Suchergebnisse

In 1950 the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance to foster cultural and technological cooperation between the Soviet bloc and the PRC. While this treaty was intended as a break with the colonial past, Austin Jersild argues that the alliance ultimately failed because the enduring problem of Russian imperialism led to Chinese frustration with the Soviets. Jersild zeros in on the ground-level experiences of the socialist bloc advisers in China, who were involved in everything from the development of university curricula, the exploration for oil, and railway construction to piano lessons. Their goal was to reproduce a Chinese administrative elite in their own image that could serve as a valuable ally in the Soviet bloc's struggle against the United States. Interestingly, the USSR's allies in Central Europe were as frustrated by the "great power chauvinism" of the Soviet Union as was China. By exposing this aspect of the story, Jersild shows how the alliance, and finally the split, had a true international dimension. [Amazon.com] ; https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_books/1012/thumbnail.jpg

Former Soviet diplomats Iu.M. Galenovich and V.P. Fedotov remain oblivious to the significant tensions in Sino-Soviet relations during the 1950s that contributed to the Sino-Soviet split. Further, they remain unapologetic for a host of issues that plagued the relationship and continue to bother contemporary Chinese historians and commentators. Their memory of Soviet history, diplomacy, and the Sino-Soviet relationship is shaped by Russia's contemporary geopolitical consciousness about America, Russia's role in the world, and Russia's relationship to the bordering states of former imperial and Soviet space. Adapted from the source document.

THE BIGGEST PRIZE SOUGHT by the Soviet Union in its newly acquired postwar territory was the bomb itself—or initially the defense‐related industries, research specialists, and scientists in the German zone deemed useful to achieving this goal.1 The Soviets similarly made arrangements to benefit from uranium deposits in Jáchymov, Czechoslovakia, from the fall of 1945.2 The effort to develop the bomb, however, was merely the most visible expression of the Soviet state at work in what would eventually become the socialist bloc. The Soviet technical and managerial elite routinely engaged in a similar search for useful forms of industrial development and technology throughout an alliance that eventually included even distant China. Moscow was at the center of a vast project of imperial scavenging that simultaneously shaped and was shaped by the transnational nature of exchange and collaboration in the socialist bloc. These exchanges within the socialist world shaped the evolution of the bloc in the 1950s, the Sino‐Soviet relationship, and even the broader Cold War.

The Russian Empire was composed of diverse nationalities, as was the revolutionary movement that sought to overthrow it. Georgians played a prominent role in both the evolution of the empire and the revolutionary movement. Russia offered Georgians protection from nearby Islamic states, an administrative and military alliance against the enduring mountain insurgency in the North Caucasus, and institutional and intellectual resources in their historic struggle to build a nation and overcome regional fragmentation.