Suchergebnisse

Part 1: Invited Paper ; International audience ; The computer security community has traditionally regarded security as a "hard" property that can be modelled and formally proven under certain simplifying assumptions. Traditional security technologies assume that computer users are either malicious, e.g. hackers or spies, or benevolent, competent and well informed about the security policies. Over the past two decades, however, computing has proliferated into all aspects of modern society and the spread of malicious software (malware) like worms, viruses and botnets have become an increasing threat. This development indicates a failure in some of the fundamental assumptions that underpin existing computer security technologies and that a new view of computer security is long overdue.In this paper, we examine traditionalmodels, policies and mechanisms of computer security in order to identify areas where the fundamental assumptions may fail. In particular, we identify areas where the "hard" security properties are based on trust in the different agents in the system and certain external agents who enforce the legislative and contractual frameworks.Trust is generally considered a "soft" security property, so building a "hard" security mechanism on trust will at most give a spongy result, unless the underlying trust assumptions are made first class citizens of the security model. In most of the work in computer security, trust assumptions are implicit and they will surely fail when the environment of the systems change, e.g. when systems are used on a global scale on the Internet. We argue that making such assumptions about trust explicit is an essential requirement for the future of system security and argue why the formalisation of computational trust is necessary when we wish to reason about system security

AbstractReplication alone does not yield a smooth constant-returns-to-scale production function as those usually assumed in the literature. However, such a function arises endogenously with replication, driven by profit-maximization, if the efficiency of the underlying production process varies with the intensity it is operated at, and reaches a maximum at a stationary point. The result applies when the number of production processes must be discrete, thus overcoming the so-called integer problem. When inputs are non-rival, public goods or generated by externalities, replication can lead to increasing or decreasing returns to scale.

ABSTRACTWhile a delay between the publication and implementation of a policy can make the time‐consistent solution capture the expectational effects that make commitment superior to discretion, this comes at the cost of a suboptimal present‐period policy. This cost is larger the longer the delay, and the more extreme the prevailing conditions, making the optimal duration of an implementation delay vary over time as initial conditions change. Therefore, we integrate over these to choose the implementation delay that will do best on average. The optimal delay is usually of intermediate length, balancing commitment gains with the loss of responsiveness to contemporary needs.

With 27 member states using a variety of administrative practices and institutions to implement European Union (EU) policy, the EU has been widely used as a natural laboratory for analyzing administrative politics and institutions. This research has largely focused on the institutional relationships as they are at the time of the analysis. However, the EU has used several legislative procedures. Furthermore, there has been little attention given to the administrative and delegatory consequences of changes in the EU's legislative procedures. This article examines how legislative institutions' preferences for limits to the implementing discretion of the Commission and the member states have changed with the shift from the cooperation procedure to the codecision procedure. I find that the European Parliament (EP) responded to the codecision procedure by increasing the share of its amendments that expand the implementing discretion of member states. Furthermore, the Council significantly changed its attitude toward EP amendments restricting Commission discretion. Adapted from the source document.

This article shows that member state governments' ability rather than their willingness to implement directives drives uneven implementation of European Union labor policy. Analysis of 186 labor policy infringement cases against 15 member states between 1978 and 2000 shows that administrative oversight mechanisms that concentrate authority in the hands of government and exclude interest group participation enhance governments' ability to resolve conflicts with the Commission over implementation. Mechanisms that depend on cooperation with interest groups inhibit the resolution of these conflicts. This finding undermines the common prescription that increasing interest group involvement should improve member state governments' implementation of EU laws.

Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience and are tested with data from the U.S. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that "police patrol" mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideological range of their governments. "Deck stacking" mechanisms appear in countries that experience greater problems with gridlock measured in the same way.

Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience & are tested with data from the US. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that "police patrol" mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideological range of their governments. "Deck stacking" mechanisms appear in countries that experience greater problems with gridlock measured in the same way. 5 Tables, 4 Figures, 61 References. Adapted from the source document.