[Abstract] This paper empirically investigates the causal relationship between local government transparency and political corruption in a sample of Spain's 110 largest municipalities. After implementing a two-stage probit estimation procedure, our evidence indicates that transparency is inversely related to the likelihood of local political corruption. This result supports the hypothesis that a lack of transparency conceals corrupt activities and that an unwillingness to provide information is a good proxy of the likelihood of corruption.
Empirical evidence drawn from the economic literature points to a low level of competition in the retail petrol market. Similar evidence can be found for the Spanish market. In fact, both Spain's antitrust authority -Comisión Nacional de la Competencia- and its energy regulator -Comisión Nacional de la Energía- have recently initiated disciplinary proceedings against the majors on the grounds of suspected price manipulation in the retail petrol market. They are accused of cutting retail prices on Mondays so as to distort the rank position of Spain in European Union statistics in a practice that has received the name of the Monday effect. Here, we analyze this effect by constructing a database that includes daily retail prices for all petrol stations in Spain in the period 2009-2012, and a more detailed database for the city of Barcelona in 2013. Our estimations confirm that: 1- in 2011 and 2012 prices fell on Mondays at retailers branded by majors; 2- prices were unchanged at stations in our two control groups; 3- prices were also seen to fall when a more detailed analysis was conducted, and this price cut was also found in 2013. In short, one more indicator of collusion in this sector and … one more lie.
The upward trend in fuel prices and the desire to reduce pollution levels mean that the electric vehicle has become an increasingly attractive alternative in recent years. The aim of this study is to examine the main barriers that the electric vehicle must overcome if it is to become a successful mode of transport and to review the main public policies that governments might implement to help in overcoming these obstacles. Public policies have been directed at four basic features of the electric vehicle: the charging network; increasing demand for these vehicles; industrialization and research and development programs; and the introduction of electric vehicles in programs of sustainable mobility. This article describes the public policies that have been implemented around the world to overcome the barriers to the adoption of electric vehicle so that it might become the vehicle of the future.
This paper empirically investigates the causal relationship between local government transparency and political corruption in a sample of Spain's 110 largest municipalities. After implementing a two-stage probit estimation procedure, our evidence indicates that transparency is inversely related to the likelihood of local political corruption. This result supports the hypothesis that a lack of transparency conceals corrupt activities and that an unwillingness to provide information is a good proxy of the likelihood of corruption
During the recent years of economic boom in Spain, political corruption at the local level boomed as well. In fact, it increased from 7 publicly denounced cases from 1999-2003 to at least 180 in the last legislative period (2007-2011). In this paper, we explore this phenomenon in two related ways: how it has affected voting results and political participation, and whether the wrongdoing of local politicians has undermined the voters' confidence in them. We constructed a socioeconomic municipality database that matched polling results and corruption cases and then estimated a voting-share equation by difference-in-difference and matching techniques. Our results confirm that the voters' attitude towards corruption is significantly different with respect to parties on the right or the left. In fact, after an imputation in a local corruption case, abstention increases by an average 1.8 percentage points, leftparties' voting share is reduced by approximately 2 percentage points, while right-parties' share increases approximately 3 points. However, if the imputed candidate stands for re-election again, right-parties voting share is reduced by 4.4 points, but right-wing corruption at superior levels also increases voting share.
An important process of decentralization has been taking place in Spain in the last few decades. This has created at least three levels of government: central, regional and local. Recent data on elections show that national parties have lost the voting race at local elections. On the other hand, at the same time as the economic boom in this country in the 2000s, there was also a boom in political corruption at the local level. Using an own-elaborated database, including municipal data from 2003-2011 in Spain, we try to evaluate whether national parties lose votes at national elections due to the wrongdoing of their local candidates. Moreover, we focus on partisan effects, split analysis in two main political parties in Spain. Our analyses yield two main conclusions: the impact is somewhat reduced, but the sign of results also depends on whether the corruption is on the right wing or the left wing.
Public Service Obligations are a key mechanism for countries to improve connections among islands and remote regions with the Continent. While Public Service Obligations are allowed by the European Commission, they represent an interference with free market competition, and impact on the entrance of competitors, prices and service frequency. This study employs Canarian air market data for 2002-2015 to econometrically evaluate the effects of two changes in European policy on the number of passengers transported. The results point to the need to make market access more flexible to benefit society by generating increases in the volume of passengers moved.
Competition policy is a dynamic process in which two questions arise: the configuration of the institutional framework and, on the other hand, the potential negative effects of the reforms processes. Based on surveys to employers (International Institute for Management Development, IMD), this paper evaluates the evolution of the effectiveness of competition policy at international level and how some countries' competition policy (or authority) reforms change this perceived effectiveness: United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Finland and Spain. Results show that the last Spanish competition policy reform (creation of the CNMC), was non-positive, despite some improvements in recent years.
Las políticas e instituciones están sometidas a ciclos de reforma y contra-reforma. Éstas pueden impulsar periodos de auge o declive en la efectividad de las políticas públicas. Estos ciclos son especialmente volátiles y amplios en los países que tienen problemas de estabilidad institucional. En España, la política de competencia ilustra estos ciclos volátiles y amplios en la efectividad de las políticas públicas como pocas otras. En los últimos 20 años (1995-2014), España ha vivido dos ciclos completos de intensos auges y declives en la efectividad de la política de competencia, con una ganancia media de efectividad del 14 por 100. El último ciclo de diez años (2005-2014) ha recogido un aumento destacable y posterior caída en la efectividad de la política de competencia, saldándose sin ganancia significativa en la misma: un inane y desgastante ciclo completo de reforma y contra-reforma. La comparación de resultados con un conjunto de 54 países del mundo muestra que esta volatilidad cíclica en la efectividad de la política de competencia en España es una anormalidad estadística. Dada la relevancia del marco institucional y el enforcement, nuestros resultados apuntan a la necesidad de estabilizar la calidad institucional en materia de competencia como garante de una mayor efectividad de la misma.
This paper examines the influence of network airline bankruptcy (and consequently its market exit) on prices and route frequencies. Specifically, the 2011 case of Spanair is analyzed, using Spanish route data for the period 2006-2013. The study finds that the Spanair bankruptcy led to a reduction in prices on those routes where its services were replaced by low-cost airlines. On the other hand, there was no evidence of any clear reduction in flight frequencies. Given that tourist passengers are particularly sensitive to prices, this paper provide evidence about the positive impact of low-cost airlines on tourism.
Using a dataset from consumption patterns in the island of Gran Canaria collected by the authors, this paper attempts to quantify some non-positive effects of tourism on local destination retail markets for goods and services. In particular, we empirically prove, controlling by factors such as population, size of supermarkets or number of competitors, two main effects: first, that supermarkets located in touristic areas charge higher prices than those in non-touristic areas; and second, that brand diversity is lower in the same stores, particularly in the case of smaller ones. These results confirm that local population do not always benefit from living in a touristic city and possibly provide a more balanced view on the positive and negative side of tourism.
On the basis of information collected from all the published European Commission's decisions in cartel cases between 1962 and 2014, this paper identifies different stages in the supra‐nationalization of cartel policy at the European Union (EU) level. It analyzes major competition policy reforms, strategies and initiatives taken by the European Commission (EC), and its relationship and interaction with Member States' resistance and other policy players' positions, which offers a new in‐depth study on the history and political economy of a key pillar of EU integration. It also provides a forensic analysis of the sanctioned cartels at each stage. This study shows that the introduction of the leniency programme was a critical juncture that allowed cartel authorities to identify cartels more effectively and to provide evidence for sanctioning collusion much more easily than before. This success was a key determinant for deepening the EU integration in competition policy. The intended drivers and the paradoxically unexpected shifters of such growing integration in cartel policy enforcement at the EU are discussed.
There is no honour among thieves. This aphorism concisely expresses why the leniency programmes in competition policy have become one of the most effective instruments in the fight against the cartels. In this work we describe the dissemination, evolution, and effects of the aforementioned programmes in the two decades since its implementation around the world, paying special attention to what is being done at the European Union level and in Spain. The empirical regularities obtained from the descriptive analysis of leniency decisions adopted by the European Commission and by the Spanish Competition Authority provide relevant information about the effectiveness of their corresponding programmes, as well as information about the underlying reasons why companies, in this context, submit applications for sanction exemption or reductions in the penalty amount. We conclude that still there is scope to increase substantially the dissemination and implementation of the leniency programme in Spain, and if the reforms are handled correctly, the programme is set to catch up and to be the main source of detecting and sanctioning of Spanish cartels in the next decade