Suchergebnisse

SUMMARYThis paper reconsiders different questions related to the transfer of central bank profits to the government. We arrive at three main conclusions: I) The extent to which central bank profits are transferred is irrelevant, economically speaking, as long as fiscal spending is independent of the size of the transfers; 2) The asset structure should reflect the needs of the central bank to ensure the credibility of its money. Portfolio return is of secondaly importance; 3) In order to minimize the spending response of the fiscal authority, transfers of central bank profits should evolve at a constant rate which reflects an average of previous profits.ZUSAMMENFASSUNGIn diesem Aufsatz werden verschiedene Fragen im Zusammenhang mit der Überweisung von Zentralbankgewinnen an die Fiskalbehörde diskutiert. Es können drei Hauptschlussfolgerungen gezogen werden: I) Das Ausmasq der Gewinnüberweisung ist irrelevant, solange das Ausgabever‐halten der Fiskalbehörde davon unabhängig ist: 2) Die Aktivenstruktur sollte dem Bedürfnis der Zentralbank dienen, die Glaubwüdigkeit ihres Geldes zu garantieren. Die Rentabilität hat eine zweitrangige Bedeutung; 3) Um die Reaktion des Ausgabeverhaltens der Fiskalbehörde zu mini‐mieren, sollten die Überweisungen uber längere Zeit konstant gehalten werden und einem Durchschnitt aus früheren Gewinnen entsprechen.RÉSUMÉCet article considi‐re des questions différentes concernant le transfert des bénéfices de la banque centrale au gouvernement. II y a trois conclusions principales: I) L'étendue des bénétkes transférés n'a pas d'importance si les dépenses fiscales n'en dépendent pas: 2) La structure des actifs devrait retléter le besoin de la banque centrale d'assurer la crédibilité de sa monnaie. La rentabilité n'a qu'une importance secondaire; 3) Pour réduire I'augmentation des dépenses du gouvernement, le transfert des bénéfices de la banque centrale devrait évoluer d'une façon constante et refléter la moyenne des bénéfices précédents

Inflation targeting has become the monetary policy framework of the nineties. At the other extreme, several central banks have recently adopted key elements of the inflation targeter's toolkit, but at the same time they have made formal declarations that they are not inflation targeters. Such a position may appear surprising. It indirectly suggests that a reneging strategy is beneficial for some. The paper considers reasons why it may be advantageous for some central banks to distinguish themselves from the inflation-targeting strategy. Most importantly, we argue that explicit inflation targets can potentially undermine the goal independence of a central bank. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier B.V.]

This paper analyzes forward-looking rules for Swiss monetary policy in a small structural VAR consisting of four variables. First, the paper looks at the ex ante inflation-output-growth volatility trade-off for a forward-looking policy aiming at a convex combination of a strict inflation and output growth targeting rule implied by this SVAR model. Thereby the paper introduces a new analytical method. Second, the paper considers the effect of measurement errors in GDP on this inflation-output-growth volatility trade-off. Third, the paper works at the impact of changing beliefs about the potential growth rate on the variability of output growth and inflation. Finally the effects of different targets in a forward-looking monetary policy on ex post or unconditional volatility of inflation and output growth is explored by a simulation exercise.