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"A representative Swedish sample was asked to judge the relative trustworthiness of people from different groups, characterized by several dimensions such as political views and reading habits. A significant similarity effect was found in each of the seven dimensions analyzed. For example, rightwing voters consider Social Democratic voters to be much less trustworthy than rightwing voters, and vice versa. Thus, perceived trustworthiness appears to decrease generally with social distance, for which social identity theory offers a plausible explanation. Moreover, people who are old and live in small cities are generally considered more trustworthy than young people living in big cities. The results suggest reasons behind discrimination other than those underlying taste-based and statistical discrimination." [author's abstract]

Recent evidence suggests that social comparisons between people in different countries have become more important over time due to globalization. This paper deals with optimal nonlinear income taxation in an international setting, where consumers derive utility from their relative consumption compared both with other domestic residents and people in another country. The optimal tax policy in our framework reflects both correction for positional externalities and redistributive aspects of such correction due to the incentive constraint facing each government. If the national governments behave as Nash competitors to each other, the resulting tax policy only internalizes the externalities that are due to within-country comparisons, whereas the tax policy chosen by the leader country in a Stackelberg game also to some extent reflects between-country comparisons. We also derive globally Pareto-efficient tax policies in a cooperative framework, and conclude that there are potentially large welfare gains of international tax policy coordination.

This paper derives Pareto‐efficient provision rules for national and global public goods in a two‐country world, where each individual cares about his or her relative consumption of private goods compared to other domestic and foreign residents. We contrast these rules with those following from a non‐cooperative Nash equilibrium. Both national and global public goods are underprovided in Nash equilibrium under such relative consumption concerns. Finally, when individuals also care about the relative consumption of national public goods, based on between‐country comparisons, the optimal provision rule depends on whether or not the national public goods are less positional than private consumption.

Abstract
A choice experiment eliciting environmental values with both real and hypothetical trade-offs is set up in order to test for hypothetical bias. A larger hypothetical bias was found in a between-subject than in a within-subject design, using otherwise identical scenarios, which can explain previous diverging results in the literature. We argue that people strive for consistency between their attitudes and behaviors, leading them to act in ways that correspond with their prior hypothetical statements. People hence seem to prefer to do what they say they would do, although this may not always reflect their true preferences regarding the good being valued.