Suchergebnisse

EU Agencies are becoming central players in the development and implementation of European laws and regulations. In this research, I show what actions private stakeholders undertake to interact with EU Agencies and how EU Agencies in turn react to private stakeholders.

AbstractUS nuclear weapons are presently hosted in five European countries. In recent years, parliaments in four out of the five countries held debates about these weapons. For most of them, this was the first (or the only) debate in many years. By contrast, in the Netherlands, the Tweede Kamer, the House of Representatives, held forty-four votes related to nuclear weapons in the last two parliamentary periods alone. Although parliament's powers are restricted, these votes can oblige government to pursue a certain policy and ultimately put soft constraints on government's freedom of action. Yet, the extent of the contestation of nuclear weapons in European parliaments is almost unknown. Using the Dutch case and spatial modeling methods, we offer three lessons: first, that security policy does not stand above the parliamentary politics; second, that cross-bench voting happens but the activity originates in partisan silos; and third, that there is a strong partisan element to the debates about nuclear weapons in Europe.

AbstractNational governments have increasingly transferred enforcement powers to EU agencies that monitor and penalize non‐compliance by private actors. How do EU agencies apply enforcement competences in practice? Based on the Eurolegalism thesis, pressures for deeper integration have led to the emergence of a more adversarial enforcement style in Europe. Consequently, supranational regulators are expected to employ formal and coercive enforcement instruments. Conversely, studies of EU enforcement suggest that EU agencies may be reluctant to antagonize national governments by prosecuting private actors. In this study, we analyze the enforcement practices of supranational agencies with direct enforcement powers: the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and European Medicines Agency (EMA). We find that EU agencies apply a legalistic approach, but they vary in coerciveness of enforcement. Whereas EU agencies tend to apply more coercive measures against non‐conform products, they are generally not adversarial toward non‐compliant organizations.

AbstractRecent scholarship on parties and foreign policy argues that foreign policy preferences seem to be split along the same lines as the general policy disputes. We use spatial modeling to analyze whether this is indeed the case. Drawing on the unique complete sample of all votes in the Slovakia's National Council from 2002 through 2019, our results suggest that the split over foreign policy is much smaller than the general policy divide. Contrary to expectations, this split does not follow the left–right distinction. The results suggest that the government–opposition split remains in the foreign policy as well.

Recent scholarship on parties and foreign policy argues that foreign policy preferences seem to be split along the same lines as the general policy disputes. We use spatial modeling to analyze whether this is indeed the case. Drawing on the unique complete sample of all votes in the Slovakia's National Council from 2002 through 2019, our results suggest that the split over foreign policy is much smaller than the general policy divide. Contrary to expectations, this split does not follow the left-right distinction. The results suggest that the government-opposition split remains in the foreign policy as well.

Existing typologies of the European administrative space locate decision‐making powers with the European Commission, member state governments, and EU and national agencies, sometimes aided through regulatory networks. This article argues that those typologies are incomplete because they do not take into account the existence of transnational executive bodies. These are public authorities that are responsible for administering and implementing EU policies across multiple member states, that are part of neither domestic nor EU institutions and whose decisions are legally binding. They represent a potentially highly prevalent form of governance in a previously uncharted area of the European administrative space. We document their workings by presenting a case study of the Rhine‐Alpine Corridor organization, a transnational executive body implementing parts of the EU rail freight policy.

Transcrisis aims to develop a solid understanding of the role of leaders in managing transboundary crises, and the requirements for ensuring an effective and legitimate crisis response. In addition to material and institutional requirements, leaders' policy ideas, peoples' preferences and public discourses play an important role in many of the seven phases of crisis management identified in this project, like for instance in the phase of detection, coordination, and especially meaning making and communication. Establishing the precise nature and effects of these 'soft' but influential factors in crisis management is notoriously difficult, for ideas, preferences and discourses are intangible phenomenon that cannot be observed directly (Fiske & Taylor 1991; Risse 1994). To be able to study these phenomenon and their effects on the effectiveness and legitimacy of crisis management, Transcrisis will make use of a method that was specifically designed to analyse such ideational factors: the method of Comparative Cognitive Mapping (CCM). CCM is a well-developed technique that has been successfully applied in many fields of study (Axelrod, 1976; Bougon, Weick & Binkhorst 1977; Curseu, Schalk & Schruijer 2010; Princen & Van Esch forthcoming; Van Esch 2012; 2014; Young & Schafer 1998). It may provide insight in the ideas and preferences of the various leaders involved in transboundary crisis management, but has also been used to study discourses and the way citizens think about the causes of, and potential solutions to crises. Through its various modes of analysis, CCM also enables a comparison between actors' and the evolution of ideas and discourses over time. As such, CCM provides an useful technique to apply in the various case-studies within the Transcrisis project and can be combined with techniques that provide insight in the material and institutional requirements for effective and legitimate crisis management. This guideline will provide an overview of the CCM technique as well as some basic ...

This study analyses how preference heterogeneity across EU member states affects the adoption of soft-law acts over time. On the one hand, high diversity in policy preferences is expected to increase the proportion of soft-law instruments because governments are less likely to agree to binding measures. Conversely, preference heterogeneity could also decrease soft law due to the perceived threat of compliance problems. We test these competing arguments using a dataset on all EU soft-law and hard-law instruments adopted between 1967 and 2019. The results show that preference heterogeneity increases the share of soft EU instruments. However, more past heterogeneity prompts EU legislators to decrease the proportion of softer measures in areas that experience high levels of past non-compliance.

Political leaders are often perceived as unresponsive to the daily concerns of citizens, especially when European integration is concerned. Academic research, however, provides at most mixed evidence for the existence of such a gap. This article tries to shed light on this discrepancy by introducing an alternative measure to study leaders' responsiveness—narrative congruence—and explores the assumption that responsiveness increases leaders' credibility in the eyes of their voters. As narrative congruence is a more intricate measure that captures leaders' and followers' policy preferences and argumentation, it may better capture the gap between their positions and therefore provide a more adequate explanation for citizens' support for their leaders than traditional congruence measures like issue saliency and ideological distance. To provide a first test of this, the technique of cognitive mapping is introduced and used to explore the congruence in beliefs on European integration of four Dutch political leaders and their followers. Although the study finds a significant gap between some leaders and their followers' narratives on Europe, it finds no evidence that this narrative congruence is related to the credibility of these leaders in the eyes of their followers.

Political leaders are often perceived as unresponsive to the daily concerns of citizens, especially when European integration is concerned. Academic research, however, provides at most mixed evidence for the existence of such a gap. This article tries to shed light on this discrepancy by introducing an alternative measure to study leaders' responsiveness—narrative congruence—and explores the assumption that responsiveness increases leaders' credibility in the eyes of their voters. As narrative congruence is a more intricate measure that captures leaders' and followers' policy preferences and argumentation, it may better capture the gap between their positions and therefore provide a more adequate explanation for citizens' support for their leaders than traditional congruence measures like issue saliency and ideological distance. To provide a first test of this, the technique of cognitive mapping is introduced and used to explore the congruence in beliefs on European integration of four Dutch political leaders and their followers. Although the study finds a significant gap between some leaders and their followers' narratives on Europe, it finds no evidence that this narrative congruence is related to the credibility of these leaders in the eyes of their followers.