Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Title -- Dedication -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- My Caveat -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1: Start of a Journey - Setting the Scene -- Chapter 2: Be Careful What You Wish For -- Chapter 3: The Story of Rasha -- Chapter 4: Rasha's Return - Now What? -- Chapter 5: The End of the Beginning and the Start of a New Journey -- Reference Pictures -- Chapter 6: The Return Journey and Departure - Hoping to Get Out Alive -- Chapter 6.5: Iraq End Piece Summary: The Final Goodbye -- Chapter 7: Darfur - My Humanitarian Coming-of-Age Journey -- Chapter 8: The End Game - The Road to Ebola and Beyond -- Chapter 9: The Lioness's Tale -- Testimonial -- Copyright.

Individuals do not act collectively simply because they recognise common interests; collective interests can be defined as collective goods and collective goods are non-excludable. In 'large' groups instrumental individuals have no incentive to act because individual action is imperceptible. But are individuals always this instrumental? If it is a mistake to assume that collective action occurs 'naturally' when common interests are recognised, it is a mistake to ignore awareness of common interests. Individuals derive satisfaction from expressing identity with common interests but when will individuals choose to 'nail their colours to the mast'?

Rational choice analysis of collective action predicts that individual members of a large group will not contribute voluntarily towards a common cause; members of large groups attribute no significance to individual action. Large groups are mobilised by the attraction of private goods and services; private interest, rather than identity with a common cause, is the stimulus. Yet the efficacy of such selective incentives depends on the signal that erstwhile 'profits' (from the provision of private goods) are dedicated to achieving a collective goal. At the same time, the signal that collective action is 'non-profit' enhances the intrinsic value of the act of participation. When the impact of individual action on outcome is difficult to discern, individuals rely on low-cost signals relating to process. There are incentives to identify with the pursuit of a common cause when collective action is deemed 'non-profit' and a common goal is non-rival.

Abstract.  Public choice analysts argue that, while incentive mechanisms in competitive markets ensure consumer sovereignty, decisions in political processes conflict with voters' preferences. Voters are vulnerable because they are rationally apathetic. Yet, if this is so, how can high participation rates be explained? Evidence reveals that, in the absence of effective quid pro quo, behaviour differs systematically from that predicted of homo economicus. Here it is argued that, while participation cannot be explained in terms of an instrumental act (to affect outcome), it can be explained in terms of individuals' perceptions of the intrinsic value of the process itself. It follows that inherent mechanisms within representative democracy are capable of mitigating the more 'dismal' predictions of public choice analysis.