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Applied mereology: C. Calosi and P. Graziani (eds): Mereology and the sciences: Parts and wholes in the contemporary scientific context. Heidelberg: Springer, 2014, 378pp, €107.09
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 239-245
ISSN: 1467-9981
Formalizing common sense: an operator-based approach to the Tibbles–Tib problem
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 163, Heft 2, S. 217-225
ISSN: 1573-0964
Searle's Monadological Construction of Social Reality
In: The American journal of economics and sociology, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 233-255
ISSN: 1536-7150
ABSTRACT . One aim of this paper is to make visible the connection between Searle's views on social reality and his general ontology, and at the same time to show that some peculiar features of his analysis of social reality are a natural outcome of his general ontology. The paper contains five sections. In the first Searle's naturalism is philosophically situated and its differentia specifica explained. Then, Searle's view that intentional states exist only in brains is presented. One might say that, according to Searle, each mind is, although caused by a material brain, a Leibnizian monad. This view is related to an important, but neglected, distinction that Searle himself has made between requirement conditions of satisfaction and required conditions of satisfaction. In the third section, it is pointed out that, necessarily, sometimes there has to exist some kind of relation of satisfaction between the two kinds of conditions of satisfaction. Searle, however, has never really discussed what this satisfaction relation may look like. The upshot of all the remarks is that, fourth, Searle's general ontology automatically implies an ontology of social reality according to which a social fact can only exist as a scattered aggregate whose items exist in the brains of the people who constitute it. Finally and fifth, I try to think with Searle against Searle. His monadological view of social reality cannot, Searle notwithstanding, be regarded as being close to the direct realism of common sense. Searle's realism is an indirect realism. However, if Searle's view that intentional states exist only in brains is rejected, then the rest of his ontology has features that may take us closer to a direct realism. Such a move, which in one respect takes us closer to common sense, takes us in another respect away from common sense. The title of the last section is "Social Reality and the Impossibility of Common Sense."
Pluralism and Rationality in the Social Sciences
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 21, Heft 4, S. 427-443
ISSN: 1552-7441
This article takes it for granted that science is intrinsically social and that competition is part and parcel of science. Four kinds of competition are distinguished and related to four kinds of rationalities: technological, normal scientific, political, and philosophical. It is argued that science as a whole is rational when there is interaction between the different (sub-) rationalities. Science needs not only different disciplines, but a methodological division of labor.
Johanssonian investigations: essays in honour of Ingvar Johansson on his seventieth birthday
In: Eide : foundations of ontology v. 5
Preface; Living with Uncertainty -- A Plea for Enlightened Skepticism; An Argument Against Disjunctivism; Is Experience a Reason for Accepting Basic Statements?; Egos & Selves -- From Husserl to Nagel; Gewirthian Positive Duties Reconsidered; Quasi-Realism, Absolutism, and Judgment-Internal Correctness Conditions; Towards a Formal Representation of Document Acts and the Resulting Legal Entities; Information and Encoding; On the Money; On the Necessity of a Transcendental Phenomenology; Provocation and the Mitigation of Responsibility.