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Intro -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1 Dewey's Logical Education, 1915-1937: From Lectures on the Types of Logical Theory to Logic: The Theory of Inquiry -- Part 1: Dewey's Logical Theory circa 1915 -- Part 2: Dewey's Logical Education, 1916-1924 -- Aristotle -- Mill -- Russell -- Peirce -- Klyce -- Part 3: Dewey's Logical Education, 1925-1932 -- Aristotle -- Mill -- Russell -- Peirce -- Physics and the Physicists -- Franz Boas -- Dewey's Correspondence -- Part 4: Dewey's Logical Education, 1933-1937 -- Peirce -- Dewey's Correspondence -- Conclusion -- Chapter 2 Dewey's Logical Development 1916-1924 -- Traits, Meanings, and the Indeterminacy of Experiential Situations -- The 1915-1916 Types of Logical Theory -- Dewey's Correspondence -- Democracy and Education (1916) -- Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) -- The Matrices of Inquiry: habit, language, culture -- Democracy and Education (1916) -- The Pragmatism of Peirce (1916) -- Human Nature and Conduct (1922) -- Scientific and Social inquiry -- Democracy and Education (1916) -- The Pragmatism of Peirce (1916) -- Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) -- Science, Belief, and the Public (1924) -- Forms and Propositions in Logical Theory -- The 1915-1916 Types of Logical Theory -- Dewey's Correspondence -- Logical Objects (1916) -- Concerning Novelties in Logic: A reply to Mr. Robinson (1917) -- Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) -- Logical Method and the Law (1924) -- Conclusion -- Chapter 3 Dewey's Logical Development 1925-1932 -- Traits, Meanings, and the Indeterminacy of Experiential Situations -- Experience and Nature (1925) -- The Traits of Existence -- Meanings -- Continuity -- The 1929 introduction to Experience and Nature -- The Development of American Pragmatism (1925) -- Meaning and Existence (1928) -- The Quest for Certainty (1929).

In this response to Martin's "Should Deliberate Democratic Inclusion Extend to Children?" I examine Martin's comments against the "argument from circumspection," which is dubious regarding the claims children make to change democratic policies and procedures. I explain there are good reasons for being circumspect. One of these concerns the need for all in public discourse to supply not just claims but reasons and to have both these claims and reasons adjudicated in the logical space of reasons. Children, as with all who practice public discourse, must have their claims and reasons assessed for these to be admitted as candidates for changing policies and procedures. This augurs for a case-by-case inclusion of children, as opposed to a wholesale one.