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"Liberalism and Security" published on by Oxford University Press.

Recent research suggests a conditional relationship between states' domestic regimes or ideologies & their alliances. I argue that the likelihood that alliances will form along ideological lines increases with the fear among at least two governments of ideology I that they are threatened by transnational rival ideology J. Understanding the power of demonstration effects -- that when J advances in one country it gains credibility in others -- I-governments will have an incentive to enter an international agreement to oppose J domestically. Such domestic-security agreements will exacerbate the security dilemma, raising fears among J-governments that I-governments are forming a bloc directed at J & J-governments. J-governments will tend to respond by increasing cooperation among themselves, inducing corresponding fears among I-governments; the coalescing I- & J-blocs will tend to spiral into alliances. I- or J-governments wishing to avoid ideologically based alliances may signal an absence of rollback intentions through various means. I demonstrate this process of alliance formation with a lengthy case study of alliance formation in the Holy Roman Empire in the 16th century. 3 Figures, 111 References. Adapted from the source document.

A review essay on a book by Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (MIT Press, 2005).

International relations research has paid little attention to why states often spend precious resources building and maintaining domestic institutions in other states. I identify 198 cases offorcibledomestic institutional promotion, the most costly form of such interventions, between 1555 and 2000. I note several patterns in the data: these interventions come in three historical clusters; they are carried out by states of several regime types; states engage in the practice repeatedly; target states tend to be undergoing internal instability; states tend to promote their own institutions; and targets tend to be of strategic importance. The most intensive periods of promotion coincide with high transnational ideological tension and high international insecurity. I argue that these two conditions interact: forcible promotion is most likely when great powers (1) need to expand their power; and (2) find that, by imposing on in smaller states those institutions most likely to keep their ideological confreres in power, they can bring those states under their influence. Although in periods of high insecurity domestic variables alone may account for institutional impositions, such impositions may nonetheless extend the promoting states' influence and thereby alter the balance of international power.

Seeks for theories as to why, contrary to the balance-of-power theory, the international community has tolerated US unipolar global dominance for over two decades. The author argues that since political liberalism has been a transnational movement that has affected most states, no coalition has been formed to counterbalance US power. Liberal elites share common interests & perceive the US as benign, & the liberals who govern the US also treat foreign liberals benignly. US unilateral moves may anger its allies, but should not motivate them towards counterbalancing. Antiliberal elites interpret US motives as maligned & devote more resources to counterbalancing. US primacy is explored on the notion of identity in the social theory of Georg Simmel, & this argument is shown to be consistent with US relations with Japan, Western Europe, Russian, & the People's Republic of China. It is in the interest of the US, & the rest of the world, that the US primacy continues as long possible. Americans must carefully balance preserving their power & promoting transnational liberalism while avoiding the appearance of imperialism. 1 Table. L. A. Hoffman