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Media coverage of civil wars often focuses on the most gruesome atrocities and the most extreme conflicts, which might lead one to think that all civil wars involve massive violence against civilians. In truth, many governments and rebel groups exercise restraint in their fighting, largely avoiding violence against civilians in compliance with international law. Governments and rebel groups make strategic calculations about whether to target civilians by evaluating how domestic and international audiences are likely to respond to violence. Restraint is also a deliberate strategic choice: governments and rebel groups often avoid targeting civilians and abide by international legal standards to appeal to domestic and international audiences for diplomatic support. This book presents a wide range of evidence of the strategic use of violence and restraint, using original data on violence against civilians in civil wars from 1989 to 2010 as well as in-depth analyses of conflicts in Azerbaijan, El Salvador, Indonesia, Sudan, Turkey, and Uganda

Media coverage of civil wars often focuses on the most gruesome atrocities and the most extreme conflicts, which might lead one to think that all civil wars involve massive violence against civilians. In truth, many governments and rebel groups exercise restraint in their fighting, largely avoiding violence against civilians in compliance with international law. Governments and rebel groups make strategic calculations about whether to target civilians by evaluating how domestic and international audiences are likely to respond to violence. Restraint is also a deliberate strategic choice: governments and rebel groups often avoid targeting civilians and abide by international legal standards to appeal to domestic and international audiences for diplomatic support. This book presents a wide range of evidence of the strategic use of violence and restraint, using original data on violence against civilians in civil wars from 1989 to 2010 as well as in-depth analyses of conflicts in Azerbaijan, El Salvador, Indonesia, Sudan, Turkey, and Uganda

AbstractDo rebel group violations of international humanitarian law during civil war—in particular, attacks on noncombatant civilians—affect conflict outcomes? I argue that in the post-Cold War era, rebel groups that donottarget civilians have used the framework of international humanitarian law to appeal for diplomatic support from Western governments and intergovernmental organizations. However, rebel group appeals for international diplomatic support are most likely to be effective when the rebel group can contrast its own restraint toward civilians with the government's abuses. Rebel groups that donottarget civilians in the face of government abuses, therefore, are likely to be able to translate increased international diplomatic support into more favorable conflict outcomes. Using original cross-national data on rebel group violence against civilians in all civil wars from 1989 to 2010, I show that rebel groups that exercise restraint toward civilians in the face of government violence are more likely to secure favorable conflict outcomes. I also probe the causal mechanism linking rebel group behavior to conflict outcomes, showing that when a rebel group exercises restraint toward civilians and the government commits atrocities, Western governments and intergovernmental organizations are more likely to take coercive diplomatic action against the government. The evidence shows that rebel groups can translate this increased diplomatic support into favorable political outcomes.

"Media coverage of civil wars often focuses on the most gruesome atrocities and the most extreme conflicts, which might lead one to think that all civil wars involve massive violence against civilians. In truth, many governments and rebel groups exercise restraint in their fighting, largely avoiding violence against civilians in compliance with international law. Governments and rebel groups make strategic calculations about whether to target civilians by evaluating how domestic and international audiences are likely to respond to violence. Restraint is also a deliberate strategic choice: governments and rebel groups often avoid targeting civilians and abide by international legal standards to appeal to domestic and international audiences for diplomatic support. This book presents a wide range of evidence of the strategic use of violence and restraint, using original data on violence against civilians in civil wars from 1989 to 2010 as well as in-depth analyses of conflicts in Azerbaijan, El Salvador, Indonesia, Sudan, Turkey, and Uganda"--

In nearly two-thirds of civil wars since 1989, governments have received support in their counterinsurgency operations from militias. Many scholars predict higher levels of violence in conflicts involving pro-government militias because governments are either unable or unwilling to control militias. This article challenges this view, arguing that governments can and do often control militia behavior in civil war. Governments make strategic decisions about whether to use violence against civilians, encouraging both regular military forces and militia forces to target civilians or restraining regular military forces and militia forces from attacking civilians. In some cases, however, government and militia behavior differs. When a militia recruits its members from the same constituency as the insurgents, the militia is less likely to target civilians, as doing so would mean attacking their own community. Statistical analyses, using new data on pro-government militia violence in civil wars from 1989 to 2010, support these arguments.

Early research on wartime violence against civilians highlighted a distinction between macro- and micro-level approaches. Macro-level approaches, grounded in the international relations subfield, focus on variation across countries or conflicts, while micro-level approaches, more influenced by the comparative politics subfield, focus on variation within countries or conflicts. However, some of the recent research on civilian targeting does not fit neatly into this dichotomy—such as research comparing subnational units or armed groups across conflicts or research relying on geo-referenced event data for multiple conflicts. We review the literature and advocate moving beyond the language of the micro- and macro-level divide, instead focusing on the determinants of violence against civilians at five different levels of analysis: international, domestic, subnational, organizational, and individual. While acknowledging significant advances in the field, we argue for continued research aimed at developing a more integrated theoretical understanding of the multiple actors and interactive social processes driving violence against civilians.

Abstract
Research has established links between intrastate conflict and political gains by women following war, suggesting that changes of a positive nature can emerge from the misery of war. While much of the empirical focus on conflicts' transformative effects has been on battle-related violence, we investigate whether pro-social effects are associated with two other types of violence perpetrated against civilians—one-sided violence and sexual violence. We expect that both one-sided violence and sexual violence spur mobilization, which in turn contributes to gains in women's political empowerment. Informed by feminist scholarship, we also draw attention to social and political constraints associated with high levels of sexual violence, restrictions that we argue women are unlikely to confront to a similar degree with respect to high levels of one-sided and other forms of violence. We posit that these factors will result in the attenuation of gains in women's political power in conflicts characterized by high levels of sexual violence. Using cross-national data on civil conflicts for the period 1989–2017, we find that moderate levels of sexual violence are consistently associated with gains in women's political empowerment, an effect that diminishes in conflicts marked by widespread sexual violence. One-sided violence, on the other hand, is not associated with improvements in women's political empowerment. Our results demonstrate the importance of considering the different forms of wartime violence, and the differential impacts these forms of violence have on women.​

Research has established links between intrastate conflict and political gains by women following war, suggesting that changes of a positive nature can emerge from the misery of war. While much of the empirical focus on conflicts' transformative effects has been on battle-related violence, we investigate whether pro-social effects are associated with two other types of violence perpetrated against civilians—one-sided violence and sexual violence. We expect that both one-sided violence and sexual violence spur mobilization, which in turn contributes to gains in women's political empowerment. Informed by feminist scholarship, we also draw attention to social and political constraints associated with high levels of sexual violence, restrictions that we argue women are unlikely to confront to a similar degree with respect to high levels of one-sided and other forms of violence. We posit that these factors will result in the attenuation of gains in women's political power in conflicts characterized by high levels of sexual violence. Using cross-national data on civil conflicts for the period 1989–2017, we find that moderate levels of sexual violence are consistently associated with gains in women's political empowerment, an effect that diminishes in conflicts marked by widespread sexual violence. One-sided violence, on the other hand, is not associated with improvements in women's political empowerment. Our results demonstrate the importance of considering the different forms of wartime violence, and the differential impacts these forms of violence have on women.​