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AbstractIn the era of the second demographic transition, "diverging destinies" theory states that women with the most economic opportunities often obtain gains while women with the least economic opportunities suffer from losses. Using nationally representative data from the 2017 China Fertility Survey, we attempted to examine if diverging destinies theory can explain differences in the incidence of induced abortion among women with differing economic opportunities. We found that women with good economic opportunities (i.e., well-educated and holding urban hukou) were more likely to have induced abortions between 1980 and 2010 and less likely to do so between 2015 and 2017. Moreover, younger cohorts were far more likely to have induced abortions at a younger age and before marriage. These findings provide supportive evidence for diverging destinies in induced abortion scenarios in China. We thus advocate that sexual and reproductive health policy making shows an overarching concern for the interests of disadvantaged groups.

China's impact on the world has been increasing in the past few decades. How is the rest of the world reacting to China's rise? One way to answer this question is to study public attitudes toward China. This article examines the trends, patterns, and determinants of public attitudes toward China in other countries by analyzing data from opinion surveys in the years 2005 to 2018. Two motivating hypotheses guide this article's analyses. First, public attitudes toward China in developing or less-developed countries are economy-oriented, with China's involvement in a local economy leading to a more positive attitude toward the country. Second, public attitudes toward China in developed countries are ideology-oriented, with an emphasis on values and beliefs. The study concludes that public opinion on China has experienced a downward trend overall, especially in developed and democratic countries. Moreover, China's foreign direct investment in a given country is positively associated with favorable opinion, while Chinese exports to other countries are negatively associated with favorable opinion. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

AbstractObjectiveThis study examines the general patterns of intergenerational relationships in Chinese extended families and tests two competing viewpoints that explain how intergenerational relationship resources are coordinated within the family: pursuing maximum economic utility versus leaning toward the disadvantaged family members.MethodsBy using a national representative survey of older population, we constructed four intergenerational relationship types and conducted hierarchical multinomial logistic analyses to test the hypotheses.ResultsThe results showed that tightknit and loose relationship types shared 72% of the four types, reflecting a strong intergenerational solidarity among Chinese families. Parents with higher socioeconomic and health status tend to form closer relationships with their less accomplished children. However, when parents have poorer status in either socioeconomic or health factors, they would have a tighter relationship with their more accomplished children.ConclusionsThese results support the second viewpoint that Chinese families primarily respond to the immediate needs of vulnerable members with a possible sacrifice of economic efficiency. The finding further suggests that Chinese extended families still serve as safety nets to guarantee the basic needs of its members and provide important resources to manage external social risks.ImplicationsThe study contributes to the theoretical literature by adopting a collective family perspective and advances the understanding of how Chinese extended families are organized. It also has important implications that policies aiming to strengthen family solidarity should be adopted to support long‐term development of families, which is crucial for Chinese society to cope with the challenges of rapid population aging.

AbstractIn China, premarital sexual and reproductive behavior is seldom considered and poorly understood. Increases in premarital pregnancy are thought to not only illuminate a decoupling of marriage and sexual/reproductive behavior but also serve as a key feature of family change in East Asia. This study assesses change across cohorts in the likelihood of premarital pregnancy and the extent to which change differs by educational attainment. Drawing on the 2017 China Fertility Survey, we apply a discrete‐time, competing‐risk survival analysis to a nationally representative sample of 221,990 women born between 1960 and 1999. Women born in the 1980s and 1990s are more likely than those born in the 1960s and 1970s to experience a pregnancy prior to first marriage. This cohort trend is driven by increases in premarital pregnancy among women with a high school education or less. The less educated women and their college counterparts increasingly diverge in the likelihood of experiencing a premarital pregnancy. The diverging patterns of premarital pregnancy underscore the urgency to shift the focus of China's family planning programs from fertility control to reproductive health, with an emphasis on providing information and services to disadvantaged unmarried individuals.

Using data from a nationwide household survey—the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS)—we study how social determinants—political and market factors—are associated with wealth and income among urban households in China. Results indicate that both political and market factors contribute significantly to a household's economic wellbeing, but the political premium is substantially greater in wealth than in income. Further, political capital has a larger effect on the accumulation of housing assets, while market factors are more influential on the accumulation of non-housing assets. We propose explanations for these findings.

Much research has focused on the relative success of Asian Americans in U.S. higher education, particularly their high rates of enrollment and graduation compared to White Americans. In this research, we investigate one factor that may influence these outcomes: whether Asian American families invest more financially in their children's college education. Using data from the 2015–2016 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, we find that Asian American families contribute more not only absolutely but also proportionate to their incomes. This is not due to their greater financial resources but is related to Asian American students' attendance at more selective institutions. Asian American families may adopt college investment strategies that place more value on selective institutions, perhaps because of perceived intrinsic value, high esteem in their social networks, limited information about other institutions, and/or because they anticipate that such experiences more easily translate into desired occupations.

Prior research has attributed the socio-economic disparity in COVID-19 infections to differences in degrees of exposure or economic resources. This study proposes beliefs about COVID-19 as a potential additional explanation. We conducted a nationally representative US survey with six measures of COVID-19 beliefs. Socio-economic status was measured through educational level. Compared with less-educated respondents, highly educated respondents treat COVID-19 more seriously, including believing in (1) face mask use, (2) asymptomatic transmission, (3) media non-exaggeration, (4) the necessity of stay-at-home orders, (5) a likelihood of themselves being infected with COVID-19 and (6) no protection of God against COVID-19. The educational gradient in COVID-19 beliefs was largely explained by differential levels of belief in science across education. Our findings suggest that encouraging public trust in science can potentially reduce the educational gradient in COVID-19 infections in the USA.

The US public holds more nuanced views about China than are typically captured in public opinion surveys. Empirical investigation of a nationwide online survey of US adults shows that the American public is sharply divided over the US–China trade war, despite reporting high support for international trade with China (76%). Using survey questions on US–China trade and the trade war, a typology was developed that indicates more than 40% of US adults support trade with China but oppose the trade war. A slightly smaller share has a more economically militant view of trade with China, supporting trade and the trade war. Political identity is strongly associated with attitudes toward the trade war, but only weakly associated with attitudes toward trade with China. Perceptions about China and its government, people, and culture are highly correlated with views on trade with China but are unrelated to views on the trade war. (J Contemp China / GIGA)