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Developing countries will need to be involved if a future international agreement is to be effective in slowing climate change. Under the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period(2008–12), developing countries have not got emissions targets, and the United States have opted out. Whether the Kyoto Protocol will live and have 'teeth' in future depends on negotiations which are due to formally begin in 2005. Current conflicting positions between developing countries, the United States, and Europe appear entrenched, but progress could be made towards cooperation if developing countries' interests are paid heed and a balance on equity issues is achieved. This paper interprets some of the politics and economics surrounding developing country participation in international climate policy, including future emissions targets, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and adaptation to climate change.

Developing countries will need to be involved if a future international agreement is to be effective in slowing climate change. Under the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period(2008–12), developing countries have not got emissions targets, and the United States have opted out. Whether the Kyoto Protocol will live and have 'teeth' in future depends on negotiations which are due to formally begin in 2005. Current conflicting positions between developing countries, the United States, and Europe appear entrenched, but progress could be made towards cooperation if developing countries' interests are paid heed and a balance on equity issues is achieved. This paper interprets some of the politics and economics surrounding developing country participation in international climate policy, including future emissions targets, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and adaptation to climate change.

Is it possible to devise a functioning early warning system for currency crises, and is there a role for the analysis of indicators beyond economic fundamentals? In light of the East Asian crisis, the issue is examined both theoretically and empirically. An analytical framework to detect macroeconomic and structural vulnerability as well as changes in the perception of fundamentals is developed, and a range of leading indicators explored. An exemplary early warning system which includes investors' sentiments is applied retrospectively in case studies of the crises in Indonesia and Thailand in 1997, Mexico 1994 and three other Latin American episodes. The paper argues that the monitoring of market sentiments has a place along with the analysis of economic fundamentals, structural and political factors. Particularly in the recent East Asian experience, a sudden and dramatic change in the perception of economic fundamentals and expectations regarding future developments was the driving force behind the crisis. A range of promising indicators are identified, some using readily available quantitative data. The challenge lies in the exploration of relevant information outside the traditional realm of economics and the construction of quantifiable indices. The importance of sudden changes in expectations, however, is the very fact that ultimately defeats any attempt to predict currency crises under perfect international capital mobility. Applying the framework suggested in this paper shows that in most cases alarm bells would have gone off some time before the crash; but this result is ultimately due to the benefit of hindsight. The next crisis will always be different. The best any early warning system can do is to give policymakers a clearer indication that problems are brewing.

Is it possible to devise a functioning early warning system for currency crises, and is there a role for the analysis of indicators beyond economic fundamentals? In light of the East Asian crisis, the issue is examined both theoretically and empirically. An analytical framework to detect macroeconomic and structural vulnerability as well as changes in the perception of fundamentals is developed, and a range of leading indicators explored. An exemplary early warning system which includes investors' sentiments is applied retrospectively in case studies of the crises in Indonesia and Thailand in 1997, Mexico 1994 and three other Latin American episodes. The paper argues that the monitoring of market sentiments has a place along with the analysis of economic fundamentals, structural and political factors. Particularly in the recent East Asian experience, a sudden and dramatic change in the perception of economic fundamentals and expectations regarding future developments was the driving force behind the crisis. A range of promising indicators are identified, some using readily available quantitative data. The challenge lies in the exploration of relevant information outside the traditional realm of economics and the construction of quantifiable indices. The importance of sudden changes in expectations, however, is the very fact that ultimately defeats any attempt to predict currency crises under perfect international capital mobility. Applying the framework suggested in this paper shows that in most cases alarm bells would have gone off some time before the crash; but this result is ultimately due to the benefit of hindsight. The next crisis will always be different. The best any early warning system can do is to give policymakers a clearer indication that problems are brewing.

Much hope has been placed on China's decisions regarding low-carbon stimulus following COVID-19. Analysis of China's recent Government Work Report suggests that while a repeat of recovery measures focused on high-emissions infrastructure following the 2008 global recession is not in the cards, a Chinese Green New Deal is not in sight either. Much investment is flowing to fossil fuel industries, whilst support policies for renewable energy industries are absent from Beijing's recovery program. These signs of environmental ambition taking a back seat are worrisome given that Beijing is currently designing its 14th Five-Year Plan.

In this paper we propose a market mechanism for regulated exit of highly emissions intensive power stations from the electricity grid. The starting point is that there is surplus capacity in coal fired power generation in Australia. In the absence of a carbon price signal, black coal generation capacity may leave the market instead of high emitting brown coal power stations. We lay out options for a mechanism of regulated power station closure using a market mechanism. Plants bid competitively over the payment they require for closure, the regulator chooses the most cost effective bid, and payment for closure is made by the remaining power stations in proportion to their carbon dioxide emissions. This could overcome adverse incentive effects for plants to stay in operation in anticipation of payment for closure and solve the political difficulties and problems of information asymmetry that plague government payments for closure and direct regulation for exit. We explore the issues theoretically and provide empirical illustrations. These suggest that closure of a brown coal fired power station in Australia could yield emissions savings at costs that are lower than the social benefits. The analysis in this paper is applicable to other countries.

Australia is establishing an economy-wide emissions trading scheme, with a detailed proposal tabled by government in December 2008 and a scheme start planned for 2011. The proposal is for unilateral linking through the Clean Development Mechanism and Join