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Does international law matter on the periphery, where potential subjects are marginalized with uncertain legal status and without lawmaking power? Under what conditions would international law matter among the actors on the periphery, to be accepted as law, remain relevant, and eventually be complied with? By adopting an interdisciplinary perspective from international law and international relations, this article assesses how international humanitarian law (ihl) is accepted and adhered to among the non-state armed actors (nsaas). The author argues that international law matters on the periphery when two conditions are met. The first is when incentives of nsaas are compatible with ihl's goal of restraint. The second is when the interpretation of ihl at the local level is consistent with international law at the global level. This article provides ample examples of nsaas' words and deeds to illustrate the arguments.

This paper assesses the rise and decline of international rule of law in the case of non-state armed actors. Both signs of rise and signs of decline of international rule of law show in the case of non- state armed actors. Signs of rise include the expansion of coverage of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law, as well as international legal argumentation and rhetoric made by non-state armed groups. Some non-state armed actors express that they are governed by IHL in public statements or bilateral agreements with international actors, partly acknowledging universality of international humanitarian norms, and sometimes act as such. Signs of decline in the international rule of law also show – although some of them can be seen as business-as-usual – privileging of military advantage, instrumental use of international law (as justification and local interpretations), as well as conflicting understanding of IHL between local and global norms. The multiplicity of non-state actors also portends the decline of international rule of law, with the proliferation of many non-organized groups without legitimacy-seeking motivations.

This paper assesses the rise and decline of international rule of law in the case of non-state armed actors. Both signs of rise and signs of decline of international rule of law show in the case of non- state armed actors. Signs of rise include the expansion of coverage of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law, as well as international legal argumentation and rhetoric made by non-state armed groups. Some non-state armed actors express that they are governed by IHL in public statements or bilateral agreements with international actors, partly acknowledging universality of international humanitarian norms, and sometimes act as such. Signs of decline in the international rule of law also show – although some of them can be seen as business-as-usual – privileging of military advantage, instrumental use of international law (as justification and local interpretations), as well as conflicting understanding of IHL between local and global norms. The multiplicity of non-state actors also portends the decline of international rule of law, with the proliferation of many non-organized groups without legitimacy-seeking motivations.

International actors engage rebel groups in conflict zones for better humanitarian outcomes. What are the political conditions under which such external engagement occurs in internal conflict zones? We argue that "insecure governments" and politically "modulated rebels" are the key factors that explain the international humanitarian engagement with rebels in civil conflicts. With the history of instability marred by coups and frequently changing hands of governments, insecure governments resort to international help and allow international actors to interact with their internal enemies. In contrast, with strong political control and military capacity, secure governments play a gatekeeper role, dealing with internal enemies autonomously. On the rebel side, politically "modulated rebels" are the prime candidates for international humanitarian engagement. Such modulation is likely to occur after civilian-connecting experiences over time by holding territory or after peace talks. We test these arguments using the case of the United Nations (UN) action plans between 2000 and 2015, in which some rebel groups committed to reducing the practice of child soldiering. We find that the combination of "insecure governments" and "modulated rebels" can systematically account for the UN action plans occurrence. Our analysis has implications for the role of external actors in internal conflict zones around the world.

In the past 25 years, the United Nations has sanctioned 28 rebel groups in 13 civil wars. Have the UN sanctions been effective in meeting the goal of conflict reduction? In this article, we argue that UN sanctions are effective to the extent that they can constrain and weaken some rebel groups. But this constraining effect can only occur when UN sanctions curtail rebel groups' ability to adapt. For less adaptable groups, UN sanctions can trigger a causal chain of depressed rebel income, territorial losses, and battlefield defeats that leads to conflict reduction. This adaptability is the key to the understanding of UN sanctions' effectiveness in conflict reduction, as rebel groups often engage in illegal and criminal economic activities and many of them are 'Hydra-like', being able to shift their income sources in response to sanction measures. As evidence of how UN sanctions can trigger these conflict dynamics, we first perform negative binomial regression on all civil war cases. We then proceed to provide more detailed evidence for our causal chain by conducting time-series intervention analysis on two sanctioned rebel groups: UNITA in Angola and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Our work is the first systematic quantitative analysis of UN sanctions' effects on rebel groups, and the results have implications for the viability of economic coercion as a means to intervene into civil conflicts.

AbstractWhether and how violence can be controlled to spare innocent lives is a central issue in international relations. The most ambitious effort to date has been the International Criminal Court (ICC), designed to enhance security and safety by preventing egregious human rights abuses and deterring international crimes. We offer the first systematic assessment of the ICC's deterrent effects for both state and nonstate actors. Although no institution can deter all actors, the ICC can deter some governments and those rebel groups that seek legitimacy. We find support for this conditional impact of the ICC cross-nationally. Our work has implications for the study of international relations and institutions, and supports the violence-reducing role of pursuing justice in international affairs.