Suchergebnisse

Weber and Durkheim: A methodological comparison is a systematic, comparative analysis of the methodologies of Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. Jensen shows how Weber and Durkheim analyse Protestants and Catholics in practice in The Protestant Ethic and Suicide, respectively. The very different ways that Weber and Durkheim carry out their analyses are then used to describe, analyse and contrast their methodological principles and points of view, raising fundamental questions in sociological and social science analysis, such as:What constitutes the object of sociology? How are concepts developed? W

This title provides a systematic, comparative analysis of the methodologies of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Jensen shows how Weber and Durkheim analyse Protestants and Catholics in practice in 'The Protestant Ethic' and 'Suicide' respectively.

According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forwardlooking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy intentions, thereby making current inflation more responsive to policy actions. This induces the central bank to pay more attention to inflation rather than output gap stabilization. Then, transparency may be disadvantageous. It may actually be a policy-distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys low-inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy.

Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen, Jørgen Albæk Jensen, Peter Bjerre Mortensen og Helene Helboe Pedersen: Når embedsmænd lovgiver. København: DJØF Forlag, 2020, 239 sider, 285 kr. (anmeldt af Henrik Jensen)

Frances Lee, Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign. The University of Chicago Press, 2016 (anmeldt af Henrik Jensen)

Mark Wickham-Jones, Whatever Happened to Party Government? Controversies in American Political Science. University of Michigan Press, 2018 (anmeldt af Henrik Jensen)

David Mayhew, The Imprint of Congress. Yale University Press, 2017 (anmeldt af Henrik S. Jensen)

Richard F. Fenno, The Challenge of Congressional Representation, Cambridge/London, 2013 (anmeldt af Henrik Jensen)

Lanny W. Martin og Georg Vanberg, Parliaments and Coalitions. The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance. ECPR/Oxford University Press, 2011 (anmeldt af Henrik Jensen)

Within a simple New Keynesian model emphasizing forward-looking behavior of private agents, I evaluate optimal nominal income growth targeting versus optimal inflation targeting. When the economy is mainly subject to shocks that do not involve monetary policy trade-offs for society, inflation targeting is preferable. Otherwise, nominal income growth targeting may be superior because it induces inertial policy making, which improves the inflation–output-gap trade-off. Somewhat paradoxically, inflation targeting may be relatively less favorable the more society dislikes inflation, and the more persistent are the effects of inflation-generating shocks.

According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forwardlooking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy intentions, thereby making current inflation more responsive to policy actions. This induces the central bank to pay more attention to inflation rather than output gap stabilization. Then, transparency may be disadvantageous. It may actually be a policy-distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys low-inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy. ; Den meisten Akademikern und politischen Entscheidungsträgern zufolge ist Transparenz in der Geldpolitik wünschenswert. Ich untersuche diese Behauptung anhand eines kleinen theoretischen Models, das das vorausschauende Verhalten des privaten Sektors hervorhebt. Transparenz erleichtert es denjenigen, die Preise festsetzen, auf die künftigen geldpolitischen Absichten der Zentralbank zu schließen, wodurch die laufende Inflation stärker auf stabilitätspolitische Maßnahmen reagiert. Dies führt dazu, dass die Zentralbank sich eher auf die Inflation als auf die Stabilisierung der Produktionslücke konzentriert. In diesem Fall kann Transparenz negative Folgen haben. Sie kann sich sogar als eine die Geldpolitik verzerrende Zwangsjacke herausstellen, wenn die Zentralbank sich stabilitätspolitischer Glaubwürdigkeit erfreut und eine aktive monetäre Stabilisierungspolitik benötigt wird.