Suchergebnisse

Political leaders in Taipei and Washington need to seriously consider how to prioritize Taiwan's ability to deter and defend itself against China.

Congress should reject tying together fundamentally unrelated priorities and consider the Israel emergency request as a standalone.

The Biden administration recently established a new system for responding to incidents in which a U.S. arms recipient is suspected of using American-made weapons to injure or kill civilians. The policy represents the first systematic approach to monitoring when and where U.S. arms sales cause civilian casualties and aligns well with the Biden administration's Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy. But an executive order is not enough to durably improve oversight of U.S. arms transfers. Congress should codify the new system into law, ensuring that it receives the resources and attention it needs to make an impact and making it impossible for a future president to end the program on a whim. Losing this policy, or otherwise allowing it to languish, would mean eliminating the first process for tracking and punishing those who harm civilians with U.S. weapons. Having such a system in place is important because the United States itself has a terrible track record of harming civilians. And until now, the government did not appear to care about how many more were harmed by U.S. weapons in the hands of others.The policy, known as Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance (CHIRG), compels State Department officials to investigate and potentially penalize reported abuses of U.S. weapons abroad. Under this system, U.S. government officials will examine allegations of abuse reported by diplomatic or intelligence officials, the United Nations, international media, or civil society groups. If investigators deem a report valid, they will recommend a course of action that could include intensifying military training and education to shore up issues, curbing future arms sales until the recipient addresses its human rights problems, or other authorized diplomatic responses.There are multiple security and humanitarian reasons to institutionalize such a policy. For example, there is evidence that U.S. national security is threatened when it sends arms to nations that frequently violate human rights. These risks include American-made weapons threatening U.S. troops, strengthening relations between autocrats and terrorist or criminal groups, and preventing less risky and strategically important partners like Taiwan from getting the weapons that they need.The Cato Institute's 2022 Arms Sales Risk Index analyzes the risks presented by every U.S. weapons recipient. While this year's index shows that the Biden administration has thus far sold weapons to a less risky portfolio of clients than its two most recent predecessors, the White House continues to dole out significant numbers of weapons to some of the world's riskiest countries, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt.Furthermore, the CHIRG allows the administration to finally put actions to its words. Biden's CAT policy claims that the United States will strive to "prevent arms transfers that risk facilitating or otherwise contributing to violations of human rights or international humanitarian law." Nonetheless, the White House continues approving massive weapons sales to some of the worst human rights abusers, including a recent deal to give 31 advanced drones to India despite concerns about the actions of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. A new policy analyzing civilian harm will at least force U.S. officials to confront the consequences of their decisions.In fact, the CHIRG should reduce the risk of civilian casualties from problematic clients. The new system would theoretically impose some degree of punishment — including potentially delaying or ending weapons transfers — against countries like Saudi Arabia if, for example, Riyadh continues to use U.S. weapons to intentionally target civilians in Yemen.Nonetheless, the CHIRG does contain potential pitfalls, similar to those found in the Leahy Laws. The Leahy Laws focus on preventing the president from providing U.S. security assistance to military units that have committed a gross violation of human rights. This vetting process often lacks any real bite because there is little guidance as to how to document instances of human rights abuses, vague definitions of what constitutes "civilian harm," a reporting system that is difficult to use, and a lack of transparency. The CHIRG will likely face similar problems. Moreover, the CHIRG does not currently specify the exact consequences of violations, nor the resources required to undertake such an initiative.Despite the problems associated with the Leahy Laws, Congress did codify them after more than a decade of yearly reauthorizations. This means that, to end the Leahy Laws, a president would need Congress to pass new legislation — no small feat in a gridlocked legislature.The lack of codification for the CHIRG means that, at any point, a presidential administration can undo this policy. Absent congressional action to codify the CHIRG, it will likely be undone by a future administration that wants to sell more weapons to risky countries like Saudi Arabia.Fortunately, Congress can codify this legislation. In fact, recent research shows that Congress has a good opportunity of successfully doing so in the near future. Even the Leahy Laws — named for democratic Senator Patrick Leahy, initially passed under President Bill Clinton, and codified under President Barack Obama — passed with the support of a Republican-controlled Congress. The key was framing the legislation as a way to publicly restrict Clinton's foreign policy authority following arms transfer scandals in Colombia. The timing is also ripe to codify the CHIRG according to new findings about how lawmakers develop foreign policy, which show that the legislature tends to pass measures to restrict presidential authority abroad during bipartisan congresses.The CHIRG is a positive step forward for reducing risk in arms sales, but without congressional codification to clarify the ambiguities, it will create only moderate improvements — like the Leahy Laws — until a new president decides to end the policy.

The main issue with this finding, however, is that Kiel compares European multiyear commitments to single‐​year U.S. commitments.

Unfortunately, it has become a bit of a pattern for Saudi Arabia to send U.S.-trained troops using American‐​made weapons to commit human rights abuses, including multiple instances this year alone.

The potential positives of this emergency spending bill are ambiguous and conjectural. Nonetheless, there is clear evidence that additional emergency spending contributes to future security threats and worsens the U.S. fiscal trajectory.

Jordan Cohen


American weapons aiding coups and then being dispersed to terrorists is a tale as old as time. In Niger, the U.S. pursued short‐​term goals of fighting terrorism and completely disregarded the risk of transferring weapons to Niamey. Nonetheless, at the end of July, a military armed with U.S. weapons led a coup in Niger and ousted their democratically elected leader, Mohamed Bazoum. General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the commander of Niger's presidential guard, currently leads the country.
The U.S. State Department refuses to acknowledge this is a coup so they can continue sending weapons to Niger. Ironically, previous military assistance increased risks of coups and weapons dispersion.
Since the start of the Trump administration, the United States has delivered over $158 million in arms sales and $122 million in security assistance to Niger. These weapons transfers allowed Niger's military to oust one of the only democratically elected presidents in West Africa.
In the future, Niger's already‐​limited control over its weapons is likely to worsen. A 2019 study from Conflict Armament Research found significant amounts of loose weapons in Niger's Diffa region and terrorist groups like Boko Haram arming themselves with this dispersed weaponry. With the coup weakening the government's control over armaments, Niger will become a likely location for even more weapons dispersion.
The Cato Institute's 2022 Arms Sales Risk Index analyzes the risk of U.S. weapons recipients misusing and losing weapons. Niger is in the top‐​fifth of risk for potential U.S. weapons recipients and has become riskier every year since 2018.
The reasons for this score are because of terrorism, state fragility, and lack of freedom from the state. Niger has the 10th worst score in Vision of Humanity's Global Terrorism Index, the 24th most fragile state in The Fund For Peace's Fragile State Index, and is only the 110th most free country in the Cato Institute and Fraser Institute's 2022 Human Freedom Index.
Using these metrics, the Arms Sales Risk Index predicted that Niger was a country at risk for destabilizing events like coups and weapons dispersion.
Policymakers historically do not consider risk before selling weapons abroad. The result is instability in regions where Washington is committing resources to create stability. Niger is just the latest example of U.S. arms sales undermining U.S. goals.

Washington is doing a poor job of monitoring whether the weapons it sends to Ukraine are ending up in the right hands.

Jordan Cohen


To promote debate and help improve U.S. decision‐​making about arms sales, we created the Arms Sales Risk Index, now in its fifth year. By measuring the factors linked to negative outcomes of arms sales, such as dispersion, diversion, and the misuse of weapons by recipients, the index provides a way to assess the risk involved with selling arms to another nation. Specifically, we examine the risk of U.S. weapons being used in ways that are against U.S. interests and desires. The index scores a country's risk score on a scale of 1 to 100, with 1 being the lowest risk and 100 the highest risk.
Though this sort of assessment is by no means an exact science, and we focus here only on the potential downsides of sales, the Arms Sales Risk Index can help policymakers consider the dangers of U.S. arms sales policy more rigorously and make better decisions about which nations should and should not receive U.S. weapons.
This year's report has three findings.
First, we do find that the Biden administration is generally selling more weapons to less risky partners and has a lower average customer risk score than Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump.











Nonetheless, the Biden administration is still selling to risky clients. For example:
Saudi Arabia (risk score of 73, over $3.4 billion in weapons received since 2021);
India (risk score of 57, over $1.15 billion in weapons received since 2021);
United Arab Emirates (risk score of 57, over $1.14 billion in weapons received since 2021);
Turkey (risk score of 74, over $728 million in weapons received since 2021);
Egypt (risk score of 73, over $368 million in weapons received since 2021);
Pakistan (risk score of 69, over $324 million in weapons received since 2021);
Colombia (risk score of 55, over $252 million in weapons received since 2021); and
Afghanistan (risk score of 92, over $122 million in weapons received since 2021)
Second, we find little evidence that selling more American‐​made weapons to a country correlates with a decrease in that nation's risk score over time. In fact, only one country (Kuwait) in the top‐​quintile of purchasers has left a conflict in the last five years. Moreover, when it comes to corruption, human rights abuses, and authoritarianism, the biggest weapons purchasers are getting riskier.











Third, we respond to one of the most common arguments in favor of arms sales: that these sales produce leverage over recipients. We show that arms sales do not produce much leverage and that the risks of reverse leverage—recipient nations influencing American behavior—are underappreciated. Through the risk data and case studies of Saudi Arabia, India, and Afghanistan, we find that, if anything, the recipient has leverage over the United States.
Finally, it is important to note two things that this index does not cover. The index does not predict or include the potential for a new conflict. For example, while the risk of war between China and Taiwan exists, there is no way to quantify this risk.
Additionally, while Ukraine has received substantial amounts of U.S. weapons, these primarily come from various forms of security assistance and are not foreign military sales. Thus, while the risks of Ukraine obtaining U.S. weapons may be similar, this index does not study weapons given through anything other than foreign military sales and direct commercial sales.

Jordan Cohen


Over the last 48 hours, national news outlets have begun reporting that Ukrainian militias used U.S.-made armored vehicles (albeit unconfirmed by the U.S. government) in an attack over the Russian border and that Ukraine's security services conducted a drone attack against the Kremlin earlier this month. It is important to note that despite Washington's support for Ukraine, the United States was not involved in either attack. This recent escalation – with U.S. weapons systems in one case – is disappointing but not surprising.
Since the start of the conflict, I have written eight different editorials addressing loose weapons in Ukraine. This weapons dispersion happens for a few reasons. First, there is a history of weapons dispersion in Ukraine. According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime Index, Ukraine has one of the largest illegally trafficked arms markets in Europe, especially when it comes to small arms and ammunition. About 300,000 small arms and light weapons were reported lost or stolen between 2013 and 2015. Of these, only slightly more than 13 percent are recovered, while the vast majority remains in circulation on the black market.
All of this was already a problem before the conflict. The invasion exacerbated these issues as the country was flooded with a sudden influx of millions of arms and ammunition and an increasing number of civilians received military training and weapons. As Rep. Sara Jacobs (D‑CA) noted at a 2022 Cato policy forum on the risk of weapons trafficking in Ukraine, the United States does not "have the capacity to do the end‐​use monitoring we were doing before" because monitoring changes when you begin to "arm an insurgency."
This sort of weapons dispersion is not surprising, nor are its effects. Loose U.S. weapons threaten to entangle the United States in a conflict with another nuclear power by unintentionally increasing escalation against Russia, while also risking further destabilization within Ukraine if a disagreement breaks out between different armed groups or in any post‐​conflict situation.
The world has seen weapons dispersion of U.S. arms cause similar damage twice over the last two years. First, in Afghanistan, where the Taliban have used U.S. weapons left behind to arm themselves and generate profits. Second, in Yemen, when U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia turned the United States into an unwitting participant in the conflict.
Nonetheless, while the damage done in Afghanistan and Yemen is severe, they pale in comparison to what could happen in Ukraine. Dispersion in Ukraine risks great power war and destabilization in Eastern Europe. Regrettably, there is little that the United States can do now to prevent this from continuing to happen.