Suchergebnisse

Rural reforms have resulted in great uneven development in rural China. The gap between the rich and the poor has been widened due to the diversity in the conditions for production and social life in the countryside. This paper probes into an interesting yet complex question: what causes the great economic divergences among villages that are geographically so close sharing similar physical settings and natural endowment? Answering this question is beyond the scope of a sole economic analysis. Using the case of Dayingjie Township, Yunnan Province, the paper develops an answer based on the political economy approach. It argues that human capital and social networking play important roles in the economic take off of a rich village in the Dayingjie context. As the gap between rich and poor communities widens, localism and weak distribution power at the township level become apparent, indicating a combination of both economic and political dimensions in deepening the gap. Finally, extreme concentration of resources leads to the rise of a group of a new rural elite who holds both political and economic leverage. They influence local politics toward profit hunting in favour of the wealthy clan in a rich village. This further leads to an ever-widening gap between the rich and poor. The Dayingjie case presents important insights in understanding inter-village disparity in rural China. Whether this story is generalizable in China is still too early to tell, but, by investigating one particular geographic area, this article attempts to direct attention to the political economy of inter-village disparity in China and to stimulate more discussion in the future. (J Contemp China/DÜI)

The introduction of administrative and economic reforms in China has led to the use of market mechanisms in allocating urban land resources. This situation has resulted in a diversified land-development process in Chinese cities. The paper addresses this issue using the example of Guangzhou, and argues that the Chinese plannig system and land market need to be reformed, and legal concepts strengthened. (DSE/DÜI)

AbstractWe study the optimal disclosure policy in a sender–receiver communication game where the receiver's morale, defined as his expected state of the world, affects his performance. The sender observes the state and chooses whether to disclose it to the receiver, who then decides whether to participate in a task. The receiver wins if his performance in the task meets a target. No disclosure is optimal if the receiver wins with average morale in each state. Otherwise, in the threshold disclosure equilibrium that Pareto‐dominates full disclosure, the receiver quits as the sender discloses the worst states and wins as the sender withholds the rest. The receiver wins in more states in the Pareto‐optimal equilibrium as the sender chooses a non‐monotonic disclosure policy. Our theory reveals a trade‐off between transparency and efficiency when morale affects performance. It has applications in a broad range of areas including military, family, education and business.