Suchergebnisse

As evidenced by the countless scandals of recent years, town planning has become a very serious source of political corruption in Spain. As will be analysed in this article, corruption was caused by the confluence of three major factors: the singularities of the Spanish town-planning model, defective oversight mechanisms for municipalities, and the extraordinary growth of housing construction during the last ten years. Finally, the new law on the subject is reviewed and solutions are suggested. Adapted from the source document.

Reviews the main cases of political scandals & corruption in democratic Spain & accounts for their prominence during the 1990s. It is argued that the public debate generated by these scandals represents a lost opportunity to build sound & practical rules & traditions of political responsibility. The positions adopted by the socialist government & its supporters as well as by its accusers have created much confusion in the debate on political responsibility & have also contributed to the failure to forge some workable conventions in this area. 1 Table, 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.

The Mexican government needs facts and figures on internal displacement and then to mobilise national institutions to design appropriate responses. Adapted from the source document.

According to a recent democratic audit and different perceptions of corruption surveys, the quality of the Spanish democracy is falling and one of the most important reasons for that is corruption. Is this perception of widespread corruption based on objective data? This article analyses the different methods to measure corruption and assesses their methodological problems. In general terms, study rates of prosecution or conviction for misuse of office are not reliable. The rates and surveys of victimization is a way to quantify corruption, but the only corruption measured through this instrument is "bribes". The other way to measure corruption is subjective, based on perceptions. But perceptions are not the same as corruption and they lead to an "echo chamber" problem and insensitivity to actual trends. As a result, fighting corruption effectively requires more micro knowledge of the incentives and constraints affecting such problem. Adapted from the source document.

Taking as our starting-point the empirical literature on the electoral consequences of political scandals, our argument in this paper has two objectives. On the one hand, we provide an overview of the evidence on the magnitude of the effect of scandals on voting. We find that scandals do have a not negligible impact on the vote, but that impact does not give usually way to a very strong decline in the electoral support of the candidate affected by the scandal & in many occasions does not mean his or her electoral defeat. On the other hand, & most importantly, we identify the factors that condition the impact of a scandal on the voting behavior of citizens. References. Adapted from the source document.

In this paper we analyse the causes of the Spanish property model and its territorial, social, and political consequences. Particular attention is paid to sociopolitical contexts. These consequences include excessive dependence on economic activity and employment in the housing construction sector, the irreversible disappearance of landmarks in the country's collective history and culture, and examples of 'policy capture', especially at local and regional levels. This lengthy process has led to corruption in town planning and an increase in poor policy decisions, greatly harming Spain's reputation.

This paper analyses the problem of corruption in the local government in Spain, where despite a complex and sophisticated set of local rules to ensure due process in town planning and urban development, a great number of corruption incidents have come to light. The explanation of this outcome rests in the combined effect of factors such as the bad design of both integrity rules and town planning policies, the relevance of informal institutions such as the patronage networks, and the existence of perverse incentives. The Spanish case highlights the important influence of local informal institutions for the actual working of formal ones.

This paper analyses the problem of corruption in the local government in Spain, where despite a complex and sophisticated set of local rules to ensure due process in town planning and urban development, a great number of corruption incidents have come to light. The explanation of this outcome rests in the combined effect of factors such as the bad design of both integrity rules and town planning policies, the relevance of informal institutions such as the patronage networks, and the existence of perverse incentives. The Spanish case highlights the important influence of local informal institutions for the actual working of formal ones. Adapted from the source document.