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Contents -- Introduction. Combating Obesity and Subsidizing Fast Food Expansion -- One. Solving Urban Challenges Through Fast Food -- Two. Searching for New Urban Markets -- Three. Creating Fast Food Cities with Government Help -- Four. Diversifying out of Necessity -- Five. Shoring Up the Urban Market -- Six. Making Sense of Recent Fast Food Policies -- Seven. Unpacking Links Between Fast Food and Obesity -- Conclusion. Proposing Solutions -- Acknowledgments -- Appendix -- Notes -- Index.

Contents -- About the Authors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Japanese Politics in Flux -- 1.2 Party Competition and Ideology -- 1.3 Organization of the Book -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2: Understanding Ideological Semantics -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Dimensions of Ideological and Party Competition -- 2.3 Data and Variables -- 2.4 Empirical Analysis -- 2.5 Summary and Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 3: Perceptions of Parties' Ideological Locations and the Generation Gap -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Generational and Life-Cycle Effects

After decades of stable and seemingly semi-permanent single-party dominance, Japanese politics have gone through fundamental changes since the early 1990s. Government ministries have been reorganised, prime ministerial powers strengthened, and rules for electing the lower house of parliament overhauled. Furthermore, frequent formation, merger, splintering and disappearance of new parties have continued for more than two decades. How do citizens make sense of politics amidst such rapid shifts? The authors address this question by focusing on attitudinal and behavioural changes and continuities with respect to political ideology. They explore what issues citizens associate with ideological terms, where they perceive various parties on a conservative-progressive dimension, and to what extent ideology affects their vote choice. Results of new surveys are also presented to shed light on distinctions between different ideological labels and profiles of radical right supporters. In addition, all topics are discussed with an eye to identifying divergent patterns between older and younger generations.

In Charleston, Maine, a town of about 1,500 near the center of the state, there is an orchard with 750 apple trees and a farm where a variety of produce is grown.1 This bucolic setting is on the grounds of the Mountain View Correctional Facility, a 374-bed minimum- and medium-security state prison.2 Incarcerated people tend to the apple trees and vegetables, and every year they cultivate 100,000 pounds of produce that wind up on their prison cafeteria, or chow hall, trays.3 Writing for the New York Times in 2021, Patricia Leigh Brown highlighted how Mountain View's prison food service manager Mark McBrine, who also happened to be "an organic farmer with dirt under his fingernails," was "making the prison a pioneer in a nascent farm-to-prison table movement."4 According to multiple media outlets that have reported on Mountain View's food system, it is a model to be emulated—both an antidote to dreary prison food and a cost-saver for the state of Maine.5

Two elections to the Legislative Yuan have been held under a mixed parallel system. While there have been criticisms that this new set of rules leads to a considerable disparity between parties' vote and seat shares in the district tier, in so far as the new electoral system has been accepted and therefore treated as given by both parties and voters, its fairness should be assessed not by the degree of proportionality, but rather by examining various sources of potential bias. These include differences in electorate sizes and turnout rates across districts, and the efficiency by which votes for the main parties' candidates are distributed. The present study investigates how "fair" the functioning of Taiwan s new mixed parallel system was in the 2008 and 2012 legislative elections by simulating equal and reverse vote scenarios at the district level, and measuring the magnitude of each component of electoral bias. The results show that the operation of the electoral system entails no marked partisan bias, since it does not consistently confer an advantage to either of the main parties or camps. (Issues Stud/GIGA)