Suchergebnisse

Mit Beginn der russischen Vollinvasion der Ukraine vor zwei Jahren setzte auch bei uns am PRIF eine intensive Auseinandersetzung mit dem Konflikt ein. Nach nunmehr zwei Jahren Krieg, Hunderttausenden von Gefallenen und Verwundeten, Millionen Geflüchteten und wohl über einer Billion Euro in Wirtschaftsschäden stellt sich die Frage, wie es um die Zukunft der Ukraine bestellt ist.
Author information





Jonas J. Driedger



Dr. Jonas J. Driedger ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Programmbereich "Internationale Sicherheit" am PRIF sowie am Forschungszentrum Transformations of Political Violence (TraCe). Er forscht zu zwischenstaatlichen Kriegen, Abschreckung in den internationalen Beziehungen, Beziehungen zwischen Großmächten und ihren Nachbarstaaten sowie russischer und transatlantischer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. // Dr Jonas J. Driedger is a Researcher at the Research Department "International Security" at PRIF and at the Research Center Transformations of Political Violence (TraCe). His research focuses on interstate wars, deterrence in international politics, relations between great powers and their neighboring states as well as Russian and transatlantic security and defense policy.

|



Der Beitrag Was in der Zukunft der Ukraine liegt: Plädoyer für eine Verteidigungs- und Resilienzstrategie erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

In the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, and in the wider Russo-Western conflict, both sides compete over international influence as well as over how Ukraine and Russia are governed. While most would agree with this general assessment, prominent scholars like John J. Mearsheimer and others have argued that the West caused these confrontations by aggressively expanding its influence and preferred regime type into Ukraine, thus forcing Russia's hand. However, while Russia's perceptions of NATO evidently played a role in its decisions, a recent study finds that Mearsheimer's arguments are at best incomplete and at worst simply false.
Author information





Jonas J. Driedger



Dr. Jonas J. Driedger ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Programmbereich "Internationale Sicherheit" an der HSFK sowie am Forschungszentrum Transformations of Political Violence (TraCe). Er forscht zu zwischenstaatlichen Kriegen, Abschreckung in den internationalen Beziehungen, Beziehungen zwischen Großmächten und ihren Nachbarstaaten sowie russischer und transatlantischer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. // Dr Jonas J. Driedger is a Researcher at the Research Department "International Security" at PRIF and at the Research Center Transformations of Political Violence (TraCe). His research focuses on interstate wars, deterrence in international politics, relations between great powers and their neighboring states as well as Russian and transatlantic security and defense policy.

|



Der Beitrag "Russian Self-Defense"? Fact-Checking Arguments on the Russo-Ukrainian War by John J. Mearsheimer and Others erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

On 23 and 24 June, armed columns of the Wagner Group made their way from occupied Ukrainian territory toward Moscow, passing through Rostov and Voronezh. The declared goal of these Russian mercenaries under the leadership of oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin was to depose Russian Minister of Defense Sergei K. Shoigu and Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery V. Gerasimov. Prigozhin accused both of having betrayed Russia in its war against Ukraine.
Author information





Jonas J. Driedger



Dr. Jonas J. Driedger ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Programmbereich "Internationale Sicherheit" an der HSFK sowie am Forschungszentrum Transformations of Political Violence (TraCe). Er forscht zu zwischenstaatlichen Kriegen, Abschreckung in den internationalen Beziehungen, Beziehungen zwischen Großmächten und ihren Nachbarstaaten sowie russischer und transatlantischer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. // Dr Jonas J. Driedger is a Researcher at the Research Department "International Security" at PRIF and at the Research Center Transformations of Political Violence (TraCe). His research focuses on interstate wars, deterrence in international politics, relations between great powers and their neighboring states as well as Russian and transatlantic security and defense policy.

|



Der Beitrag What’s the Long-Term Significance of Wagner’s March to Moscow? erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

Am 23. und 24. Juni 2023 zogen bewaffnete Kolonnen der russischen Söldner-Truppe Wagner unter Führung des russischen Oligarchen Prigoschin aus besetztem Gebiet in der Ukraine über Rostow und Woronesch gen Moskau. Ihr erklärtes Ziel: den russischen Verteidigungsminister Sergei K. Schoigu und den russischen Generalstabschef Waleri W. Gerassimow abzusetzen. Prigoschin warf ihnen vor, die russischen Kriegsführung gegen die Ukraine verraten zu haben.
Author information





Jonas J. Driedger



Dr. Jonas J. Driedger ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Programmbereich "Internationale Sicherheit" an der HSFK sowie am Forschungszentrum Transformations of Political Violence (TraCe). Er forscht zu zwischenstaatlichen Kriegen, Abschreckung in den internationalen Beziehungen, Beziehungen zwischen Großmächten und ihren Nachbarstaaten sowie russischer und transatlantischer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. // Dr Jonas J. Driedger is a Researcher at the Research Department "International Security" at PRIF and at the Research Center Transformations of Political Violence (TraCe). His research focuses on interstate wars, deterrence in international politics, relations between great powers and their neighboring states as well as Russian and transatlantic security and defense policy.

|



Der Beitrag Russische Dolchstoßlegenden: Was bedeutet der Wagnermarsch nach Moskau langfristig? erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

AbstractThe article analyzes arguments, made by John J. Mearsheimer and others, that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was largely caused by Western policy. It finds that these arguments rely on a partially false and incomplete reading of history. To do so, the article identifies a range of premises that are both foundational to Mearsheimer's claims and based on implied or explicit historical interpretations. This includes the varying policies of Ukraine toward NATO and the EU as well as the changing Russian perceptions thereof; the political upheavals in Ukraine in early 2014 that were immediately succeeded by the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass; and the supposed absence of Russian 'imperialism' toward Ukraine prior to 2014. Finding that these interpretations do not hold up in light of relevant and available data, the article qualifies and contextualizes the validity of Mearsheimer's arguments, points to superior ones, and highlights the need for case-specific expertise when using explanatory theory to make sense of politically salient ongoing events.

Für große Teile der deutschen Politik und Politikwissenschaft kam der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine am 24. Februar 2022 als ein unerwarteter Schock. Gleichzeitig schien der Krieg realistische Kernaussagen zu bestätigen, beispielsweise durch Russlands erklärtes Ziel, gewaltsam eine zukünftige NATO-Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine zu verhindern. Infolgedessen beklagten prominente Kommentator*innen Vorurteile gegenüber dem Realismus in Deutschland. In der Tat ist im internationalen Vergleich der Realismus in der deutschen IB-Forschung unterrepräsentiert. Der Artikel argumentiert, dass eine idealtypische Unterscheidung zwischen realistischer Theorie und realistischer Heuristik weite Bereiche dieser Realismuskontroverse löst. Hierfür zeigt der Artikel beispielhaft auf, dass auch minimalistische Modelle realistischer Theorie für Kernfragen der ukrainisch-russisch-deutschen Sicherheitsbeziehungen wichtige Erklärungs­beiträge liefern können. Auch demonstriert der Artikel, inwiefern atheoretische realistische Heuristiken zu empirisch falschen, nur vermeintlich autoritativen und politisch problematischen Annahmen über die ukrainisch-russisch-deutschen Beziehungen führen können.

The European Green Deal (EGD) puts forward and engages with review mechanisms, such as the European Semester and policy monitoring, to ensure progress towards the long-term climate targets in a turbulent policy environment. Soft-governance mechanisms through policy monitoring have been long in the making, but their design, effects, and politics remain surprisingly under-researched. While some scholars have stressed their importance to climate governance, others have highlighted the difficulties in implementing robust policy monitoring systems, suggesting that they are neither self-implementing nor apolitical. This article advances knowledge on climate policy monitoring in the EU by proposing a new analytical framework to better understand past, present, and potential future policy monitoring efforts, especially in the context of the EGD. Drawing on Lasswell (1965), it unpacks the politics of policy monitoring by analysing who monitors, what, why, when, and with what effect(s). The article discusses each element of the framework with a view to three key climate policy monitoring efforts in the EU which are particularly relevant for the EGD, namely those emerging from the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (now included in the Energy Union Governance Regulation), as well as related processes for illustration. Doing so reveals that the policy monitoring regimes were set up differently in each case, that definitions of the subject of monitoring (i.e., public policies) either differ or remain elusive, and that the corresponding political and policy impact of monitoring varies. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of the findings for governing climate change by means of monitoring through the emerging EGD.

The European Green Deal (EGD) puts forward and engages with review mechanisms, such as the European Semester and policy monitoring, to ensure progress towards the long-term climate targets in a turbulent policy environment. Soft-governance mechanisms through policy monitoring have been long in the making, but their design, effects, and politics remain surprisingly under-researched. While some scholars have stressed their importance to climate governance, others have highlighted the difficulties in implementing robust policy monitoring systems, suggesting that they are neither self-implementing nor apolitical. This article advances knowledge on climate policy monitoring in the EU by proposing a new analytical framework to better understand past, present, and potential future policy monitoring efforts, especially in the context of the EGD. Drawing on Lasswell (1965), it unpacks the politics of policy monitoring by analysing who monitors, what, why, when, and with what effect(s). The article discusses each element of the framework with a view to three key climate policy monitoring efforts in the EU which are particularly relevant for the EGD, namely those emerging from the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (now included in the Energy Union Governance Regulation), as well as related processes for illustration. Doing so reveals that the policy monitoring regimes were set up differently in each case, that definitions of the subject of monitoring (i.e., public policies) either differ or remain elusive, and that the corresponding political and policy impact of monitoring varies. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of the findings for governing climate change by means of monitoring through the emerging EGD.

The European Green Deal (EGD) puts forward and engages with review mechanisms, such as the European Semester and policy monitoring, to ensure progress towards the long-term climate targets in a turbulent policy environment. Soft-governance mechanisms through policy monitoring have been long in the making, but their design, effects, and politics remain surprisingly under-researched. While some scholars have stressed their importance to climate governance, others have highlighted the difficulties in implementing robust policy monitoring systems, suggesting that they are neither self-implementing nor apolitical. This article advances knowledge on climate policy monitoring in the EU by proposing a new analytical framework to better understand past, present, and potential future policy monitoring efforts, especially in the context of the EGD. Drawing on Lasswell (1965), it unpacks the politics of policy monitoring by analysing who monitors, what, why, when, and with what effect(s). The article discusses each element of the framework with a view to three key climate policy monitoring efforts in the EU which are particularly relevant for the EGD, namely those emerging from the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (now included in the Energy Union Governance Regulation), as well as related processes for illustration. Doing so reveals that the policy monitoring regimes were set up differently in each case, that definitions of the subject of monitoring (i.e., public policies) either differ or remain elusive, and that the corresponding political and policy impact of monitoring varies. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of the findings for governing climate change by means of monitoring through the emerging EGD.

Scholars have used varying terminology for describing non-state entities seeking to influence public policy or work with the EU's institutions. This paper argues that the use of this terminology is not and should not be random, as different 'frames' come with different normative visions about the role(s) of these entities in EU democracy. A novel bibliometric analysis of 780 academic publications between 1992 and 2020 reveals that three frames stand out: The interest group frame, the NGO frame, as well as the civil society organisation frame; a number of publications also use multiple frames. This article reveals the specific democratic visions contained in these frames, including a pluralist view for interest groups; a governance view for NGOs as 'third sector' organisations, and participatory and deliberative democracy contributions for civil society organisations. The use of these frames has dynamically changed over time, with 'interest groups' on the rise. The results demonstrate the shifting focus of studies on non-state actors in the EU and consolidation within the sub-field; the original visions of European policy-makers emerging from the 2001 White Paper on governance may only partially come true.

AbstractWith wavering US support and Brexit unfolding, cooperation between Germany, the EU's economic powerhouse, and the United Kingdom, Western Europe's prime military power, becomes crucial for Europe's overall ability to deal with a resurgent Russia. Does institutional and normative disintegration between states, such as the Brexit process, weaken bilateral security cooperation? This article argues that such cooperation persists if both states continue to jointly perceive a third actor as threatening while regarding each other as useful and reliable when it comes to ameliorating this shared threat. The argument is tested on a case of intrinsic theoretical, historical, and political importance: British-German cooperation towards Russia before and after the 2016 Brexit referendum. The article finds, against a wide pessimist consensus to the contrary, that cooperation strengthened during the Brexit process. As the Ukraine crisis had caused converging threat perceptions since 2014, Brexit incentivised both sides to signal ongoing reliability to each other and, consequently, to view each other as more capable allies. The article combines qualitative comparisons and congruence analysis, drawing data from British, German and Russian primary sources in their respective original languages, including foreign and security policy documents as well as interviews with stakeholders involved in policy formation.