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Today, law student safety is a serious but often missed objective in American law schools. According to a recent survey, the typical American family wants to know their law student is safe even more than they want their law student to acquire a first-rate legal academic experience. Despite the importance of law student mental health to student performance, and cultural objectives unique to legal education, law students are not only highly vulnerable to acquiring mental health challenges during law school but are prone to be overlooked, and perhaps blamed or condemned for their mental health challenges, albeit unintentionally. My work asserts that despite the chief objective of law schools being to educate knowledgeable, competent, legal professionals, and provide them with the necessary skills to resolve complex legal essentials for corporations and government, as well as advance social justice, and to promote equal treatment for all, inherent in the nature of legal education, is a seemingly widely accepted risk of compromising law student mental health. Relying on qualitative studies and journalistic reports, my work will demonstrate that law students experience high incidents of personal depression, anxiety, extreme sadness, loss of interest or desire, feelings of guilt or low self-esteem, disturbed sleep or appetite, low energy, poor concentration, and a myriad of other mental and physical calamities, all of which greatly exceeds that of the law faculty, and surpasses levels experienced by medical and graduate students at American schools of higher education. My work further acknowledges that law student anxiety and depression are inextricably linked to the rigorous academic demands of legal education. Still it argues and set forth that law student mental health is related to avoidable conditions and patterns in the law school environment that enable or fail to account for the law student's inexperience with coping with intense stress, emotional uncertainty, geographical isolation from loved ones, strained financial resources, poor job prospects, family strife, drug or alcohol abuse, homelessness, or lack of a culturally responsive learning environment. Granted, the legal profession is not for everyone. My work argues that law schools cannot turn a blind eye to the plight of law students as if no degree of accountability and responsibility lies with the law school. Indeed, law schools, albeit unintentionally, may be some of the chief investors in patterns of conduct that compromise the physical, emotional, and mental safety of law students. Recognition of a law school's duty to students, in my view, requires law schools to resist the rhetoric of self-exceptionalism. Law schools, have an obligation, reluctantly or not, to concretely curtail repeated patterns of professional abuse, neglect, dereliction of academic duties, social domination, and student exploitation, that are uniquely embedded in the culture of legal education. Simply put, law student safety needs, coupled with the intricacies and unforgiving consequences of today's competitive legal job market and high cost of legal education, warrant that law schools resist the impulses that prioritize institutional-preservation and subordinate student mental health under the guise of teaching students the harsh realities of the legal profession and preparing them for legal practice. My work argues that student physical, emotional, mental and academic safety should, and must become a critical component of legal education.

This essay challenges the conventional wisdom that prohibitions against government-condoned child-sex slavery have attained non- derogable, peremptory status under international law. Much to the utter shock of field investigators and human rights experts, boy sex slavery has evolved into a constitutive and central feature of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan) because of a customary practice commonly referred to as bacha bazi.

This essay challenges the conventional wisdom that prohibitions against government-condoned child-sex slavery have attained non- derogable, peremptory status under international law. Much to the utter shock of field investigators and human rights experts, boy sex slavery has evolved into a constitutive and central feature of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan) because of a customary practice commonly referred to as bacha bazi.

This essay makes what some might consider a bold and novel assertion. Relying on fact-based analysis of present day social conditions, it argues that the female-oppression-male-culprit paradigm is antiquated and injurious to both men and women. It claims that existing conceptions of American society in which the vast majority of the nation's men and boys are victimless and empowered, and the core of the nation's women and girls are victims and disempowered, cannot be fundamentally or morally justified. It will demonstrate that today's regimented imperative for addressing gender discrimination and social injustice by allocating legal rights and entitlements exclusively to women and girls, without consideration of men and boys, degrades human dignity and reinforces gender discrimination and social injustice. It explicates how the urgency created by expanding economic woes and social afflictions affecting men and boys, as well as women and girls, renders it necessary for today's political leaders to advance legislation that addresses the needs of all Americans regardless of their gender. It claims that systemic abuse of the government's privilege to do otherwise has so obscured elements of gender discrimination and social injustice relative to men, married women, and mothers, that the survivability of the traditional American family appears compromised. This essay does not seek to compare the welfare of women to that of men, insinuate that the two groups are in competition, or claim that one group is more deserving than the other group. Nor is it the intent of this essay to propose a specific policy revision, or, more broadly, return men to the position of absolute power that led to the generations-long repression of women and disrespect for female dignity. Put succinctly, this essay is not a challenge to the overall meritocracy of feminist jurisprudence or the women's movement. Rather, this essay is a contribution to the emerging men's movement, a philosophical incursion into our conceptual mapping relative to social justice and male oppression. This essay situates its discussion along a jurisprudential presupposition that the advancement of women and girls is, and should remain, a meritorious component of political government. The discussion is presented in two parts. Part II highlights degrees to which men and boys are vulnerable to exploitation, alienation, and systemic injustice-matters that are also worthy of governmental attention, but widely neglected. In so doing, it explores the manner by which the ignominy of male culture and presumptions about female oppression facilitate discrimination against males in education, employment, criminal justice administration, media, and family planning; and infringe upon the liberty and expectation interest of women who are in consortium with men and boys, such as married women and mothers. Part III explores potential causes of and solutions to cultural inclinations to neglect male oppression despite widespread evidence of its occurrence. In doing so, it challenges contemporary notions of fairness and conceptions about equality, and their influence on the distribution of legal rights. It argues for a rights-distribution model to addressing social injustice based on an abiding respect for human dignity rather than notions of fairness.

This essay makes what some might consider a bold and novel assertion. Relying on fact-based analysis of present day social conditions, it argues that the female-oppression-male-culprit paradigm is antiquated and injurious to both men and women. It claims that existing conceptions of American society in which the vast majority of the nation's men and boys are victimless and empowered, and the core of the nation's women and girls are victims and disempowered, cannot be fundamentally or morally justified. It will demonstrate that today's regimented imperative for addressing gender discrimination and social injustice by allocating legal rights and entitlements exclusively to women and girls, without consideration of men and boys, degrades human dignity and reinforces gender discrimination and social injustice. It explicates how the urgency created by expanding economic woes and social afflictions affecting men and boys, as well as women and girls, renders it necessary for today's political leaders to advance legislation that addresses the needs of all Americans regardless of their gender. It claims that systemic abuse of the government's privilege to do otherwise has so obscured elements of gender discrimination and social injustice relative to men, married women, and mothers, that the survivability of the traditional American family appears compromised. This essay does not seek to compare the welfare of women to that of men, insinuate that the two groups are in competition, or claim that one group is more deserving than the other group. Nor is it the intent of this essay to propose a specific policy revision, or, more broadly, return men to the position of absolute power that led to the generations-long repression of women and disrespect for female dignity. Put succinctly, this essay is not a challenge to the overall meritocracy of feminist jurisprudence or the women's movement. Rather, this essay is a contribution to the emerging men's movement, a philosophical incursion into our conceptual mapping relative to social justice and male oppression. This essay situates its discussion along a jurisprudential presupposition that the advancement of women and girls is, and should remain, a meritorious component of political government. The discussion is presented in two parts. Part II highlights degrees to which men and boys are vulnerable to exploitation, alienation, and systemic injustice-matters that are also worthy of governmental attention, but widely neglected. In so doing, it explores the manner by which the ignominy of male culture and presumptions about female oppression facilitate discrimination against males in education, employment, criminal justice administration, media, and family planning; and infringe upon the liberty and expectation interest of women who are in consortium with men and boys, such as married women and mothers. Part III explores potential causes of and solutions to cultural inclinations to neglect male oppression despite widespread evidence of its occurrence. In doing so, it challenges contemporary notions of fairness and conceptions about equality, and their influence on the distribution of legal rights. It argues for a rights-distribution model to addressing social injustice based on an abiding respect for human dignity rather than notions of fairness.

It is widely accepted that human trafficking is a global phenomenon that poses a significant problem within the United States. Despite its wealth and sophisticated law enforcement paradigms, the United States is the third largest destination country for human trafficking victims. In fact, human trafficking in the United States is increasing. Scholars have advanced a myriad of reasons to explain this problem. For example, some have pronounced the conscious neglect of men and boys in the investigation, reporting, and publicity of human trafficking a serious impediment to progress in combating trafficking. The ease with which corporations avoid prosecution under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) has been cited as a leading obstacle to thwarting trafficking. The U.S. government's disproportionate focus on prosecuting poor and powerless individuals has also ignited concern. In addition, the dismal enforcement results reveal that the neglect of ethnic minority victims has contributed to the proliferation of trafficking schemes. Finally, even the disproportionate focus on sex trafficking and the manner in which feminist ideology negatively influences anti-trafficking measures has been explored to a significant degree. By isolating the normative point at which the shift from consenting participant to human trafficking victim occurs, this Article challenges existing approaches to identifying human trafficking victims. It demonstrates that consent may, in some cases, expire before the onset of fraud, force, or coercion, particularly in the face of unpalatable alternatives. Nevertheless, this Article will illustrate that consent may be viable despite the absence of palatable alternatives. In so doing, this Article questions whether individuals can be neatly bifurcated into two distinct categories-migrant smuggling and human trafficking-and instead points to at least five classifications that arguably fit under the ambit of migrant smuggling, human trafficking, or both, depending on one's theory of consent. Finally, this Article examines existing autonomies between migrant smuggling and human trafficking and questions whether the role of consent in each case is truly antithetical. In short, this Article attempts to take a first step in fashioning a decision-making paradigm for resolving the consent question. This paradigm incorporates the moral imperative to respect human dignity and permit individuals to determine their own direction, without compromising the undeniable empiricism of commercial exploitation and victimization. Part I distinguishes between human trafficking and migrant smuggling and evaluates the jurisprudential basis for five classifications of individuals within the human trafficking-smuggled migrant spectrum. In so doing, it highlights how the desire to migrate acts as a catalyst and sociological contributor to drive demand for human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and ultimately encourages individuals to consent to high-risk exchanges. Giving particular attention to historical accounts, Part I also evaluates the manner in which voluntariness and coercive agents inform ideas about victimization and criminality and ultimately influence anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Part II explores the conceptual basis for deciding the voluntary nature and dispositive treatment of consent in the victim identification process and introduces the two dominant, but competing, jurisprudential approaches to defining and respecting consent. This Article concludes by positing that although the two dominant approaches to defining and respecting consent both center largely on ideas about human dignity and moral culpability, only one approach operates as a legitimate safeguard for respecting each when evaluating consent.

It is widely accepted that human trafficking is a global phenomenon that poses a significant problem within the United States. Despite its wealth and sophisticated law enforcement paradigms, the United States is the third largest destination country for human trafficking victims. In fact, human trafficking in the United States is increasing. Scholars have advanced a myriad of reasons to explain this problem. For example, some have pronounced the conscious neglect of men and boys in the investigation, reporting, and publicity of human trafficking a serious impediment to progress in combating trafficking. The ease with which corporations avoid prosecution under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) has been cited as a leading obstacle to thwarting trafficking. The U.S. government's disproportionate focus on prosecuting poor and powerless individuals has also ignited concern. In addition, the dismal enforcement results reveal that the neglect of ethnic minority victims has contributed to the proliferation of trafficking schemes. Finally, even the disproportionate focus on sex trafficking and the manner in which feminist ideology negatively influences anti-trafficking measures has been explored to a significant degree. By isolating the normative point at which the shift from consenting participant to human trafficking victim occurs, this Article challenges existing approaches to identifying human trafficking victims. It demonstrates that consent may, in some cases, expire before the onset of fraud, force, or coercion, particularly in the face of unpalatable alternatives. Nevertheless, this Article will illustrate that consent may be viable despite the absence of palatable alternatives. In so doing, this Article questions whether individuals can be neatly bifurcated into two distinct categories-migrant smuggling and human trafficking-and instead points to at least five classifications that arguably fit under the ambit of migrant smuggling, human trafficking, or both, depending on one's theory of consent. Finally, this Article examines existing autonomies between migrant smuggling and human trafficking and questions whether the role of consent in each case is truly antithetical. In short, this Article attempts to take a first step in fashioning a decision-making paradigm for resolving the consent question. This paradigm incorporates the moral imperative to respect human dignity and permit individuals to determine their own direction, without compromising the undeniable empiricism of commercial exploitation and victimization. Part I distinguishes between human trafficking and migrant smuggling and evaluates the jurisprudential basis for five classifications of individuals within the human trafficking-smuggled migrant spectrum. In so doing, it highlights how the desire to migrate acts as a catalyst and sociological contributor to drive demand for human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and ultimately encourages individuals to consent to high-risk exchanges. Giving particular attention to historical accounts, Part I also evaluates the manner in which voluntariness and coercive agents inform ideas about victimization and criminality and ultimately influence anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Part II explores the conceptual basis for deciding the voluntary nature and dispositive treatment of consent in the victim identification process and introduces the two dominant, but competing, jurisprudential approaches to defining and respecting consent. This Article concludes by positing that although the two dominant approaches to defining and respecting consent both center largely on ideas about human dignity and moral culpability, only one approach operates as a legitimate safeguard for respecting each when evaluating consent.

Miller is commissioned as "Ensign of Company of Riflemen in the second Battalion of the thirteenth. Regiment seventh Brigade and third. Division of the said Militia" of Virginia. Barbour signs as governor of Virginia. ; https://digitalcommons.wofford.edu/littlejohnmss/1180/thumbnail.jpg

Collection contains diaries and autobiography, biographies, family history, correspondence, legal documents and newspaper clippings related to his personal life, pioneer memories, missionary experiences, political activities as mayor and member of the Democratic party, LDS Church activities, and leadership in business and civic activities in Utah. Also includes copies of his poetical writings. The diaries scanned concentrate primarily on his missionary activities. ; 46 p. ; vol. 3 of 3 v.

Collection contains diaries and autobiography, biographies, family history, correspondence, legal documents and newspaper clippings related to his personal life, pioneer memories, missionary experiences, political activities as mayor and member of the Democratic party, LDS Church activities, and leadership in business and civic activities in Utah. Also includes copies of his poetical writings. The diaries scanned concentrate primarily on his missionary activities. ; 183 p. ; vol. 2 of 3 v.

Collection contains diaries and autobiography, biographies, family history, correspondence, legal documents and newspaper clippings related to his personal life, pioneer memories, missionary experiences, political activities as mayor and member of the Democratic party, LDS Church activities, and leadership in business and civic activities in Utah. Also includes copies of his poetical writings. The diaries scanned concentrate primarily on his missionary activities. ; 72 p. ; vol. 1 of 3 v.