Suchergebnisse

Summary

PurposeThe objective of this research is to develop a structure for a materials supply systems (MSSs) design process to be used during product development projects (PDPs).Design/methodology/approachThe research is based on a qualitative study at a first tier supplier in the automotive industry. Empirical data were gathered over the course of one year and analysed by means of a previously developed MSSs design model and the company's product development phases.FindingsA structure for a MSSs design process has been developed, based on the following four phases: planning, concept development, system‐level design and detail design.Research limitations/implicationsFuture research could further develop the structure discussed in this paper and complement it with engineering tools for use during the design process.Practical implicationsThe results underline the importance of a MSSs design process and emphasise that such a process should cover activities at an early stage of PDPs. Moreover, the necessity of coordinating the specifications of the various materials flows and evaluating the entire MSS before becoming absorbed by detailed design issues is highlighted.Originality/valueThis paper complements the rapidly growing literature on concurrent engineering by emphasising the importance of integrating the materials supply aspects at an early stage of PDPs and designing the MSS in integration with the product and the production system.

Are grants to Swedish municipalities tactical? In this essay, I derive testable implications from a theoretical voting model and test these on a panel of 255 Swedish municipalities, 1981 - 1995. In order to decide which regions that are politically powerful, both election results, and survey data from the Swedish election studies are used. The results, although somewhat ambiguous, support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes.

Are grants to Swedish municipalities tactical? In this essay, I derive testable implications from a theoretical voting model and test these on a panel of 255 Swedish municipalities, 1981 - 1995. In order to decide which regions that are politically powerful, both election results, and survey data from the Swedish election studies are used. The results, although somewhat ambiguous, support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes.

In recent years there has been a development towards more complex forms of UN peacekeeeping. One example of this is the UN mission in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), to which Sweden has contributed troops since 1992. A questionnaire study was conducted to gain information about the role of peacekeepers in this new kind of UN mission. The study includes data from four Swedish mechanized infantry battalions, which were deployed in Bosnia for six months each, from autumn 1993 to autumn 1995. The questionnaire was completed by a total of 3,505 persons in connection with the Swedish UN personnel demobilization procedures. This article presents some of their views and experiences and discusses these in relation to the role of peacekeepers in the 1990s.

Issues raised by new, complex UN peacekeeping missions; based on survey of four mechanized infantry battalions deployed as part of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 1993-95.

In this paper we investigate whether there are any tactical motives behind the distribution of grants from central to lower-level governments. We use a temporary grant program that is uniquely suitable for testing theories of vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. The temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision-making power given to the incumbent central government. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck–Weibull/Dixit–Londregan model, in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do not, however, find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfers money to its own supporters.

In this paper we investigate whether there are any tactical motives behind the distribution of grants from central to lower level governments. We use a temporary grant program that is uniquely suitable for testing theories of vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. The temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfers money to its own supporters.

A couple of months before the Swedish election in 1998, the incumbent government distributed 2.3 billion SEK to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities. This was the first wave of a four-year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development. This temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government. In this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters.