Suchergebnisse

Despite the benefits of rebel governance such as increased legitimacy and resource extraction, providing governance is also costly for rebel groups, as it entails constant investment of time and money as well as the need to protect their properties and territories. Rebels, therefore, weigh the costs of providing governance against the benefits in their decision to provide governance. In this paper, we explore the impact of pro-government militias (PGMs) on the cost-benefit analysis of rebel governance. We argue that governance becomes a suboptimal strategy for rebel groups in the presence of semi-official PGMs but not informal PGMs. This is because semi-official PGMs' relationship with the government makes them more formally accountable to the government, which effectively bolsters the counterinsurgency capabilities of the state (and thereby weakens rebels) through providing credible and timely intelligence and undermining civilians support for the rebels, and even allowing rebel defection. We test our argument using data on rebel governance and PGMs and indeed find that semi-official—but not informal—PGMs decrease the likelihood of rebel governance.

Policymakers and peacebuilding research often focus on rebel groups when studying demobilization and integration processes, but post-war governments must also manage the non-state militias that helped them gain or maintain power. Why do some post-war governments disintegrate their militia allies, while others integrate them into the military? We argue that when a salient ethnic difference exists between the (new) ruling elite and an allied militia, a process of mutual uncertainty in the post-war period will incentivize governments to disintegrate the group. However, governments will be most likely to integrate their militias when the military has sufficient coercive capabilities but few organizational hindrances to re-organizing. Using new data on the post-war fates of victorious militias across all civil conflicts from 1989 to 2014, we find robust support for these claims. The results suggest that a government's optimal militia management strategy is shaped by both social and organizational constraints during the post-war period.

Abstract
Ordered dependent variables are widely employed in international relations (IR). These ordered dependent variables often suffer from inflated observations in their highest outcome category due to distinct processes. The application of standard ordered probit and ordered logit models to such ordinal measures will fail to capture these distinct processes, often producing biased inferences as a result. Yet IR researchers have thus far ignored the potential for top-category inflation in ordered outcome variables. We sensitize researchers to top-category inflation in ordered IR outcomes. We then intuitively extend the widely used zero-inflated ordered probit model to the top-category inflated setting, providing resources to facilitate the proper modeling of top-category inflation in ordered outcomes. Finally, we provide two applications to published IR research related to trade politics and political repression. Together, these applications illustrate the substantive and methodological potentials of our proposed tools for diagnosing and modeling top-category inflation in IR outcomes.

We develop a new Bayesian split population survival model for the analysis of survival data with misclassified event failures. Within political science survival data, right-censored survival cases are often erroneously misclassified as failure cases due to measurement error. Treating these cases as failure events within survival analyses will underestimate the duration of some events. This will bias coefficient estimates, especially in situations where such misclassification is associated with covariates of interest. Our split population survival estimator addresses this challenge by using a system of two equations to explicitly model the misclassification of failure events alongside a parametric survival process of interest. After deriving this model, we use Bayesian estimation via slice sampling to evaluate its performance with simulated data, and in several political science applications. We find that our proposed "misclassified failure" survival model allows researchers to accurately account for misclassified failure events within the contexts of civil war duration and democratic survival.

The global rise of right-wing populist (RWP) leaders has raised concerns about the threat they pose to a cooperative international order, but there is little systematic evidence linking RWP leaders to military aggression. Are RWP leaders more prone to initiating international disputes? If so, when and why? We argue that a RWP leader's hyper-nationalist rhetoric can galvanize popular support for militant internationalism, but this only leads to pressures for the leader to follow through on their belligerent rhetoric by initiating international disputes in participatory democracies. Using survey experiments fielded in India and Japan, we find strong support for our claims about the effects of RWP rhetoric on civilian attitudes. Statistical results from original data on populist leaders worldwide (1886-2014) then show that RWP leaders in participatory democracies are more likely to initiate militarized disputes. Our results are troubling given the recent increase in RWP leaders elected in participatory democracies.