Mapping synergies and trade-offs between urban ecosystems and the sustainable development goals
In: Environmental science & policy, Band 93, S. 181-188
ISSN: 1462-9011
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In: Environmental science & policy, Band 93, S. 181-188
ISSN: 1462-9011
Malaria is a vector-borne disease of significant public health concern. Despite widespread success of many elimination initiatives, elimination efforts in some regions of the world have stalled. Barriers to malaria elimination include climate and land use changes, such as warming temperatures and urbanization, which can alter mosquito habitats. Socioeconomic factors, such as political instability and regional migration, also threaten elimination goals. This is particularly relevant in areas where local elimination has been achieved and consequently surveillance and control efforts are dwindling and are no longer a priority. Understanding how environmental change, impacts malaria elimination has important practical implications for vector control and disease surveillance strategies. It is important to consider climate change when monitoring the threat of malaria resurgence due to socioeconomic influences. However, there is limited assessment of how the combination of climate variation, interventions and socioeconomic pressures influence long-term trends in malaria transmission and elimination efforts. In this study, we used Bayesian hierarchical mixed models and malaria case data for a 29-year period to disentangle the impacts of climate variation and malaria control efforts on malaria risk in the Ecuadorian province of El Oro, which achieved local elimination in 2011. We found shifting patterns of malaria between rural and urban areas, with a relative increase of Plasmodium vivax in urbanized areas. Minimum temperature was an important driver of malaria seasonality and the association between warmer minimum temperatures and malaria incidence was greater for Plasmodium falciparum compared to P. vivax malaria. There was considerable heterogeneity in the impact of three chemical vector control measures on both P. falciparum and P. vivax malaria. We found statistically significant associations between two of the three measures [indoor residual spraying (IRS) and space spraying] and a reduction in malaria incidence, which varied between malaria type. We also found environmental suitability for malaria transmission is increasing in El Oro, which could limit future elimination efforts if malaria is allowed to re-establish. Our findings have important implications for understanding environmental obstacles to malaria elimination and highlights the importance of designing and sustaining elimination efforts in areas that remain vulnerable to resurgence.
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In: Environmental science and pollution research: ESPR, Band 28, Heft 40, S. 55952-55966
ISSN: 1614-7499
AbstractThis paper explores the main factors for mosquito-borne transmission of the Zika virus by focusing on environmental, anthropogenic, and social risks. A literature review was conducted bringing together related information from this genre of research from peer-reviewed publications. It was observed that environmental conditions, especially precipitation, humidity, and temperature, played a role in the transmission. Furthermore, anthropogenic factors including sanitation, urbanization, and environmental pollution promote the transmission by affecting the mosquito density. In addition, socioeconomic factors such as poverty as well as social inequality and low-quality housing have also an impact since these are social factors that limit access to certain facilities or infrastructure which, in turn, promote transmission when absent (e.g., piped water and screened windows). Finally, the paper presents short-, mid-, and long-term preventative solutions together with future perspectives. This is the first review exploring the effects of anthropogenic aspects on Zika transmission with a special emphasis in Brazil.
Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.
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Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues. ; The David and Claudia Harding Foundation for provided funding for the BioRISC project. Arcadia provided support in the form of salaries for authors WS. and CR. TM and HS are affiliated with Opencell. KM is affiliated with Biosecure Ltd. The funders did not have any role in the study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. The specific roles of these authors are articulated in the 'author contributions' section."
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Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.
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In: Kemp , L , Aldridge , D C , Booy , O , Bower , H , Browne , D , Burgmann , M , Burt , A , Cunningham , A A , Dando , M , Dick , J T A , Dye , C , Evans , S W , Gallardo , B , Godfray , C H J , Goodfellow , I , Gubbins , S , Holt , L A , Jones , K E , Kandil , H , Martin , P , McCaughan , M , McLeish , C , Meany , T , Millett , K , Óhéigeartaigh , S S , Patron , N J , Rhodes , C , Roy , H E , Shackelford , G , Smith , D , Spence , N , Steiner , H , Sundaram , L S , Voeneky , S , Walker , J R , Watkins , H , Whitby , S , Wood , J & Sutherland , W J 2021 , ' 80 questions for UK biological security ' , PLoS ONE , vol. 16 , no. 1 , e0241190 . https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241190
Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.
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