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The message is by now clear: our global economy must be fundamentally reoriented and redeployed in order to achieve the SDGs and the commitments of the Paris Climate Agreement. This requires action by all stakeholders, including non-financial and financial firms, debt and equity investors, government policymakers, and consumers. In terms of the amount of money required, it has been estimated that meeting the SDGs will require $5 to $7 trillion annually, with investment needs for developing countries amounting to roughly $3.3 to $4.5 trillion per year. While a big picture view of and strategic thinking regarding the entire economic ecosystem is necessary to generate such investments, this paper, produced in conjunction with the UN Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable Financial System, focuses on the actual and potential role of one type of financial flow – FDI – in achieving the transition to a low-carbon, just and sustainable world and, more specifically, FDI flows into developing countries.

This paper explores both the role that local content measures can play in advancing sustainable development, and the impact that trade and investment treaties concluded over the past 20 years have had and will continue to have on the ability of governments to employ those tools. Certain local content measures had been restricted under the WTO due to wide agreement by negotiating parties that their costs outweigh their benefits. But the WTO also left a number of local content measures in governments' policy toolboxes. As is discussed in this paper, however, that is changing, with the range of permissible actions for many countries being significantly smaller than it was even a decade ago. This narrowed policy space, in turn, can limit the steps governments can take to make progress on the universally adopted Sustainable Development Goals.

This paper explores both the role that local content measures can play in advancing sustainable development, and the impact that trade and investment treaties concluded over the past 20 years have had and will continue to have on the ability of governments to employ those tools. Certain local content measures had been restricted under the WTO due to wide agreement by negotiating parties that their costs outweigh their benefits. But the WTO also left a number of local content measures in governments' policy toolboxes. As is discussed in this paper, however, that is changing, with the range of permissible actions for many countries being significantly smaller than it was even a decade ago. This narrowed policy space, in turn, can limit the steps governments can take to make progress on the universally adopted Sustainable Development Goals.

Over recent years, many states have taken steps to refine and modernize their investment treaties. They have done this to, among other things, clarify what were often vaguely worded standards, insert provisions on procedural and jurisdictional questions, and expand the express ability of states to issue binding interpretations on certain questions. Together, these reforms can help narrow states' exposure to claims and liability under investment treaties. Those reforms, however, are typically only included in newer treaties or model agreements. States typically have legacies of existing treaties that are "old-style" and therefore are still exposed to claims, litigation, and potential damages awarded under those agreements. To mitigate that exposure, states can exercise the important powers they possess as "masters of their treaties" and use practice and agreement to help shape interpretation of treaty provisions. This note focuses on this strategy. In addition to setting out the general rules regarding state practice and agreement as a means of influencing treaty interpretation, it (1) identifies three issues in investment treaty law - FET, MFN, and shareholder rights - that may be particularly ripe for proactive efforts by states applying this interpretive strategy; and (2) sets out a series of questions that aim to facilitate interstate efforts to identify consensus on these controversial treaty provisions.

Over recent years, many states have taken steps to refine and modernize their investment treaties. These reforms, however, are typically only included in newer treaties or model agreements. States continue to be exposed to claims, litigation, and potential damages under older "old-style" agreements. These risks are particularly acute given that tribunals have often permitted investors to "treaty shop" to obtain more favorable protections, and have also permitted investors to use the most-favored nation (MFN) provision to "import" more investor-friendly (or at least less clear) provisions from other treaties. This working paper discusses one strategy states can use to try to reduce their exposure to claims and liability under existing, "old-style" treaties. In addition to setting out the general rules regarding state practice and agreement as a means of influencing treaty interpretation, the paper (1) identifies three issues in investment treaty law — FET, MFN, and shareholder rights — that may be particularly ripe for proactive efforts by states applying this interpretive strategy; and (2) sets out a series of questions that aim to facilitate inter-state efforts to identify consensus on these controversial treaty provisions.

In 2014, the US continued its overall record of success in defending investment treaty claims. But it did suffer losses on a number of important issues, and those losses will render the US (and its treaty parties) vulnerable to future claims, litigation expense, and liability. The US's recent losses, which have thus far been largely ignored in commentary on the US's experiences in investment arbitration, are highlighted in this briefing note.

This paper, prepared in connection with a February 2014 conference organized by the UN Economic Commission for Africa, discusses some of the implications that investment treaties have for investments in infrastructure and the extractive industries. It focuses on liability for government conduct (1) in connection with tenders and negotiations; (2) when responding to questions regarding the legality of the investment; (3) in using performance requirements to leverage benefits and capture spillovers from the investment; (4) changing the legal framework governing an investment in response to evolving needs, circumstances, and interests; (5) administering the investment; and (6) requesting, and responding to requests for, renegotiation. After describing some investment treaty disputes, this paper concludes by outlining options for addressing and minimizing tensions between investment treaties and government policies and practices in these areas.

Governments are increasingly turning to the private sector to provide the capital, resources and/or know-how necessary for development and operation of infrastructure. In some cases, the involvement by the private sector will trigger coverage by an international investment treaty that overlies, and can override, the domestic law and contract that would otherwise be applicable to the project. This paper discusses the circumstances affecting when an investment treaty will apply and also highlights some of the ways that investment treaties can impact governance of infrastructure development and operation. While focusing on the relationship between investment treaties and investments in infrastructure, this paper is also relevant for the connections between investment treaties and other activities involving investor-state contracts (or quasi-contractual relationships) such as investments in the extractive industries.

In July 2014, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted the Mauritius Convention on Transparency that, if widely adopted, will do much to increase the transparency of investor-state arbitrations conducted under thousands of existing investment treaties and under any set of arbitration rules. This Policy Paper introduces the background and objectives of the Transparency Convention, provides commentary on each of its specific articles, and explains how the Transparency Convention can accomplish broad reform.

Governments are increasingly turning to the private sector to provide the capital, resources and/or know-how necessary for development and operation of infrastructure. In some cases, the involvement by the private sector will trigger coverage by an international investment treaty that overlies, and can override, the domestic law and contract that would otherwise be applicable to the project. This paper discusses the circumstances affecting when an investment treaty will apply and also highlights some of the ways that investment treaties can impact governance of infrastructure development and operation. While focusing on the relationship between investment treaties and investments in infrastructure, this paper is also relevant for the connections between investment treaties and other activities involving investor-state contracts (or quasi-contractual relationships) such as investments in the extractive industries.

This paper, prepared in connection with a February 2014 conference organized by the UN Economic Commission for Africa, discusses some of the implications that investment treaties have for investments in infrastructure and the extractive industries. It focuses on liability for government conduct (1) in connection with tenders and negotiations; (2) when responding to questions regarding the legality of the investment; (3) in using performance requirements to leverage benefits and capture spillovers from the investment; (4) changing the legal framework governing an investment in response to evolving needs, circumstances, and interests; (5) administering the investment; and (6) requesting, and responding to requests for, renegotiation. After describing some investment treaty disputes, this paper concludes by outlining options for addressing and minimizing tensions between investment treaties and government policies and practices in these areas.

Governments are increasingly turning to the private sector to provide the capital, resources and/or know-how necessary for development and operation of infrastructure. In some cases, the involvement by the private sector will trigger coverage by an international investment treaty that overlies, and can override, the domestic law and contract that would otherwise be applicable to the project. This working paper discusses the circumstances affecting when an investment treaty will apply and also highlights some of the ways that investment treaties can impact governance of infrastructure development and operation. While focusing on the relationship between investment treaties and investments in infrastructure, this paper is also relevant for the connections between investment treaties and other activities involving investor-state contracts (or quasi-contractual relationships) such as investments in the extractive industries.

With negotiation of "mega-treaties" such as the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and investment treaties between the EU and other large economies such as Canada and the United States, international investment agreements (IIAs) are gaining fame and raising a host of important policy questions. Among those questions are who/what the treaties benefit and at what cost.