Suchergebnisse

[This book] describes the emergence and nature of the prevailing African political and economic institutions in two periods. In the first, most African countries adopted political and economic institutions that funneled significant levels of political and economic power to the political elites, usually through one- or no-party (military) political systems, inward-oriented development policies, and/or state-led--and often state-owned--industrialization. In the second period, most countries adopted institutions that diluted the averarching political and economic power of ruling elites through the adoption of de jure multiparty electoral systems, more outward-oriented trade policies, and the privatization of many state-owned or -controlled sectors, though significant political and economic power remains in their hands. The choices made in each period were consistent with prevailing ideas on governance and development, the self-interests of political elites, and the perceived availability of support or autonomy vis-à-vis domestic, regional, and international sources of power at the time. This book illustrates how these two region-wide shifts in prevailing political and economic institutions and practices of Africa can be linked to two prior global geopolitical realignments: World War II and the ensuing American- and Soviet-led bipolar system and the end of the Cold War with American primacy. Each period featured changed or newly empowered international and regional leaders with competing national priorities within new intellectual and geopolitical climates, altering the opportunities and constraints for African leaders in instituting or maintaining particular political and economic institutions or practices. The economic and political institutions of Africa that emerged did so as a result of a complex mix of contending domestic, regional, and international forces (material and intellectual)--all which were themselves greatly transformed in the wake of these two global geopolitical realignments. -- Back cover

According to the author most African countries after independence opted for state owned enterprises in the export-producing sectors that led to inward-looking policies of economic development. He tries to show from case studies with data from 1960 to 1986 that this was the reason for poor economic growth in most African countries. For him state ownership is negatively related to income. Insinuating that his analysis applies to present-day Africa the author ignores that most countries were forced by IMF and the World since mid-1980s to privatise parastatals and to follow outward-looking economic policies - without convincing results in the growth and poverty-reducing field. (GIGA-Sbd)

In this article we address the question: what explains the varying degrees of success of the formerly dominant political parties in African oneparty states following 'democratic' transition? Indeed, political liberalization and democratization pose strong environmental shocks to formerly dominant parties and radically change the environment in which these parties exist. Such parties are faced with great pressures to adapt to their new environment. Why are some more successful than others? To address this question, we examine the evidence from 22 sub-Saharan African countries over 53 legislative elections from 1990 to 2003. We find that the legacies of different previous regimes, party incumbency and (to some extent) the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, impact on the relative electoral success of the formerly dominant parties.

France is frequently identified as the country whose official development assistance (ODA) aid program is most oriented toward the promotion of its foreign policy goals. We examine whether France reoriented the allocation of its aid in Africa to reflect changing priorities in the 1990s. Using panel data, we compare the patterns in French aid allocation to African recipients during the period 1980-1989 with that during the period 1990-2000. We find that nearly all the same political, economic, diplomatic, & cultural variables that explain French ODA allocation during the Cold War apply in the second period as well, though to a slightly lesser degree. The predictive strength of the prior years' ODA commitments did increase in magnitude, suggesting that bureaucratic inertia increasingly exerts a formidable force in such decisions. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

[...] 6. (No) helping hands: external factors affecting the conclusion of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone / Freida Ibidunt M'Cormack