Suchergebnisse

Contrary to commercial peace theories, which predicted that economic engagement would make possible China's peaceful rise, China seems to be engaging in more militarized disputes with its neighbors and trade partners. I offer an explanation for this apparent anomaly by examining the relationship between borders, trade, and conflict in a new dataset on Chinese Foreign Relations (CFR). I integrate the three main causal mechanisms in the commercial peace literature, constrain, inform, and transform, into a unified theoretical framework and use China's foreign policy behavior to develop and test this theory. I show that economic engagement, while capable of creating new areas of cooperation, is not effective at resolving underlying causes of military conflict such as territorial disputes or constraining the use of military force during crisis bargaining. Though disputed borders have been found to depress international trade flows in other regions, they have not impeded China's growing trade with its disputant neighbors. At the same time, China's use of military force against trade partners does not disrupt economic ties or produce opportunity costs as previously assumed. I find that conflict over unresolved territorial disputes account for 87% of Chinese uses of military force and China is not constrained by growing trade dependence with other claimants. These results suggest that trade may lead to stability at higher intensities of conflict --making wars more unthinkable-- but can also create instability at lower intensities of conflict -- incentivizing calibrated uses of military force, against which revoking trade would not be a credible response. Therefore, as long as China's territorial disputes remain unresolved, economic interdependence will not decrease the frequency with which China uses military force in these disputes but will put a ceiling on the intensity of these conflicts.

"Signaling in Foreign Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.

Research on China's use of economic sanctions has proliferated in recent decades, yet coverage of Chinese sanctions in existing sanctions datasets is both inconsistent and incomplete. This article introduces both a new dataset on sanctions involving China and a research framework for expanding knowledge about non-Western economic sanctions more generally. The Chinese Economic Sanctions dataset (aka China TIES) includes 135 episodes where China is the sender and 88 episodes where it is the target from 1949 to 2020. Over 70% of our cases were not captured by the existing datasets. We use the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset (TIES v.4) as a baseline for identifying and coding sanctions episodes and provide a set of standardized narratives documenting each episode with secondary sources. The result is a dataset that is interoperable with TIES but also contains new variables that better capture the informal nature of many Chinese sanctions. We describe the dataset, paying special attention to the ways Chinese sanctions differ from other senders, and we present descriptive statistics for some of the key variables, highlighting the evolution of China's sanctions use over time.

AbstractWhich factors make some American multinational corporations (MNCs) take political action in response to the US–China Trade War and cause others to stay on the sidelines? We identify China-based subsidiaries of US firms to identify firms' political actions in response to the trade war. We combine data on firms' tariff exposure, economic actions in China, and political actions in the United States during the trade war. Together these data highlight the divergent strategies with which firms engage. Even though more than 63 percent of MNCs in our sample were adversely impacted by tariffs, only 22 percent voice opposition and 7 percent exit in response to the trade war. Our analysis reveals that US MNCs in China differ in their business models, ownership structure, experience in China, and size of capital investments. These firm-level factors determine the degree to which US MNCs are embedded in China. This in turn shapes how firms perceive political risk and choose from the menu of options to deal with the trade war. Size and age increase voice while joint-venture status decreases it.

AbstractEmerging literature shows that rising import exposure resulting from the China shock devastated U.S. manufacturing and contributed to the rise of Donald Trump. However, several studies found that these recent localized economic shocks did not negatively impact the tenure of incumbent politicians, and this outcome remains a puzzle. In this paper, we examine the partisan difference in congressional communication strategies on China and trade‐related issues. We propose a theory of China‐bashing to explain how members of Congress frame the negative impacts of trade to their voters. Using press release data from members of Congress, we show that, even though Chinese import competition impacted both Republican‐ and Democrat‐held districts, Republican politicians in adversely affected districts responded by increasing their anti‐China rhetoric, while there was no similar difference among Democrats. At the same time, there was no difference between Republican and Democratic messaging on general trade issues. In doing so, Republican legislators were able to support trade liberalization during the Bush and Obama administrations while blaming its negative externalities to their constituents on China.

Abstract
While vaccine hesitancy has become a salient issue, few studies have examined the influence of international collaboration and vaccine developments on people's attitudes towards vaccines. The international collaboration especially with China has been an integral part of the field of influenza. In recent years, attitudes towards vaccines and China are both heavily politicized in the USA with a deepening partisan divide. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to be vaccine hesitant, and they are also more likely to view China negatively. At the same time, the USA has economic, security, and medical collaboration with Japan and most Americans display a very positive view of the country. Thus, does a more international collaboration or more country-specific vaccine development have an influence on US vaccine hesitancy? This study conducts a survey-embedded question-wording experiment to assess the roles of US–China and US–Japan collaboration and partisanship in people's willingness to get the flu vaccine. Despite the previously successful and effective US–China collaboration, this study finds that respondents especially Republicans are much less likely to receive a US–China flu vaccine than a US–Japan or USA alone. Interestingly, both Democrats and Republicans are as willing to receive a US–Japan vaccine as USA alone. These results point to critical roles of partisanship and international relations.