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Title Page -- Table of Contents -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- 1 SEX -- Myth #1 Men have a stronger libido than women -- Myth #2 Hooking up in college is bad for women -- Myth #3 All marriages have been consummated -- Myth #4 All marriages are sexually active -- 2 ATTRACTION AND COURTSHIP -- Myth #5 Being smooth is the best way to pick someone up -- Myth #6 Opposites attract -- Myth #7 People know what they want in a partner -- 3 ONLINE DATING -- Myth #8 Having access to innumerable online profiles of potential partners increases the likelihood of finding Mr. or Ms. Right

The transition of the motion picture from foreign amusement to local enterprise was primarily the result of transnational commercial activity linking investors, entrepreneurs, and entertainment professionals. Amid the ongoing urbanization of China's early Republican period, the enterprises emerging from this activity became increasingly profitable and, as a result, film production and exhibition became regularized phenomena, rooted in identifiable genres and standardized approaches to engaging audiences within the immersive space of the theater. By the early 1920s, those closest to the nascent industry were eager to legitimize its power by portraying the medium as a tool for political and social reform. However, commercial strategies and aesthetics remained relatively undisturbed despite this progressive rhetoric. In geographic terms, motion picture–related enterprises and culture remained strongly regional: affected and constrained by the non-Chinese national industries operating in politically divided China, by competing forms of local popular culture, and by existing geographies of exchange and infrastructure. The early Republican "experimental" period in Chinese cinema was, from an enterprise-centered perspective, one of numerous coexisting subnational cultural centers and zones.

The transition of the motion picture from foreign amusement to local enterprise was primarily the result of transnational commercial activity linking investors, entrepreneurs, and entertainment professionals. Amid the ongoing urbanization of China's early Republican period, the enterprises emerging from this activity became increasingly profitable and, as a result, film production and exhibition became regularized phenomena, rooted in identifiable genres and standardized approaches to engaging audiences within the immersive space of the theater. By the early 1920s, those closest to the nascent industry were eager to legitimize its power by portraying the medium as a tool for political and social reform. However, commercial strategies and aesthetics remained relatively undisturbed despite this progressive rhetoric. In geographic terms, motion picture–related enterprises and culture remained strongly regional: affected and constrained by the non-Chinese national industries operating in politically divided China, by competing forms of local popular culture, and by existing geographies of exchange and infrastructure. The early Republican "experimental" period in Chinese cinema was, from an enterprise-centered perspective, one of numerous coexisting subnational cultural centers and zones. Keywords: modern Chinese history, Republican era (1911–1949), business history, cultural geography, Sino-foreign enterprise, media change, cinema, motion pictures (production and exhibition), film theaters, popular culture

In the July 2013 issue of Family Relations, Alan J. Hawkins, Paul R. Amato, and Andrea Kinghorn examined the associations between family demographics and per capita spending on the Healthy Marriage Initiatives, concluding that the results demonstrated the potential of these initiatives for improving the lives of children. In this critique of that article, I make the following points: (1) this article was timely and important, (2) Hawkins and colleagues' conclusions were overly generous given the data they describe, and (3) Hawkins and colleagues' review of prior outcome studies on the Healthy Marriage Initiatives emphasized positive findings, deemphasized null effects, and expunged negative effects. I conclude that future discussions of the Healthy Marriage Initiatives should include dispassionate descriptions of all available data.

AbstractDuring the later years of the War of Resistance to Japan (1937–1945), United States (US) propaganda activities intensified in both Japanese military-occupied and 'free' regions of China. One of the most important organizations behind these activities was the Office of War Information (OWI). This paper examines the OWI, and particularly its Overseas Office, as key institutional actors within a broader US total war effort which touched the lives of civilian populations in East Asia as well as combatants, arguing that:•US propaganda institutions and propagandists played demonstrable roles in representing and shaping the experience of war in China;•these institutions, which included Asians and individuals of Asian descent, simultaneously acted to advance US goals in the wartime 'Far East';•while cooperation between US and Chinese governments was sporadic in the area of psychological warfare, conflicts over control often undermined or limited operations;•despite these shortcomings, US propaganda institutions (which included both the OWI and offices within the Department of State) had developed comparatively wide-ranging capabilities by the end of the war, and continued operations into the Civil War of 1945–1949.By 1945 propaganda had become an activity which regularly targeted allied populations as well as enemies. This process was facilitated by the early twentieth-century communications revolution, but was planned and controlled by the new engineers of the post-war order.

"Usage of the political keyword "propaganda" by the Chinese Communist Party has changed and expanded over time. These changes have been masked by strong continuities spanning periods in the history of the People's Republic of China from the Mao Zedong Era (1949-1976) to the New Era of Xi Jinping (2012-present). Redefining Propaganda in Modern China builds on the work of earlier scholars to revisit the central issue of how propaganda was understood within the Communist Party system. What did propaganda mean across successive eras? What were its institutions and functions? What were its main techniques and themes? What can we learn about popular consciousness as a result? In answering these questions, the contributors to this volume draw on a range of historical, cultural studies, propaganda studies, and comparative politics approaches. Their work captures the sweep of propaganda - its appearance in everyday life as well as during extraordinary moments of mobilization (and demobilization) - and its systematic continuities and discontinuities from the perspective of policymakers, bureaucratic functionaries, and artists. More localized and granular case studies are balanced against deep readings and cross-cutting interpretive essays which place the history of the People's Republic of China within broader temporal and comparative frames. Addressing a vital aspect of Chinese Communist Party authority, this book is meant to provide a timely and comprehensive update on what propaganda has meant ideologically, operationally, aesthetically, and in terms of social experience"--

"This edited volume explores the stunning diversity in behavior, outlook, and viewpoints at the grassroots level of society during the Mao Zedong era. Men had gay relationships in factory dormitories, teens penned searing complaints in diaries, mentally ill individuals in the Beijing suburbs cursed Mao, and farmers formed secret societies, founded new dynasties, and worshipped forbidden spirits. These diverse undercurrents were at least as mainstream in people's everyday lives as the ideas found in Mao's Little Red Book or People's Daily editorials. Bringing together senior scholars and up-and-coming researchers from China, Europe, North America, and Taiwan, the book draws on rare documents to challenge top-down historical narratives. Focusing on crime, labels, and punishment; mobilization; culture and communication; and discontent, the chapters reveal how people individually and collectively negotiated structures of power. Bringing readers stories of aggrieved schoolteachers in rural Hunan, Uyghur officials in Xinjiang, armed rebels on the southwest frontier, and disaffected youth in Tianjin, the volume sheds light on the traumas and unexpected turning points during China's years of high socialism, raising the question of whether 'Mao's China' ever existed at all"--Provided by publisher

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. How a "Bad Element" Was Made: The Discovery, Accusation, and Punishment of Zang Qiren -- 2. Moving Targets: Changing Class Labels in Rural Hebei and Henan, 1960–1979 -- 3. An Overt Conspiracy: Creating Rightists in Rural Henan, 1957–1958 -- 4. Revising Political Verdicts in Post-Mao China: The Case of Beijing's Fengtai District -- 5. Liberation from the Loom? Rural Women, Textile Work, and Revolution in North China -- 6. Youth and the "Great Revolutionary Movement" of Scientific Experiment in 1960s–1970s Rural China -- 7. Adrift in Tianjin, 1976: A Diary of Natural Disaster, Everyday Urban Life, and Exile to the Countryside -- 8. Beneath the Propaganda State: Official and Unofficial Cultural Landscapes in Shanghai, 1949–1965 -- 9. China's "Great Proletarian Information Revolution" of 1966–1967 -- 10. The Dilemma of Implementation: The State and Religion in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1990 -- 11. Radical Agricultural Collectivization and Ethnic Rebellion: The Communist Encounter with a "New Emperor" in Guizhou's Mashan Region, 1956 -- 12. Caught between Opposing Han Chauvinism and Opposing Local Nationalism: The Drift toward Ethnic Antagonism in Xinjiang Society, 1952–1963 -- 13. Redemptive Religious Societies and the Communist State, 1949 to the 1980s -- Epilogue -- Notes -- Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- Index