In: Political geography: an interdisciplinary journal for all students of political studies with an interest in the geographical and spatial aspects, Band 109, S. 103044
Rebel diplomacy in civil wars is an emerging research area, and we do not know the extent to which it contributes to the type of civil war termination. This article posits rebel diplomacy as the practices of communication and persuasion intended to generate external and internal pressures which make the government and rebel more amenable to each others' demands. The implication of this theoretical argument is that the government and rebel groups would be able to find compromises and settle civil wars in a negotiated peace agreement. Findings from the analysis of 136 civil wars since 1950 support the theoretical argument. This finding is robust in alternative model specification and after modelling the endogenous effect of factors that explain the rebel use of diplomacy.
What makes a UN member state contribute more peacekeepers to be deployed in hostile environments and place their troops at risk? A significant amount of scholarly research explores the need for, and effectiveness of, UN peacekeeping in conflict zones around the world. Few studies examine the factors that determine the size of peacekeeping contributions, and these studies do not focus on the role of neoliberal institutions. This study examines the relationship between the degree of linkages in neoliberal institutions and the size of peacekeeping contributions. I argue that the degree of linkages in neoliberal international institutions creates structural conditions that facilitate the information gathering process on the preferences and needs of UN member states and incentivize these states to contribute more peacekeeping troops. In my analysis of UN peacekeeping troop contributions data for all countries between 1990 and 2015, I find that the degree of neoliberal institutional linkages is the most consistent predictor of a UN member state's size of peacekeeping contributions.
Does one-sided violence create a negative cascading effect on the success of peace agreement implementation? If violence influences peace accord implementation negatively, how can such violence be contained to safeguard the implementation process? While post-conflict one-sided violence can be viewed as residual, the use of such violence can significantly influence peacebuilding outcomes. Implementing the agreement is a contentious process as both sides expect to maximize their benefits and minimize their losses from intended reforms negotiated in the agreement. Implementation success is achieved by minimizing the difference in policy reforms through mutual trust, reciprocity, and sequential policy moves. In such a contentious implementation setting, the use of one-sided violence by any actor undermines trust and reciprocity between signatories and subsequently forestalls implementation success. Empirical analyses of a global sample of comprehensive peace agreements since 1989 show a significant and negative relationship between the use of one-sided violence and the peace agreement implementation rate. Rebel one-sided violence has a larger negative effect on implementation compared to state and other non-state one-sided violence.
Abstract Background Previous studies suggest that countries with a higher child mortality rate are more susceptible to armed conflict onset as well as recurrence. Studies do not explain conditions under which child mortality declines among post-armed conflict states. This article argues that where armed conflict is terminated through negotiation and implementation of comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs), the child mortality rate declines. This is due to the implementation of provisions in CPAs, which addresses underlying grievances of the poor, underserved and marginalized segments of the population, as well as the successful reconstruction of the health sector. CPA implementation resolves hostilities between armed rivals and facilitates the return process for internally displaced persons and refugees. The CPA implementation may also encourage the return of aid workers and health professionals to conflict-affected zones. Method This study utilizes new data on CPA implementation and examines neonatal, infant and under-5 mortality rates among 73 post-armed conflict countries between 1989 and 2012. Multivariate cross-sectional time series correlation (fixed effect) methods are used to analyze the data. Results Within post-armed conflict states, a decline in neonatal, infant and under-5 mortality rates is associated with higher CPA implementation rates. Additionally, this study shows that higher GDP per capita, higher levels of democracy, and more primary school enrollment are also associated with lower child mortality rates. On the other hand, child mortality rates increase following a rebel victory in armed conflict. Conclusion Ongoing armed conflicts are responsible for massive displacements and the destruction of economic, healthcare and human infrastructure, thus hindering improvements in child survival. For better health outcomes in post-armed conflict countries, ongoing armed conflict must cease through the signing and implementation of a CPA. Short-term and long-term public health issues are discussed in concluding comments.
This article examines the ways in which United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions affect democratic progress and the durability of peace in post-civil war states. After a conflict, UN peacekeeping missions provide security and create incentives for former actors to resolve their differences through peaceful and democratic means. This article contends that by providing support, peacekeeping missions help to initiate a democratic process such that former rivals can claim access to power and resources without resorting to armed conflict. To arrive at this conclusion, this article empirically examines whether UN peacekeeping missions succeeded in promoting democratic progress in postwar states and, subsequently, whether that democratic progress would contribute to the durability of peace. The indirect effect of peacekeeping on stable peace has not been explored in the literature surrounding democratic progress and the durability of peace. From the analysis of the data on post-civil war democratic progress and the durability of peace from 1946 to 2005, I find support for the alternative approach and conclude that UN missions contribute to durable peace in post-civil war states by promoting democratic political processes. Adapted from the source document.