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"In The Falling Rate of Profit and the Great Recession of 2007-2009, Peter Jones develops a new non-equilibrium interpretation of the labour theory of value Karl Marx builds in Capital. Applying this to US national accounting data, Jones shows that when measured correctly the profit rate falls in the lead up to the Great Recession, and for the main reason Marx identifies: the rising organic composition of capital. Jones also details a new theory of finance, which shows how cycles in the profit rate relate to stock market booms and slumps, and movements in the interest rate. He discusses the implications of the analysis and Marx and Engels' work generally for a democratic socialist strategy"--

The sales of goods and services are exposed to a significant number of risks, many of which are not within the control of the supplier. The highest of these risks and one that can have a catastrophic impact on the viability of a supplier, is the failure of a buyer to pay for the goods or services it has purchased. In today's challenged domestic and global economic climate, recognizing and managing future risks has become a priority for businesses. Losses attributed to non-payment of a trade debt or bankruptcy can and do occur regularly. Default rates vary by industry and country from year-to-year, and no industry or company is immune from trade credit risk. The essential value of trade credit insurance is that it provides not only peace of mind to the supplier, who can be assured that their trade is protected, but also valuable market intelligence on the financial viability of the supplier's customers, and, in the case of buyers in foreign countries, on any trading risks peculiar to those countries. As well as providing an insurance policy that matches the client's patterns of business, trade credit insurers will establish the level of cover that can reasonably be provided to the supplier for trade with each individual buyer, by analyzing the buyer's financial status, profitability, liquidity, size, sector, payment behavior and location.

In 1983, for almost the first time since the end of the Second World War, defence became a major party political issue at a general election. In that year it was one of the major campaign issues between the political parties and, according to one poll, ranked second only to unemployment as an issue influencing voter behaviour. Indeed, poll evidence indicated that the Conservatives held an unprecedented and overwhelming 54 per cent lead over Labour on the question of British retention of nuclear arms. Furthermore, of those who thought of defecting from the Labour Party, 42 per cent gave defence as the main reason. Such figures as these suggest strongly that by 1983 the inter-party consensus which had governed defence issues since 1945 had broken down, particularly in view of the fact that the question of defence had not been raised as an issue affecting voting intentions in the 1979 election. The breakdown of consensus may thus be judged by the emergence of defence as a party political issue. It might even be said that in 1983 it was an electiondeciding issue, especially when one set of policies could be represented by opponents as being contrary to the continuation of British membership of NATO, the one issue on which all parties were agreed. Defence thus moved from being a peripheral issue to one at the centre stage of the election campaign and it had a major impact on the outcome of the election. However, the.demise of inter-party consensus was not reflected in the electorate as a whole, which chose to continue to support the tried, and trusted policies of the past rather than adopt the radical alternative presented by the Labour Party, If a new consensus is to emerge—and it is beyond the limits of this particular paper to consider whether a consensus in defence policy is desirable—then all parties will have to review their present policies. However, before turning to the reasons for the breakdown, it is instructive to consider the nature of the post-1945 consensus and the origins of its apparent demise.

En 1920, Cromedeyre-le-Vieil, tragédie en vers de Jules Romains, est mise en scène pour la première fois. C'est l'histoire d'un village reculé du Velay (Haute-Loire) qui tente de faire revivre une conscience plus aiguë de la solidarité du groupe en installant un culte religieux distinctif dans une église construite à cet effet. L'intrigue peut se résumer à l'interpénétration de deux mythes : la révolte contre l'autorité spirituelle incarnée par la hiérarchie catholique romaine, et l'Enlèvement des Sabines ; en effet, Cromedeyre manque de femmes et doit, de temps à autre, organiser un raid dans les villages environnants afin d'y trouver des épouses et réaliser ainsi sa quête d'autodétermination.Selon toute apparence, le village en question et l'action qui s'y déroule sont imaginaires. Néanmoins, la pièce, imprégnée de naturalisme, éveille la curiosité de l'historien et de l'ethnographe.

Nature of the post-1945 consensus and "the origins of its apparent demise."

The paper traces changes in attitudes towards road pricing in the European Community, both on the part of politicians and the general public and its representative organisations (e.g. consumer associations), across the range of member states and their geographical neighbours. It identifies the development of a European 'congestion consciousness' and considers the role of pan-European technology initiatives in shaping this consciousness. Particular attention is given to the important role played by municipalities in taking forward road-pricing initiatives, and of the need to take account of public concerns relating to the implementation of urban road pricing. The functional role played by the blurring between congestion pricing and road tolling is also discussed. The paper examines the ways in which road-pricing policy developments in one member state, and the associated technological developments, produce the conditions for the up-take of road pricing as a policy issue in another country (i.e. in line with domino theory).