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A growing body of literature on issue framing has demonstrated the conditional influence of issue frames on self-reported opinion. The effects of frames are conditioned by message content, the medium of communication, & the predispositions of respondents. However, the literature has yet to explore the influence of issue frames on respondents' perceptions of public opinion. We draw from the psychological literatures on cognitive accessibility biases & impersonal impact & construct competing hypotheses concerning the likelihood of issue frames affecting perceptions of opinion. We test hypotheses using data from an experimental field study that exposed respondents to opposing issue frames on two important issues -- reforming Social Security & physician-assisted suicide. Our results largely support the impersonal impact hypothesis. We find that available information from issue frames influences personal-level opinion but in general does not affect perceptions of public opinion. We discuss the implications of these findings & suggest avenues for future research. 4 Tables, 1 Appendix, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.

To understand public opinion and political behaviour, researchers typically sort people by self-identified groupings such as party identification, race, gender, education, and income. This book advances gun owners as a new classification. It demonstrates a "gun gap," which captures the differences between gun owners and nonowners, and shows how this gap improves conventional models of political behaviour. The gun gap in fact represents an important explanation for voter choice, voter turnout, perceptions of personal and public safety, preferences for gun control policies, and support for the death penalty. Moreover, the gun gap is growing. The 2016 presidential election witnessed the largest recorded gun gap in history. The gun gap in voter choice was nearly three times larger in 2016 than the gender gap, and it exceeded age and education gaps by notable margins.

Introduction: The neglected gun gap -- Understanding gun culture -- A gun gap in voter choice -- A gun gap in voter turnout -- Safer with a gun -- Feelings toward gun owners -- How many gun owners? -- A gun gap in death penalty support -- Conclusion: Moving forward.

To understand public opinion and political behaviour, researchers typically sort people by self-identified groupings such as party identification, race, gender, education, and income. This book advances gun owners as a new classification. It demonstrates a "gun gap," which captures the differences between gun owners and nonowners, and shows how this gap improves conventional models of political behaviour. The gun gap in fact represents an important explanation for voter choice, voter turnout, perceptions of personal and public safety, preferences for gun control policies, and support for the death penalty. Moreover, the gun gap is growing. The 2016 presidential election witnessed the largest recorded gun gap in history. The gun gap in voter choice was nearly three times larger in 2016 than the gender gap, and it exceeded age and education gaps by notable margins.

Recent studies have documented a "third‐person effect" whereby people are found to judge others as more influenced than themselves by the mass media. Meanwhile, contemporary research on issue framing has demonstrated the powerful role of mass media in shaping people's political judgments. But are the perceptual judgments that define third‐person effects sensitive to how the media frame an issue? Two studies investigated this question in the context of the Lewinsky‐Clinton scandal, one in late August 1998 and the other during spring 1999. Several hundred undergraduates in each study were randomly assigned to one of two media frames. In the 1998 study, the political scandal was depicted as a matter of sexual indiscretion by the president or as legal wrongdoing; in the 1999 study, the recently concluded impeachment process was depicted as the consequence of partisanship or of Clinton's actions. The participants' judgments of media influence on themselves and on the public were then recorded. The results show that third‐person effects were sensitive to issue framing, but change occurred primarily in participants' judgments about their own vulnerability to media influence.

Memory plays a key role in many theories of politics, yet the determinants of inaccurate political memories have not been the subject of much investigation. Combining a dosage‐resistance theory of political communications with a theory of memory lapse and reconstruction, it is predicted that a clearly identifiable cluster of traits ought to render people vulnerable to inaccurate autobiographical memory. Testing this hypothesis with ANES 1990–1992 Gulf War panel data on postwar memories of prewar preferences, the theory receives considerable empirical support. Among other factors, media exposure and trust in government increase vulnerability to misremembering, while education increases resistance. Finally, it is established that inaccuracy in autobiographical memory can be tied to future political behavior: those respondents whose recall was inaccurate in 1991 were more likely to vote for the incumbent in 1992.

Recent studies have documented a "third-person effect" whereby people are found to judge others as more influenced than themselves by the mass media. Meanwhile, contemporary research on issue framing has demonstrated the powerful role of mass media in shaping people's political judgments. But are the perceptual judgments that define third-person effects sensitive to how the media frame an issue? Two studies investigated this question in the context of the Lewinsky-Clinton scandal, one in late August 1998 & the other during spring 1999. Several hundred undergraduates in each study were randomly assigned to one of two media frames. In the 1998 study, the political scandal was depicted as a matter of sexual indiscretion by the president or as legal wrongdoing; in the 1999 study, the recently concluded impeachment process was depicted as the consequence of partisanship or of Clinton's actions. The participants' judgments of media influence on themselves & on the public were then recorded. The results show that third-person effects were sensitive to issue framing, but change occurred primarily in participants' judgments about their own vulnerability to media influence. 2 Tables, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 41 References. Adapted from the source document.

Based on 1995 telephone survey data from 510 residents of a large midwestern city, the association between personal opinion is examined across several political figures & within multivariate models of opinion perception. Also investigated is the association between affective intensity toward a political figure & perceived discrepancy with public opinion. Overall, findings highlight a strong relationship between personal & perceived public sentiment. While occasionally significant, the effects of group attachments are relatively modest. Additionally, findings suggest that, as affective orientation toward political figures advances from neutrality to highly favorable or unfavorable, perceived discrepancies with public sentiment rise considerably. Implications & future research considerations are discussed. 4 Tables, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 53 References. Adapted from the source document.

The degree of influence of consensus information, combined with relative attractiveness, on political candidate evaluations was examined in an experiment incorporating the personality construct of self-monitoring conducted with 88 undergraduates at Washington U in St. Louis, MO, 1995. Findings showed significant levels of influences between self-monitored individuals, resulting from the relative weight that subjects assigned to social sources of information. High self-monitors were found to be very susceptible to consensus information regardless of appearance, while low self-monitors proved less susceptible. Conclusions attempt to incorporate physical appearance into consensus information, thereby emphasizing its significance in the individual opinion & collective choice connection. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 34 References. Adapted from the source document.