been paid to how they influence learning. This article presents a framework to analyze narratives in the context of learning based on the case of peace operations. Using qualitative case studies for theory-building, I argue that narratives on the closeness between the military and "the people" ease pressures to improve the military's engagement with civilians and render peacekeepers less inclined to learn. All else equal, the absence of entrenched ideas about military–society relations facilitates the acquisition of new knowledge and skills in civil–military cooperation.

En todo el mundo las Fuerzas Armadas siguen teniendo dificultades para integrar y retener a las mujeres en sus organizaciones. Aunque Chile no es una excepción, el conocimiento sobre las experiencias de las mujeres militares es escaso. Este trabajo se basa en entrevistas realizadas a oficiales femeninos para analizar los obstáculos que ellas identifican en su vida profesional y que pueden influir en su decisión de permanecer o no en las Fuerzas Armadas. Específicamente se abor- dan tres grupos de factores que pueden influir negativamente en la experiencia laboral que tienen las mujeres en base de género: factores relacionados con el desarrollo profesional, con el entorno laboral y con la vida personal. Se demuestra que las oficiales enfrentan problemas que no tienden a enfrentar sus pares masculinos o que estos enfrentan de forma distinta. En base a las limitaciones identificadas se presentan recomendaciones prácticas que apuntan a disminuir la brecha de gé- nero en las Fuerzas Armadas.

Across the world, the Armed Forces continue to have difficulties to integrate and retain women in their organizations. Although Chile is not an exception in this regard, existing knowledge about the experience of military women is scarce. This study is based on interviews with female officers in order to analyse the obstacles that they identify in their daily professional life and that may influence their decision to remain in the Armed Forces. Specifically, the article addresses three groups of factors that can negatively influence the work experience of women based on gender: factors related to professional development, work environment and personal life. It will be shown that female officers face problems that their male peers generally do not face, or experience differently. Based on the shortcomings identified, the article presents practical recommendations to reduce the gender gap in the Armed Forces. ; En todo el mundo las Fuerzas Armadas siguen teniendo dificultades para integrar y retener a las mujeres en sus organizaciones. Aunque Chile no es una excepción, el conocimiento sobre las experiencias de las mujeres militares es escaso. Este trabajo se basa en entrevistas realizadas a oficiales femeninos para analizar los obstáculos que ellas identifican en su vida profesional y que pueden influir en su decisión de permanecer o no en las Fuerzas Armadas. Específicamente se abor- dan tres grupos de factores que pueden influir negativamente en la experiencia laboral que tienen las mujeres en base de género: factores relacionados con el desarrollo profesional, con el entorno laboral y con la vida personal. Se demuestra que las oficiales enfrentan problemas que no tienden a enfrentar sus pares masculinos o que estos enfrentan de forma distinta. En base a las limitaciones identificadas se presentan recomendaciones prácticas que apuntan a disminuir la brecha de gé- nero en las Fuerzas Armadas. ; Em todo o mundo, as Forças Armadas continuam enfrentando dificuldades na integração e permanência das ...

Generalmente se supone que la participación en operaciones de paz aumenta la capacidad de las fuerzas armadas para interactuar con distintos actores civiles. Este documento presenta evidencia del caso de la participación de las Fuerzas Armadas de Chile en el mantenimiento de la paz, principalmente la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en Haití (MINUSTAH, 2004-2017). En base de un estudio cualitativo, se evalúa si las operaciones de paz tuvieron efectos a través de procesos de aprendizaje institucionalizados o individuales. La evidencia demuestra que la participación en operaciones de paz condujo a distintos aprendizajes en las personas individualmente. No obstante, estas lecciones tuvieron una trascendencia limitada en el conjunto de la institución militar. En conclusión, las operaciones de paz no han conducido a cambios fundamentales en la auto-percepción de las Fuerzas Armadas chilenas de su función frente a los actores civiles.

Chile often portrays itself as Latin America's bridge to Asia, where the ASEAN countries have been singled out as its new priority. Yet, it is not difficult to see that Chile, a small and peripheral state, does not actually serve as a gateway between Latin America and Southeast Asia. This article argues that Chile has lacked consistency in its approach toward Southeast Asia as well as focus of purpose to become a bridge‐builder due to the structural constraints faced by a small state. Based on an analytical framework of small states' foreign policies, I revisit Chile's relations with Southeast Asia, pointing to factors driving and limiting deeper engagement with the distant region. The analysis shows that a risk‐adverse, low‐profile approach of tactical maneuvering has served Chile's objectives even though it is insufficient to bridge the Pacific Ocean. The article concludes with a reflection on this trans‐Pacific relationship.

The conflicts in the South China Sea have come to dominate debates on Southeast Asian security and specifically on how boundary disputes have been managed within the region. Yet, the case is not necessarily exemplary for the way Southeast Asian countries have dealt with territorial disputes generally. The article gathers three common perceptions about conflict management that are strongly informed by the South China Sea case, but have lesser relevance when looking at other territorial conflicts in the region. I offer a critical reading of the who, why, and how of territorial conflict management and provide tentative guidelines on what to expect in the future.

Armed conflict between states in Southeast Asia has been relatively rare, especially since 1979. The most recent exception to this pattern was a border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand that turned violent in 2008 and remained militarized for more than three years. Existing studies of this long-standing conflict have concentrated on explaining the upsurge in violence between 2008 and 2011, but have tended to ignore that fighting was quickly contained each time clashes occurred. This article provides a different perspective and asks how the dispute was managed short of large-scale armed violence. To answer this question, the author adopts an agency-focused perspective that emphasizes the role of critical actors who worked to de-escalate the conflict. Based on field research conducted in Cambodia and Thailand, as well as consulting primary and secondary sources, the author adopts a historical narrative that revisits critical periods from the 1950s onwards and argues that relevant actors in both Cambodia and Thailand had long-standing incentives to avoid escalating the conflict. Two elements were critical: first, crucial actors including Cambodian and Thai bureaucrats, diplomats and members of the security and intelligence services developed an understanding of the problems inherent in defining their land border; and second, the establishment of personal contacts, even in the context of antagonistic relations. Together, these factors created possibilities for Cambodia and Thailand to cooperate in managing conflict and increased the willingness of both sides to exercise self-restraint. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)