Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Dramatis Personae -- List of Abbreviations -- Prologue -- Introduction -- 1. Lessons Lived, Learned, Lost: Episodic Progress in U.S. and British Experiences in Coalition Warfare, 1900-1918 -- 2. Neither Friend nor Foe: U.S.-British Relations in the Interwar Years -- 3. Groping in the Dark: U.S.-British Coalition Encounters, 1936-1939 -- 4. Ties That Bind: The Effects of Supply Negotiations on Anglo-American Cooperation, 1938-1940 -- 5. The Americans Come to Listen, August-September 1940 -- 6. Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Inching toward Collaboration, Autumn 1940 -- 7. Full-Dress Talks: The American-British Conversations-1 Conference, January-March 1941 -- 8. Easier Said Than Done: Implementing the American-British Conversations-1 Report, April-July 1941 -- Photographs -- 9. Muddy Waters: Reexamining the Coalition's Grand Strategy, June-October 1941 -- 10. Racing an Unseen Clock: More Problems Than Solutions -- Conclusion -- Chronology -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index.

View the Executive SummaryAfter 13 years of prolonged ground combat, a weary American public is leery of further interventions requiring land forces. Shifting geostrategic conditions, such as a revanchist Russia and a rising China, reinforce this reluctance. At the same time, technological innovation once more offers the chimera of war from a distance that does not endanger land forces. Nonetheless, at some point, a highly volatile international security environment will place U.S. national interests at risk, requiring the use of military power. Given the increasing rise of interdependence among all components of military power (air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space), a better understanding of Landpower is essential if national leaders are to have a full range of policy options for protecting and promoting those interests. Landpower, "the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, exploit control over land, resources, and people," stems from a country's geostrategic conditions, economic power, population, form of government, and national will. The military elements of Landpower include a country's ground forces, the institutions that generate and sustain those forces, and the human dimension—intelligent, highly adaptable, and innovative individuals—so vital to the successful employment of Landpower. Landpower offers policymakers tremendous utility in peace, crisis, or war, because Landpower can defeat, deter, compel, reassure, engage, and support the nation. Within each of these roles, as well as across them, Landpower can carry out the broadest range of military operations. This versatility across the spectrum of conflict offers national leaders the greatest number of effective policy options. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1473/thumbnail.jpg

Divisive debates over the future force structures of the U.S. Armed Forces have continued despite the Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions for the Armed Forces (May 1995) and the more recent reports of the Quadrennial Defense Review (May 1997) and the National Defense Panel (December 1997). Part of the reason for the bitter nature of these debates is due to parochial partisanship. Part is due to a lack of clear understanding of the individual components of military power or of their collective interrelationships. This latter conclusion may be particularly true for land power. Responsibility for this misunderstanding does not always fall at the feet of outside observers. No official definition or general articulation of land power currently exists. And, because land power is self-evident to most who wear Army or Marine Corps green, they see little need to explain land power to a broader audience. But, if national leaders are to have a fuller under- standing of land power, its central role in the growing interdependence of military power, or the policy options that land power's versatility brings to security policy planning and execution, then such explanations are imperative. To help fill this conceptual gap, the author offers a definition of land power to meet the demands of the 21st century. While defining land power is his primary purpose, he also places land power within the overarching context of total military power. Additionally, he highlights the growing interdependence among the components of national power. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1165/thumbnail.jpg

As the daily headlines attest, the Department of Defense is in the midst of a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Charged by Congress, the Department of Defense is examining a broad range of issues concerning U.S. military policy and strategy (inter alia, future national defense strategy, the force structure necessary to implement that strategy, the affects of technology on force structure, and the anticipated roles and missions of the Reserve Components in executing the defense strategy) that will have far-reaching consequences for the United States. Before these crucial issues are addressed, however, a more fundamental question needs to be explored: what does the United States want its military to do? In other words, what are the future roles of the U.S. military? Only after this issue has been answered can the Department of Defense turn to the other important issues posed by Congress. Dr. William T. Johnsen tackles this question. In brief, he concludes that the U.S. military will continue to perform its traditional roles: deterrence, reassurance, compellence, and support to the nation. The method and manner of carrying out those roles, however, will change; in some cases substantially. The implications of these adapted roles will be considerable. More importantly, Dr. Johnsen also examines the emerging role of preventive defense and its potentially profound consequences for the U.S. military. The debates carried out within and about the QDR will shape the security policy of the United States well into the 21st Century. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1193/thumbnail.jpg

The U.S. decision to join the Implementation Force (IFOR) for the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina (familiarly known as the Dayton Accords) marked a crucial milestone toward achieving the U.S. national objective of a lasting political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. Equally critical will be determining whether the United States will continue participating in IFOR beyond the currently established 12-month deadline. Decisions of great import rarely entail simple cause and effect judgments. Thinking through the likely second and third order consequences of contemplated actions often defines success or failure as much as dealing with the issue of the moment. Such is the case for U.S. policy in Bosnia. In examining what form U.S. involvement in IFOR beyond the current deadline will take, we should recall that, while events inside Bosnia influenced the introduction of U.S. ground troops, wider U.S. interests in the Balkans, in Europe, and throughout the world proved more pivotal in the decision-making calculus. Likewise, a decision on whether to withdraw from or to extend IFOR also must encompass a similarly broad geo-strategic context. To that end, Dr. William Johnsen examines in this monograph the potential for creating suitable conditions for a lasting political settlement in Bosnia by December 1996, identifies possible outcomes of a U.S. withdrawal from IFOR, and assesses potential consequences for U.S. national objectives and interests within the Balkans, and beyond. Dr. Johnsen's conclusions will not sit well with most in the United States and abroad who are weary of the Bosnian "problem" and would like to see it "wrapped up" by December. That it appears intractable on the civil side despite IFOR's quieting of the guns heightens the frustration. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1208/thumbnail.jpg

Each April the Strategic Studies Institute hosts a conference that addresses key strategic issues facing the Armed Forces and the Nation. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation in times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI. Dr. William T. Johnsen, Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College and a former NATO staff officer, examines The Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Released in November 1991, the Strategic Concept represents NATO's response to the dramatically changed security environment in Europe, and the intense desire to reap the resultant "peace dividend." Dr. Johnsen argues that a close reading of the strategy and subsequent implementing initiatives refutes critics who claim that NATO has failed to respond adequately to Europe's new security conditions. The Strategic Concept dramatically expands the scope of the Alliance's security objectives and functions, takes NATO "out of area," and lays the foundation for massive forces cuts, as well as for a fundamental restructuring of Alliance military forces and command structures. In Dr. Johnsen's opinion, however, the Alliance has been less than successful in the practical implementation of its Strategic Concept. These difficulties stem predominately from confusion within the Alliance over NATO's ultimate function: Should it remain a collective defense organization or should it evolve into a collective security body? Dr. Johnsen argues that for the foreseeable future NATO must remain focused on collective defense. This recommendation has a number of consequences for the Alliance, most notably for the pace of expanding its membership, NATO's future role in crisis management and conflict resolution. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1881/thumbnail.jpg

The resurgence of ethnic animosities in Europe has substantial consequences for the United States, which has a vital interest in maintaining peace and stability in Europe. Because ethnic conflict potentially represents a significant threat to those national objectives, a strong likelihood exists that the United States will continue to be involved in efforts to prevent or resolve ethnically motivated violence. The purpose of this study is to help prepare soldiers, policymakers, and statesmen for future U.S. involvement in ethnic conflict in Europe. The study offers a brief explanation of the strategic significance of ethnic conflict in Europe. It next provides a primer on ethnicity, and then acquaints policymakers with the historical and proximate sources of ethnic conflict in Europe. The report next identifies and analyzes the spectrum, patterns, and special characteristics of ethnic conflict. The difficulties inherent in crafting policy options, to include strategic objectives and political and military concepts, are then addressed. The study next assesses the implications of ethnic conflict in Europe for the U.S. Army. Brief recommendations for policymakers and their advisors close the report. While this report focuses on Europe, it bears noting that many of the insights and recommendations apply to ethnic conflict in other regions of the world. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1248/thumbnail.jpg