Suchergebnisse

Democratic political economy in the United States -- Taxing, spending, regulating -- Government and the economy -- The politics of economic policy -- Neoliberal shifts and the Reagan era -- High-stakes politics, 1990-2008 -- Financial crisis and the Obama years -- The Trump turn -- The path of America's democracy.

This paper argues that perceptions of corruption in Latin America exhibit predictable fluctuations in the wake of presidential turnover. Specifically, presidential elections that result in the partisan transfer of power are normally followed by a surge-and-decline pattern in perceived corruption control, with initial improvements that fade with time. The causes are multiple and stem from the removal of corrupt administrations, public enthusiasm about administrative change, and the relative lack of high-level corruption scandals in the early phases of new governments. A statistical analysis of two widely used corruption perceptions indices demonstrates the pattern for eighteen Latin American democracies from 1996 to 2010. Both indices exhibit a temporary surge (of about two years) after turnover elections, while no such change follows reelections of incumbent presidents or parties. The theory and results are relevant for understanding public opinion in Latin America and for the analysis of corruption perceptions indices. (GIGA)

This article (a) argues that campaign spending is no more effective for challengers than incumbents in congressional elections using candidate-centered forms of proportional representation (PR), (b) develops a new method to estimate spending effects in poly-candidate elections, and (c) demonstrates that spending benefits incumbents as much as challengers in the congressional elections of three separate countries (Brazil, Ireland, and Finland). This article also offers a theory of campaign spending effectiveness that emphasizes a candidate's relative potential to attract new electoral support as determined by both precampaign familiarity and personal, partisan, and ideological attributes. Challengers and incumbents obtain similar returns to spending under PR because its permissiveness encourages challengers who are limited in their abilities to build electoral support, even when they spend heavily. The theory and findings have important implications for understanding the effects of campaign finance and campaign finance regulations. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

This article (a) argues that campaign spending is no more effective for challengers than incumbents in congressional elections using candidate-centered forms of proportional representation (PR), (b) develops a new method to estimate spending effects in poly-candidate elections, and (c) demonstrates that spending benefits incumbents as much as challengers in the congressional elections of three separate countries (Brazil, Ireland, and Finland). This article also offers a theory of campaign spending effectiveness that emphasizes a candidate's relative potential to attract new electoral support as determined by both precampaign familiarity and personal, partisan, and ideological attributes. Challengers and incumbents obtain similar returns to spending under PR because its permissiveness encourages challengers who are limited in their abilities to build electoral support, even when they spend heavily. The theory and findings have important implications for understanding the effects of campaign finance and campaign finance regulations.

Research from various countries has shown that incumbents in legislative elections raise and spend more money when they face a tougher contest. A statistical analysis of Chilean candidates' campaign finance disclosures shows the opposite: an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and electoral competitiveness. This occurs because Chile's deputies are relatively limited in their influence over policy and pork and because the congressional electoral system makes most competitive contests relevant only to the intra-coalitional balance of power. This account implies that political finance is as much a function of political systems and the supply of contributions as it is candidates' demand for funds, and motivates several hypotheses about campaign finance in Chile. Among others, the analysis confirms that incumbents and challengers compete on a level playing field, spending similar amounts of campaign finance. The paper also illustrates that incumbents and challengers fare equally well in Chile's "secret" donation system. Adapted from the source document.

Research from various countries has shown that incumbents in legislative elections raise and spend more money when they face a tougher contest. A statistical analysis of Chilean candidates' campaign finance disclosures shows the opposite: an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and electoral competitiveness. This occurs because Chile's deputies are relatively limited in their influence over policy and pork and because the congressional electoral system makes most competitive contests relevant only to the intra-coalitional balance of power. This account implies that political finance is as much a function of political systems and the supply of contributions as it is candidates' demand for funds, and motivates several hypotheses about campaign finance in Chile. Among others, the analysis confirms that incumbents and challengers compete on a level playing field, spending similar amounts of campaign finance. The paper also illustrates that incumbents and challengers fare equally well in Chile's "secret" donation system. (GIGA)