Suchergebnisse

Denne artikel handler om, hvordan cybervåben giver småstater en række nye strategiske muligheder. Den forklarer først, hvorfor der ikke er megen hjælp at hente i den eksisterende forskningslitteratur. Artiklen gennemgår derefter en række generelle karakteristika for cybervåben ét ad gangen og beskrive hvad de betyder for småstater generelt og Danmark specifikt. Det konkluderes, at cybervåben delvist ændrer balancen mellem småstater og stormagter i småstaternes favør. Men der er grænser for de muligheder, våbnene åbner. Særligt for småstater, der som Danmark knytter deres sikkerhedspolitik snævert til medlemskab af en militær alliance som NATO. Cybervåben er vanskeligere at anvende i NATO end konventionelle våben både på det strategiske og operative niveau – og især hvis vi ikke er i krig. Det er derfor måske ikke overraskende, at det stadig ikke er helt klart, hvordan Danmark vil anvende disse våben – særligt i fredstid.

Siden 2003 har regeringerne i Norge, Danmark, Sverige, Finland og Island arbejdet med at udvikle og implementere nationale strategier for cyber- og informationssikkerhed. Strategierne omfatter mange forskellige områder; f.eks. institutionel kapacitetsopbygning, uddannelses- og forsvarspolitik, internationalt samarbejde etc. Denne artikel skitserer landenes forskellige strategier per august 20181 for statens rolle i samfundets cyberresiliens, dvs. de kritiske samfundsfunktioners evne til at modstå og overkomme negative effekter af hændelser med udspring i cyberdomænet. Endvidere skitserer artiklen de udfordringer, som regeringerne har konstateret, at opgavefordeling og ansvarsplacering har givet, samt hvordan implementeringerne af strategierne reflekterer disse erkendelser. Her har den finske regering vist sig mest konsekvent ved at placere ansvaret for implementeringen af cyberresiliens centralt i en magtfuld organisation og udstyre den med konkrete styringsredskaber og en stor, velintegreret kontaktflade til den private del af Finlands kritiske infrastruktur.
Abstract in English
Since 2003, the governments of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland have developed and implemented national strategies for cyber and information security. The strategies include several topics such as organisational and human resource capacity building, defence policy, international cooperation, etc. This article gives a thumbnail sketch of the countries' strategies for the state's role in societal cyber resiliens (the ability to resist and overcome negative effects of events emanating from the cyber domain). It then shortly describes the experienced challenges with distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and how the implementation of the strategies reflect attempts to overcome them. It concludes that the Finnish government has gone furthest by placing responsibility for implementation centrally in an influential organisation and giving it a centrally developed common matrix for assessing progress and a well-established formal network within the private segment of Finland's critical infrastructure.

Mikkel Storm Jensen ser på truslerne fra cyperspace.

Over the last two decades the state's traditional duty to defend its citizens against threats has been extended to a new man-made domain: the cyber domain. As part of this defence states have created systems for establishing a level of preparedness in order to ensure societies' resilience. 'Resilience' in this regard describes societal robustness – not only to deflect outside pressure, but also to absorb its effects and constantly adapt to changing conditions by collecting knowledge of negative events, learning from it and implementing the experience. Denmark's cyber resilience plays an increasing role, as digitisation has meant that threats in the cyber domain have changed from peripheral nuisances to questions of national security. Hence, the Danish government has initiated the development of a new strategy for cyber and information security. Also, Denmark has committed to implementing the EU NIS Directive concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information. This report focusses on those governmental aspects of the strategy that play a role in Denmark's resilience against cyber threats. The report suggests that the new cyber strategy, along with the implementation of the EU NIS Directive, is an occasion to adjust the current interpretation of the sector responsibility principle. The report finds that the sector responsibility principle must remain the basic principle for governance of societal resilience in Denmark, but that adding some central authority and clarifying the division of responsibilities may overcome identified weaknesses in the current implementation of the principle.

Over the last two decades the state's traditional duty to defend its citizens against threats has been extended to a new man-made domain: the cyber domain. As part of this defence states have created systems for establishing a level of preparedness in order to ensure societies' resilience. 'Resilience' in this regard describes societal robustness – not only to deflect outside pressure, but also to absorb its effects and constantly adapt to changing conditions by collecting knowledge of negative events, learning from it and implementing the experience. Denmark's cyber resilience plays an increasing role, as digitisation has meant that threats in the cyber domain have changed from peripheral nuisances to questions of national security.Hence, the Danish government has initiated the development of a new strategy for cyber and information security. Also, Denmark has committed to implementing the EU NIS Directive concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information.This report focusses on those governmental aspects of the strategy that play a role in Denmark's resilience against cyber threats. The report suggests that the new cyber strategy, along with the implementation of the EU NIS Directive, is an occasion to adjust the current interpretation of the sector responsibility principle. The report finds that the sector responsibility principle must remain the basic principle for governance of societal resilience in Denmark, but that adding some central authority and clarifying the division of responsibilities may overcome identified weaknesses in the current implementation of the principle.

The abstract has the title: "The Cycle of Warfare - Analysis of an Analytical Model" The Cycle of Warfare is an analytical model designed to illustrate the coherence between the organization, doctrine and technology of a military entity and the influence of the surrounding society as expressed by its economic, political and ideological characteristics. With the single assumption of economic rationality in human behaviour, Cycle of Warfare is not only coherent, it is applicable to all entities engaged in competition anywhere in the world at any point in history. The Cycle of Warfare can be used both retrospectively and predictively. As a tool for historians the model can help to identify decisive factors in developments and outcomes. As a tool for intelligence analysts, it can be used predictively to identify likely possible outcomes or unknown elements in analysed entities. ; The abstract has the title: "The Cycle of Warfare - Analysis of an Analytical Model" The Cycle of Warfare is an analytical model designed to illustrate the coherence between the organization, doctrine and technology of a military entity and the influence of the surrounding society as expressed by its economic, political and ideological characteristics. With the single assumption of economic rationality in human behaviour, Cycle of Warfare is not only coherent, it is applicable to all entities engaged in competition anywhere in the world at any point in history. The Cycle of Warfare can be used both retrospectively and predictively. As a tool for historians the model can help to identify decisive factors in developments and outcomes. As a tool for intelligence analysts, it can be used predictively to identify likely possible outcomes or unknown elements in analysed entities.

Påvirkningsoperationer fra fjendtlige stater er en stigende trussel, som kræver et stående beredskab til at forebygge og imødekomme. Skiftende danske regeringer har siden 2018 valgt en minimalistisk tilgang i rammen af sektoransvarsprincippet til håndteringen af denne trussel: en task force bestående af embedsmænd fra en række ministerier støttet af Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste, som skal imødekomme denne udfordring ved siden af deres primære opgaver. Denne artikel argumenterer for, at truslen fra påvirkningsoperationer er et såkaldt wicked problem – en kompleks problemstilling, der ikke kan løses af en enkelt aktør alene, og som fordrer en mere netværksbaseret tilgang med bred inddragelse fra offentlige og private organisationer og civile borgere. Artiklen undersøger den nuværende indsats og vejer den op imod de teoretiske anbefalinger i håndteringen af komplekse problemer. Til sidst drages paralleller til Sveriges tilgang, hvor der er oprettet en organisation udelukkende dedikeret til håndtering af truslen.

Since 2018, Danish governments have considered the threat from hostile influence campaigns sufficiently significant to require a constant readiness to counter such events. Over the years, Danish governments years have taken a minimalistic approach to the complex threats: A task force consisting of civil servants from various ministries supported by the national intelligence services operating under the sectorial responsibility principle. The involved personnel, which solve the task alongside their primary portfolios, are designated as the core in ad-hoc organizations that handle the challenges depending on where they emerge. The analysis compares the Danish minimalist approach with the Swedish approach. Sweden also responds to the challenge using the sector responsibility principle, but contrary to Denmark, Sweden has established a substantial and highly profiled standing organisation with no other tasks.

Abstracts of each article