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"In late 2015, almost every state in the world pledged its support for the Paris Climate Agreement. This environmental agreement declares that "climate change is a common concern of humankind" and calls upon its member-states "to undertake ... ambitious efforts" to limit greenhouse gas emissions.1 The path to Paris wasn't easy. Environmental advocacy in the United Nations (UN) began in the 1960s and 1970s. This advocacy eventually pushed states in 1992 to begin attending annual UN negotiations on climate change. These negotiations eventually yielded the Paris Climate Agreement.Within developed states, the Paris Climate Agreement was hailed as a landmark achievement. Malcolm Turnbull, the Prime Minister of Australia, proclaimed in 2015 that: "We do not doubt the implications of the science, or the scale of the challenge. But above all, we do not doubt the capacity of humanity to meet it."6 However, many developing states were less enthusiastic, noting that the problem of climate change had been caused by other states. For example, Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India, noted that: "The prosperous still have a strong carbon footprint. And the world's billions at the bottom of the development ladder are seeking space to grow ... Climate justice demands that, with the littler carbon space we still have, developing countries should have enough room to grow."7 While all states are affected by climate change, many developing states resent being asked to solve a problem created by powerful and rich states"--

International organizations (IOs) play a vital role in enforcing international law. I argue that collective-action problems and the design of legal-standing rules drive decisions about whether to enforce international law. When cooperation generates concentrated benefits—such as compensation for the expropriation of foreign investment—transnational standing can work well because the cost and benefit of enforcement are both fully internalized by the litigant. However, when cooperation generates diffuse benefits—like a cleaner environment—individuals and even governments have the incentive to free ride on enforcement, avoiding the cost of litigation in the hopes that another actor will step up. In such circumstances, supranational standing is necessary to uphold international law. Finally, hybrid regimes, which contain multiple forms of enforcement, are most needed when an IO has members that vary in their ability to enforce, or regulates issue areas that vary in their diffuseness.

"The Diverging Theory and Practice of International Law" published on by Oxford University Press.

I examine the impact of depth and rigidity in international trade agreements. Increasing the depth of required cooperation lowers the likelihood of full compliance and the stability of a trade regime. In contrast, increasing the rigidity of an agreement raises the likelihood of full compliance and lowers stability. Both depth and rigidity can lower tariffs if a state does not defect from its treaty obligations. I argue that if we control for the benefits of trade liberalization, then observable treaties will have a negative relationship between depth and rigidity. Deep agreements will be flexible, while shallow agreements will be rigid. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

I examine the impact of depth and rigidity in international trade agreements. Increasing the depth of required cooperation lowers the likelihood of full compliance and the stability of a trade regime. In contrast, increasing the rigidity of an agreement raises the likelihood of full compliance and lowers stability. Both depth and rigidity can lower tariffs if a state does not defect from its treaty obligations. I argue that if we control for the benefits of trade liberalization, then observable treaties will have a negative relationship between depth and rigidity. Deep agreements will be flexible, while shallow agreements will be rigid.

Why do states build international courts, submit cases, and enforce court judgments? This article examines the role of a court that is neither a "decider" nor an "information provider." Litigation is costly and does not reveal private information. The court's ruling is not binding and bargaining can occur before and after the court has ruled. Nevertheless, an alternative dispute resolution mechanism emerges: court rulings can coordinate endogenous multilateral enforcement. Disinterested states will enforce to ensure that they can profitably use the court in the future. Accepting jurisdiction of the court allows a state to make efficiency-enhancing "trades," winning high-value disputes in exchange for losing low-value disputes. This is possible because litigation is a screening device: states only sue when they derive relatively high value from the disputed asset. The use of the court as a coordination device for multilateral enforcement allows for the existence of a court with endogenous enforcement and jurisdiction. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]