Power, Institutions, and Issues as Causes of Conflict
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Power, Institutions, and Issues as Causes of Conflict" published on by Oxford University Press.
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Power, Institutions, and Issues as Causes of Conflict" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Domestic Constraints on Foreign Policy in Authoritarian Systems" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: International organization, Band 69, Heft 1, S. 163-32
ISSN: 0020-8183
In: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Why do some autocratic leaders pursue aggressive or expansionist foreign policies, while others are much more cautious in their use of military force? The first book to focus systematically on the foreign policy of different types of authoritarian regimes, Dictators at War and Peace breaks new ground in our understanding of the international behavior of dictators. Jessica L.P. Weeks explains why certain kinds of regimes are less likely to resort to war than others, why some are more likely to win the wars they start, and why some authoritarian leaders face domestic punishment for foreign policy failures whereas others can weather all but the most serious military defeat. Using novel cross-national data, Weeks looks at various nondemocratic regimes, including those of Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin; the Argentine junta at the time of the Falklands War, the military government in Japan before and during World War II, and the North Vietnamese communist regime. She finds that the differences in the conflict behavior of distinct kinds of autocracies are as great as those between democracies and dictatorships. Indeed, some types of autocracies are no more belligerent or reckless than democracies, casting doubt on the common view that democracies are more selective about war than autocracies
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 804-805
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 803-804
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: International politics reviews, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 39-41
ISSN: 2050-2990
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 2, S. 326-347
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 35-64
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 65, Heft 3, S. 811-824
ISSN: 1468-2478
How do military alliances affect public support for war to defend victims of aggression? We offer the first experimental evidence on this fundamental question. Our experiments revealed that alliance commitments greatly increased the American public's willingness to intervene abroad. Alliances shaped public opinion by increasing public fears about the reputational costs of nonintervention and by heightening the perceived moral obligation to intervene out of concerns for fairness and loyalty. Finally, although alliances swayed public opinion across a wide range of circumstances, they made the biggest difference when the costs of intervention were high, the stakes of intervention were low, and the country needing aid was not a democracy. Thus, alliances can create pressure for war even when honoring the commitment would be extremely inconvenient, which could help explain why democratic allies tend to be so reliable. These findings shed new light on the consequences of alliances and other international legal commitments, the role of morality in foreign policy, and ongoing debates about domestic audience costs.
World Affairs Online
In: American political science review, Band 114, Heft 3, S. 856-873
ISSN: 1537-5943
Foreign electoral intervention is an increasingly important tool for influencing politics in other countries, yet we know little about when citizens would tolerate or condemn foreign efforts to sway elections. In this article, we use experiments to study American public reactions to revelations of foreign electoral intervention. We find that even modest forms of intervention polarize the public along partisan lines. Americans are more likely to condemn foreign involvement, lose faith in democracy, and seek retaliation when a foreign power sides with the opposition, than when a foreign power aids their own party. At the same time, Americans reject military responses to electoral attacks on the United States, even when their own political party is targeted. Our findings suggest that electoral interference can divide and weaken an adversary without provoking the level of public demand for retaliation typically triggered by conventional military attacks.
In: American journal of political science, Band 63, Heft 1, S. 53-66
ISSN: 1540-5907
AbstractAn old adage holds that "only Nixon could go to China"; that is, hawkish leaders face fewer domestic barriers than doves when it comes to pursuing reconciliation with foreign enemies. However, empirical evidence for this proposition is mixed. In this article, we clarify competing theories, elucidate their implications for public opinion, and describe the results of a series of survey experiments designed to evaluate whether and why there is a hawk's advantage. We find that hawks are indeed better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement than doves. We also find support for two key causal mechanisms: Voters are more confident in rapprochement when it is pursued by a hawk and are more likely to view hawks who initiate conciliation as moderates. Further, the hawk's advantage persists whether conciliatory efforts end in success or failure. Our microfoundational evidence thus suggests a pronounced domestic advantage for hawks who deliver the olive branch.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 705-719
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 705-719
ISSN: 1540-5907
Study after study has found that regime type has little or no effect on states' decisions to pursue nuclear weapons. We argue, however, that conventional approaches comparing the behavior of democracies to that of nondemocracies have resulted in incorrect inferences. We disaggregate types of nondemocracies and argue that leaders of highly centralized, 'personalistic' dictatorships are particularly likely to view nuclear weapons as an attractive solution to their concerns about regime security and face fewer constraints in pursuing nuclear weapons than leaders of other types of regimes. Combining our more nuanced classification of regime type with a more theoretically appropriate empirical approach, we find that personalist regimes are substantially more likely to pursue nuclear weapons than other regime types. This finding is robust to different codings of proliferation dates and a range of modeling approaches and specifications and has significant implications for both theory and policy. Adapted from the source document.
In: American political science review, Band 107, Heft 4, S. 849-865
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online