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Introduction 1. The US Automobile Market After The 'Great Recession': Back To Business As Usual Or Birth Of A New Industry?-- Bruno Jetin 2. A Model To Follow? The Impact Of Neoliberal Policies On The British Automobile Market And Industry-- Tommaso Pardi 3. Excess Capacity Viewed As Excess Quality - The Case Of French Car Manufacturing-- Bernard Jullien 4. Income Polarisation, Rising Mobility Costs And Green Transport. Contradictory Developments On Germany's Automotive Market-- Antje Blocker And Julia Hildermeier 5. The Automobile Demand In Spain-- Holm-Detlev Kohler And Jose Pablo Calleja Jimenez 6. Japan's Automobile Market In Troubled Times-- Holger Bungsche 7. From Expansion To Mature: Turning Point Of The Korean Automotive Market-- Myeong-Kee Chung Conclusion

Global Automobile Demand is a two-volume work analysing the impact of the Great Recession and the structural factors which shape automobile demand in developed and emerging countries. Geography, demographics, local culture, public policies, and the existence or the absence of a strong local automobile industry are obvious candidates to explain the peculiarities of national automobile demands and these factors are examined in the book. However, there are also some common factors specific to the demand side that need to be inquired: the evolution of household income, the persistence of poverty in some emerging countries or the return of poverty in some developed countries, and the growing inequalities observed in both developed and emerging countries. The author explores the significance of income, poverty and inequality to analyse automobile demand and to examine the major trends in the type of vehicles preferred by consumers, as well as the respective importance of new and used vehicle markets. The second volume of Global Automobile Demand examines the automobile demand in the BRICS and other emerging countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, Turkey, Mexico, Thailand and Malaysia.

International audience ; This book chapter analyses the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia and Europe. It shows the attractiveness of the Chinese initiative for the host countries but also the political and economic challenges it involves: the sudden massive presence of Chinese companies, the new financial dependence on Chinese loans that will have to be paid back, and the political ties it establishes with China's diplomacy. This may destabilise both ASEAN and the EU, which are ill-prepared to defend a common attitude vis-à-vis China. Confronted with the creation of the "Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries" (China-CEE, China-CEEC) initiated in 2012, the EU struggled to maintain its unity like ASEAN before in the South China Sea conflict. The EU policy in Southeast Asia and towards ASEAN lacks ambition and means and is a poor alternative to China's BRI. We conclude that the EU must change its policy towards ASEAN and propose more than new free trade agreements ; La stratégie chinoise des "nouvelles routes de la soie" (NRS) L'initiative des nouvelles routes de la soie 1 a été annoncée en septembre 2013 par le Président Xi Jinping au Kazakhstan, pour ce qui concerne les routes terrestres, et en octobre en Indonésie pour ce qui concerne les routes maritimes. Lors de son 19 ème congrès en 2017, le Parti communiste chinois l'a incluse dans sa charte constitutive en même temps que la « pensée » de Xi Jinping, pour en souligner l'importance pour la diplomatie chinoise pour ce 21 ème siècle. C'est un projet très ambitieux visant à renforcer les infrastructures de transport, d'énergie et de communication entre la Chine et 65 pays d'Asie, d'Afrique et d'Europe. Cette stratégie de long terme vise plusieurs objectifs. Premièrement, maintenir la prospérité de l'économie chinoise qui est entrée dans une phase durable de croissance plus modérée et dont les avantages compétitifs se modifient. L'avantage du faible coût salarial s'est érodé et pour garantir leurs débouchés extérieurs, les ...

The COVID-19 pandemic calls for a collective response at the global and regional level. Otherwise, some nations may be left behind and the potential for the contagion to return remains high. As advanced regional blocs, the EU and ASEAN have a major responsibility to their members for coordinating health protection measures and access to vaccines, maintaining the mobility of people and goods, and supporting their economy. The pandemic is therefore a test for regions. They must demonstrate that they are at least making national measures more effective. This paper seeks to determine whether the EU and ASEAN have passed the COVID- 19 test. It does so by analysing their responses in 2020 when the countries were hit by the first wave of contagion. The first section of the paper considers their attitude and action when the initial cases appeared in Europe and Southeast Asia in the early part of 2020. While the second section focuses on vaccines and the policies adopted in each region. The paper concludes that overall, the responses of the two regions to their COVID-19 test were late and insufficient.

International audience ; The purpose of this paper is precisely to check whether the region played a significant role in the supply of PPE and vaccines during 2020, the first full year of the pandemic for which data is available. Our concept of the region is two-fold. First, we will focus on ASEAN to verify to what extent it could satisfy its needs of medical products and vaccines. ASEAN is then compared with the wider Asian region. ASEAN has signed with China, Japan and South Korea a set of trade and political agreements which establishes privileged relationships. These three partner countries have expertise and capabilities in the production of medical goods. However, among the three, China plays a specific role. It is the second-largest economy in the world and the largest global producer of some critical medical goods. It has signed with ASEAN a free trade agreement in 2002, which progressively eliminated tariffs on goods between the two parties. Their connectivity has also improved.The paper's ambition is a modest contribution to the role of regions in the COVID-19 pandemic that we have more comprehensively analysed in another paper on the policy response of ASEAN and the EU (Jetin, 2021). Here, the objectives are the following: in the next section, we want to check if Asia , as a broad region, is the leading provider of medical goods to ASEAN. We also look at the specific contribution of China, the rest of Asia, and ASEAN in the supply of medical goods to ASEAN. In the latter case, we want to assess the capacity of ASEAN to be self-sufficient. Finally, we look at the rest of the world, primarily the European Union (EU) and the USA, to see in which case they provide medical goods.

International audience ; The purpose of this paper is precisely to check whether the region played a significant role in the supply of PPE and vaccines during 2020, the first full year of the pandemic for which data is available. Our concept of the region is two-fold. First, we will focus on ASEAN to verify to what extent it could satisfy its needs of medical products and vaccines. ASEAN is then compared with the wider Asian region. ASEAN has signed with China, Japan and South Korea a set of trade and political agreements which establishes privileged relationships. These three partner countries have expertise and capabilities in the production of medical goods. However, among the three, China plays a specific role. It is the second-largest economy in the world and the largest global producer of some critical medical goods. It has signed with ASEAN a free trade agreement in 2002, which progressively eliminated tariffs on goods between the two parties. Their connectivity has also improved.The paper's ambition is a modest contribution to the role of regions in the COVID-19 pandemic that we have more comprehensively analysed in another paper on the policy response of ASEAN and the EU (Jetin, 2021). Here, the objectives are the following: in the next section, we want to check if Asia , as a broad region, is the leading provider of medical goods to ASEAN. We also look at the specific contribution of China, the rest of Asia, and ASEAN in the supply of medical goods to ASEAN. In the latter case, we want to assess the capacity of ASEAN to be self-sufficient. Finally, we look at the rest of the world, primarily the European Union (EU) and the USA, to see in which case they provide medical goods.

International audience ; This book chapter analyses the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia and Europe. It shows the attractiveness of the Chinese initiative for the host countries but also the political and economic challenges it involves: the sudden massive presence of Chinese companies, the new financial dependence on Chinese loans that will have to be paid back, and the political ties it establishes with China's diplomacy. This may destabilise both ASEAN and the EU, which are ill-prepared to defend a common attitude vis-à-vis China. Confronted with the creation of the "Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries" (China-CEE, China-CEEC) initiated in 2012, the EU struggled to maintain its unity like ASEAN before in the South China Sea conflict. The EU policy in Southeast Asia and towards ASEAN lacks ambition and means and is a poor alternative to China's BRI. We conclude that the EU must change its policy towards ASEAN and propose more than new free trade agreements ; La stratégie chinoise des "nouvelles routes de la soie" (NRS) L'initiative des nouvelles routes de la soie 1 a été annoncée en septembre 2013 par le Président Xi Jinping au Kazakhstan, pour ce qui concerne les routes terrestres, et en octobre en Indonésie pour ce qui concerne les routes maritimes. Lors de son 19 ème congrès en 2017, le Parti communiste chinois l'a incluse dans sa charte constitutive en même temps que la « pensée » de Xi Jinping, pour en souligner l'importance pour la diplomatie chinoise pour ce 21 ème siècle. C'est un projet très ambitieux visant à renforcer les infrastructures de transport, d'énergie et de communication entre la Chine et 65 pays d'Asie, d'Afrique et d'Europe. Cette stratégie de long terme vise plusieurs objectifs. Premièrement, maintenir la prospérité de l'économie chinoise qui est entrée dans une phase durable de croissance plus modérée et dont les avantages compétitifs se modifient. L'avantage du faible coût salarial s'est érodé et pour garantir leurs débouchés extérieurs, les ...

International audience ; This book chapter analyses the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia and Europe. It shows the attractiveness of the Chinese initiative for the host countries but also the political and economic challenges it involves: the sudden massive presence of Chinese companies, the new financial dependence on Chinese loans that will have to be paid back, and the political ties it establishes with China's diplomacy. This may destabilise both ASEAN and the EU, which are ill-prepared to defend a common attitude vis-à-vis China. Confronted with the creation of the "Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries" (China-CEE, China-CEEC) initiated in 2012, the EU struggled to maintain its unity like ASEAN before in the South China Sea conflict. The EU policy in Southeast Asia and towards ASEAN lacks ambition and means and is a poor alternative to China's BRI. We conclude that the EU must change its policy towards ASEAN and propose more than new free trade agreements ; La stratégie chinoise des "nouvelles routes de la soie" (NRS) L'initiative des nouvelles routes de la soie 1 a été annoncée en septembre 2013 par le Président Xi Jinping au Kazakhstan, pour ce qui concerne les routes terrestres, et en octobre en Indonésie pour ce qui concerne les routes maritimes. Lors de son 19 ème congrès en 2017, le Parti communiste chinois l'a incluse dans sa charte constitutive en même temps que la « pensée » de Xi Jinping, pour en souligner l'importance pour la diplomatie chinoise pour ce 21 ème siècle. C'est un projet très ambitieux visant à renforcer les infrastructures de transport, d'énergie et de communication entre la Chine et 65 pays d'Asie, d'Afrique et d'Europe. Cette stratégie de long terme vise plusieurs objectifs. Premièrement, maintenir la prospérité de l'économie chinoise qui est entrée dans une phase durable de croissance plus modérée et dont les avantages compétitifs se modifient. L'avantage du faible coût salarial s'est érodé et pour garantir leurs débouchés extérieurs, les ...

International audience ; The purpose of this paper is precisely to check whether the region played a significant role in the supply of PPE and vaccines during 2020, the first full year of the pandemic for which data is available. Our concept of the region is two-fold. First, we will focus on ASEAN to verify to what extent it could satisfy its needs of medical products and vaccines. ASEAN is then compared with the wider Asian region. ASEAN has signed with China, Japan and South Korea a set of trade and political agreements which establishes privileged relationships. These three partner countries have expertise and capabilities in the production of medical goods. However, among the three, China plays a specific role. It is the second-largest economy in the world and the largest global producer of some critical medical goods. It has signed with ASEAN a free trade agreement in 2002, which progressively eliminated tariffs on goods between the two parties. Their connectivity has also improved.The paper's ambition is a modest contribution to the role of regions in the COVID-19 pandemic that we have more comprehensively analysed in another paper on the policy response of ASEAN and the EU (Jetin, 2021). Here, the objectives are the following: in the next section, we want to check if Asia , as a broad region, is the leading provider of medical goods to ASEAN. We also look at the specific contribution of China, the rest of Asia, and ASEAN in the supply of medical goods to ASEAN. In the latter case, we want to assess the capacity of ASEAN to be self-sufficient. Finally, we look at the rest of the world, primarily the European Union (EU) and the USA, to see in which case they provide medical goods.

The COVID-19 pandemic calls for a collective response at the global and regional level. Otherwise, some nations may be left behind and the potential for the contagion to return remains high. As advanced regional blocs, the EU and ASEAN have a major responsibility to their members for coordinating health protection measures and access to vaccines, maintaining the mobility of people and goods, and supporting their economy. The pandemic is therefore a test for regions. They must demonstrate that they are at least making national measures more effective. This paper seeks to determine whether the EU and ASEAN have passed the COVID- 19 test. It does so by analysing their responses in 2020 when the countries were hit by the first wave of contagion. The first section of the paper considers their attitude and action when the initial cases appeared in Europe and Southeast Asia in the early part of 2020. While the second section focuses on vaccines and the policies adopted in each region. The paper concludes that overall, the responses of the two regions to their COVID-19 test were late and insufficient.