Suchergebnisse

The Institute for Methods Innovation – a research charity registered in the United States and United Kingdom – was commissioned by the Australian Research Data Commons (ARDC) to investigate how research data contributes to non-academic impacts by analysing existing case studies from the Australia Research Council (ARC) Engagement and Impact Assessment 2018. This represented a second phase to this work on the impacts of research data, with the first phase focusing on United Kingdom Research Excellence Framework (REF) impact case studies (ref.ac.uk). Project overview The research involved analysing impact cases from the ARC's Engagement and Impact Assessment 2018. Only high scoring cases have currently been published by the ARC. These cases were sifted for the present research to focus our analysis on cases with an emphasis on 'data'. Relevant text segments from the published engagement and impact (E&I) case studies were extracted from the E&I case study documents. A content analysis was conducted on these data to identify patterns linking research data and impact. This analysis achieved a high level of scientific quality, based on established methodological standards. What type of impact was developed from Australian research data? The most prevalent type of research data-driven impact was Practice impact (44%). This category of impact includes changing the ways professionals operate and improving the quality of products or services through better methods, technologies, and responses to issues through better understanding. It also includes changing organisational culture and improving workplace productivity or outcomes. Government impacts were the next most prevalent category identified in this research (20%). These impacts include the introduction of new policies and changes to existing policies, as well as reducing the cost to deliver government services, enhancing the effectiveness or efficiency of government services and operations, and more efficient to government planning. Other relatively common ...

This study examines the production and content of press coverage of therapeutic cloning in the United States and Britain. The sample includes 5,128 news articles, as well as qualitative interviews with journalists who covered this science story. This article identifies variations in the valence, relative distribution, and quality of the hype found across the US, UK tabloid, and elite UK press samples. A dialectic of hope and fear is identified in the sampled press content and explained by the journalist interviews. Moreover, scientific hype emerges from the shared economic imperatives and concomitant news values defining American and British journalism.

The issue of human cloning has featured in the national science policy agendas in both the United States and the United Kingdom since the announcement in 1997 of Dolly the cloned sheep's birth in Scotland. Such news stories suggesting the imminent cloning of humans have inspired fictional entertainment media over the years, including numerous popular films. Study 1 examines elite British press coverage of human cloning from 1997 to 2004 (n = 857). Study 2 focuses on five human cloning films released between 1978 and 2003. Two sharply divergent discourses emerged from these data. Unqualified hope and habitually hyped claims of future cures permeated the press discourse. In contrast, the films constructed human cloning as an inherently dangerous technology often wielded by hubristic scientists in the tradition of Frankenstein. Both the predominately positive hype in the broadsheet press and the largely negative hype in the films indicate an impoverished and "thin" public debate on the issue of human cloning.

One of the most intriguing and important discussions in international law is the potential impact of emerging technologies on the law of armed conflict (LOAC), including weapons that incorporate machine learning and/or artificial intelligence. Because one of the likely characteristics of these advanced weapons would be the ability to make decisions implicating life and death on the battlefield, these discussions have highlighted a fundamental question concerning the LOAC: Does the law regulating armed conflict require human input in selecting and engaging targets or can that decision be made without human input? This article analyzes views expressed by scholars and NGOs, but focuses on views expressed by States, many of which have been publicized as part of the discussions of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. These differing State views make clear that States have not yet come to a consensus on the legal requirement of human decision making for LOAC compliance. Given that lack of consensus, one can only conclude that the law does not currently require a human decision for selecting and engaging targets. Indeed, though the international community may come to such a decision, it has not yet done so. Accordingly, States should continue to research and develop weapons that incorporate machine learning and artificial intelligence because such weapons offer the promise of not only greater LOAC compliance, but also increased opportunities to provide new and creative protections.

Already a controversial topic, legal debate and broader discussions concerning the amount of human control required in the employment of autonomous weapons—including autonomous cyber capabilities—continues. These discussions, particularly those taking place among States that are Parties to the 1980 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, reveal a complete lack of consensus on the requirement of human control and serve to distract from the more important question with respect to autonomy in armed conflict: under what conditions could autonomous weapons "select" and "attack" targets in a manner that complies with the law of armed conflict (LOAC). This article analyzes the specific LOAC rules on precautions in attack, as codified in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, and asserts that these rules do not require human judgment in targeting decisions. Rather, these rules prescribe a particular analysis that must be completed by those who plan or decide upon an attack prior to exercising force, including decisions made by autonomous systems without meaningful human control. To the extent that autonomous weapons and weapons systems using autonomous functions can be designed and employed in such a way to comply with all required precautions, they would not violate the LOAC. A key feature of determining the ability of autonomous weapons and weapons systems using autonomous functions to meet these requirements must be a rigorous weapons review process.

AbstractThe conduct of hostilities in urban areas is inherently difficult, particularly with respect to the protection of civilians. International humanitarian law places restraints on both attackers and defenders. While much is written about the obligations of attackers with respect to protecting civilians, much less attention has been paid to the defender's obligations. These obligations are routinely referred to as "passive precautions" or "precautions against the effects of attacks" and are codified in Article 58 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 58 requires parties, "to the maximum extent feasible", to remove civilians and civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives, to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas, and to take other necessary precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects from the dangers resulting from military operations.Even though they are limited by only requiring those actions which are feasible, the obligations placed on the defender are far from trivial and, if applied in good faith, would certainly provide much needed protections to civilians in armed conflict, particularly in times of urban conflict. However, this ever-increasing urbanization is creating significant pressure on the doctrine of precautions in defence, stretching the "feasibility" standard beyond its capacity to adequately protect civilians. On the other hand, the emergence of advanced technology provides a mechanism for defenders to more easily and more fully comply with their obligations to segregate or protect the civilian population.For the customary obligation of "precautions against the effects of attacks" to maintain its effectiveness, particularly in urban areas of conflict, the understanding of feasibility and what is "practicable" in current urbanized armed conflicts will have to expand, increasing the practical responsibilities on the defender, including through the use of modern technology. Moreover, imposing criminal responsibility when appropriate and feasible precautions are not taken will rectify the perceived imbalance between the responsibilities of the attacker and those of the defender.