Suchergebnisse

This book explores the role of private mining rights in the utopian imaginary of space colonisation. It presents a transdisciplinary account and interrogates the new and evolving legislative frameworks that govern access to the mineral resources of space.

1. Introduction : the study of vernacular architecture -- 2. Building traditional houses -- 3. Houses in the landscape -- 4. Houses in the later Middle Ages --5. Rebuilding and reformation -- 6. Polite and rustic -- 7. Everyday life in the traditional house -- 8. The Georgian order -- 9. Conclusions.

Militarism is usually regarded as a phenomenon of the political right. It has traditionally been seen as alien - indeed, as antithetical - to the values and principles of the left. In Britain during the years before the Great War, however, the relationship between militarism and the politics of the left was a highly complex one. Militarism in pre-war British society was manifest in a variety of forms, from popular enthusiasm for war and martial values, to demands for greater provision to be made for the nation's defence, and even in calls for the militarization of society itself. The response of the political left to these challenges was ambivalent and contested. Whilst militaristic sentiment and practice did not always sit comfortably alongside progressive principles, an ideological space existed on the left in which militaristic ideas could take root. Indeed, militarism could take on ostensibly 'progressive' forms that proved particularly appealing to some elements on the left. Moving beyond the focus on pacifism and anti-militarism that has characterized much of the existing scholarship on this subject, this book explores the ways in which Liberals, socialists, and others on the left of British politics were able to accommodate aspects of militarism during the years before 1914. In doing so it offers an intriguing new perspective on the nature of militarism itself

The UK Conservative Government 2017-2019 has taken steps to promote Engagement as a means of Knowledge Exchange (KE). In 2019/2020, a Knowledge Exchange Framework (KEF) will be introduced alongside the existing Research (REF) and Teaching (TEF) evaluations. Indeed, the OfS (Office for Students) and UKRI (UK Research and Innovation) [2018. Collaboration Agreement between the Office for Students (OfS) and UK Research and Innovation. London: OfS, 1] regard each of these evaluations as 'mutually reinforcing'. Given that the KEF is likely to take place in full for the first time in 2020, it is essential that colleagues understand both the nature of the Engagement agenda, the reasons for its emergence, the possibilities it offers and means by which to reduce opportunity cost. In this article, I draw upon a range of resources to present a clear overview of these factors and argue that KEF can be harnessed effectively for a number of, often socially valuable, ends and that its most onerous implications can be mitigated efficiently.

Jonathan Evershed presents a compelling account of the clear dangers that lie in forms of state-led remembrance. The danger is, of course, that, in commemorating, actual experience is lost. While I do not wish to challenge any of the core claims in the piece, I do think that there is one element that requires greater examination: Evershed's claim that contemporary Irish conceptions of the First World War as 'A war that stopped a war' 'contributes to a (post)colonial and militaristic nostalgia in British political culture'. While the dangers of that for Northern Ireland are clear, perhaps the greatest risks lie in England, since any such benign account of the conflict serves radically to distort the experience of those soldiers commonly regarded as identifying as British and painted as being motivated by patriotism. Drawing on experience from Tyneside, I argue that, in considering the nature of that conflict, we must remember the many diverse, and often banal, reasons for working class engagement in conflict.

Seán Byers presents a comprehensive overview of the post-crash political landscape in Northern Ireland. His most significant contribution is, perhaps, the most understated: that the Blairite settlement is incapable of resolving the social cleavages that threaten any possibility of harmony. He highlights, again and again, the ways in which apparently divergent actors, such as Sinn Féin and the DUP are brought together through the demands of neoliberal governance and, in so doing, deprive their working class electorates of real change. In this reply, I argue that the current situation highlights the need for genuine transformative politics and that this is most likely to come from Britain, not the Republic.

This is an introduction to Militancy and the working class: The case of Northern Ireland. I outline the substantive content of the issue, arguing that the dynamics at play render much of our established understandings contestable.

Seán Byers presents a comprehensive overview of the post-crash political landscape in Northern Ireland. His most significant contribution is, perhaps, the most understated: that the Blairite settlement is incapable of resolving the social cleavages that threaten any possibility of harmony. He highlights, again and again, the ways in which apparently divergent actors, such as Sinn Féin and the DUP are brought together through the demands of neoliberal governance and, in so doing, deprive their working class electorates of real change. In this reply, I argue that the current situation highlights the need for genuine transformative politics and that this is most likely to come from Britain, not the Republic.

Jonathan Evershed presents a compelling account of the clear dangers that lie in forms of state-led remembrance. The danger is, of course, that, in commemorating, actual experience is lost. While I do not wish to challenge any of the core claims in the piece, I do think that there is one element that requires greater examination: Evershed's claim that contemporary Irish conceptions of the First World War as 'A war that stopped a war' 'contributes to a (post)colonial and militaristic nostalgia in British political culture'. While the dangers of that for Northern Ireland are clear, perhaps the greatest risks lie in England, since any such benign account of the conflict serves radically to distort the experience of those soldiers commonly regarded as identifying as British and painted as being motivated by patriotism. Drawing on experience from Tyneside, I argue that, in considering the nature of that conflict, we must remember the many diverse, and often banal, reasons for working class engagement in conflict.