Suchergebnisse

An increasing number of regions have unsustainable groundwater balance due to overdraft. This is most evident in semi-arid areas where intensive irrigated agriculture takes place. In general, agriculture is taking the larger share of water extractions. Therefore, the main objective of policy-makers is to induce a reduction of water use by the agricultural sector to achieve sustainability in aquifer management and also to reallocate water to other sectors. This work studies the impact of water demand-management strategies on small-scale groundwater irrigated systems that are managed by groups of farmers in the Baj´ıo Guanajuatense, centre of Mexico, where intensive irrigated agriculture predominates. Several strategies are considered : economic tools (electricity pricing, electricity quotas, subsidies) on one side, technological change with conservation tillage on the other side. We also paid attention to the impact of institutional settings (collective rules) on the effectiveness of these instruments. Farmers decisions, interacting strategically with other members, are represented by mathematical programming models with a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) structure. The simultaneous optimizations of utility functions of the different interacting members, considering their technical constraints, result in a non-cooperative equilibrium. Non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium, whereby all farmers would contribute to a unique and additive utility function, are compared. This comparison brings a quantitative perspective to the debate on the respective role of economic incentives versus organizations in addressing natural resources degradation. Results shows that, at current electricity price regime, water consumption by cooperative and non-cooperative wells are not significantly different. However, cooperation does have an effect on water allocation between members. Therefore, institutional change within groups is more likely to have an effect on water allocation that global water consumption, thereby reducing ...

An increasing number of regions have unsustainable groundwater balance due to overdraft. This is most evident in semi-arid areas where intensive irrigated agriculture takes place. In general, agriculture is taking the larger share of water extractions. Therefore, the main objective of policy-makers is to induce a reduction of water use by the agricultural sector to achieve sustainability in aquifer management and also to reallocate water to other sectors. This work studies the impact of water demand-management strategies on small-scale groundwater irrigated systems that are managed by groups of farmers in the Baj´ıo Guanajuatense, centre of Mexico, where intensive irrigated agriculture predominates. Several strategies are considered : economic tools (electricity pricing, electricity quotas, subsidies) on one side, technological change with conservation tillage on the other side. We also paid attention to the impact of institutional settings (collective rules) on the effectiveness of these instruments. Farmers decisions, interacting strategically with other members, are represented by mathematical programming models with a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) structure. The simultaneous optimizations of utility functions of the different interacting members, considering their technical constraints, result in a non-cooperative equilibrium. Non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium, whereby all farmers would contribute to a unique and additive utility function, are compared. This comparison brings a quantitative perspective to the debate on the respective role of economic incentives versus organizations in addressing natural resources degradation. Results shows that, at current electricity price regime, water consumption by cooperative and non-cooperative wells are not significantly different. However, cooperation does have an effect on water allocation between members. Therefore, institutional change within groups is more likely to have an effect on water allocation that global water consumption, thereby reducing ...

An increasing number of regions have unsustainable groundwater balance due to overdraft. This is most evident in semi-arid areas where intensive irrigated agriculture takes place. In general, agriculture is taking the larger share of water extractions. Therefore, the main objective of policy-makers is to induce a reduction of water use by the agricultural sector to achieve sustainability in aquifer management and also to reallocate water to other sectors. This work studies the impact of water demand-management strategies on small-scale groundwater irrigated systems that are managed by groups of farmers in the Baj´ıo Guanajuatense, centre of Mexico, where intensive irrigated agriculture predominates. Several strategies are considered : economic tools (electricity pricing, electricity quotas, subsidies) on one side, technological change with conservation tillage on the other side. We also paid attention to the impact of institutional settings (collective rules) on the effectiveness of these instruments. Farmers decisions, interacting strategically with other members, are represented by mathematical programming models with a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) structure. The simultaneous optimizations of utility functions of the different interacting members, considering their technical constraints, result in a non-cooperative equilibrium. Non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium, whereby all farmers would contribute to a unique and additive utility function, are compared. This comparison brings a quantitative perspective to the debate on the respective role of economic incentives versus organizations in addressing natural resources degradation. Results shows that, at current electricity price regime, water consumption by cooperative and non-cooperative wells are not significantly different. However, cooperation does have an effect on water allocation between members. Therefore, institutional change within groups is more likely to have an effect on water allocation that global water consumption, thereby reducing ...

Un nombre croissant d'aquifères ont un déséquilibre marqué entre recharge et demande provoquant un épuisement progressif de la ressource. Ce phénomène est marqué dans les zones semi-arides où une agriculture irriguée intensive s'est développée. La majorité des prélèvements sur ces nappes est imputable à l'agriculture. L'objectif est donc, de réduire la consommation brute globale des systèmes de production agricoles au nom de la durabilité et de l'allocation entre lm secteurs. Ce travail étudie l'impact des instruments de gestion de la demande en eau sur des petits périmètres irrigués collectifs, ici appelés puits collectifs, d'une région d'agriculture intensive du centre du Mexique. Plusieurs instruments sont considérés: économiques (tarification, quotas, subventions) d'une part, offre technologique d'autre part. Par ailleurs, une part importante est consacrée à l'impact de la configuration institutionnelle (règles collectives) sur les résultats de ces instruments. A l'aide de la programmation mathématique, nous modélisons les décisions individuelles des producteurs en situation dinteractions stratégiques au sein des puits collectifs par une formulation type problème de complémentarité mixte. Cette formulation nous permet de représenter l'optimisation simultanée d'agents en interactions (équilibre de Nash). Nous confrontons les résultats de ce modèle avec ceux d'un puits où le comportement des producteurs est coopératif, i-e, maximisant une fonction d'utilité unique du groupe. Ceci nous permet d'apporter une perspective quantitative au débat sur les rôles respectifs des incitations économiques et des institutions dans la lutte contre ta dégradation des ressources naturelles. Notre étude montre qu'au régime de tarification actuel la consommation globale des puits collectifs est peu différentiée entre les modes coopératifs et non-coopératifs. Par contre l'allocation de l'eau entre les différents membres varie entre ces deux modes. Tout travail institutionnel est donc susceptible d'induire une ré-allocation plutôt qu'une réelle diminution du niveau global de consommation, réduisant l'intérêt que pourront porter les décideurs politiques. Cependant, avec un scénario d'augmentation du prix de l'électricité, les écarts de consommations croissants entre les deux équilibres justifient un travail d'accompagnement institutionnel d'une réforme tarifaire. Par ailleurs, l'étude de la tarification uniforme avec remise fixe réhabilite l'outil tarifaire souvent perçu comme nécessaire mais politiquement difficile à mettre en place du fait de l'inélasticité de la consommation des systèmes de production au coût de l'eau. Ce type de tarification évite de ponctionner le secteur agricole dans son ensemble, mais engendre des transferts entre les différents types d'utilisateurs. Au final, ce travail montre que si aucun des instruments pris isolément ne permet d'apporter une solution en termes de diminution de la demande en eau agricole, une combinaison des instruments tarifaires et institutionnels et du changement technique permettrait d'apporter une solution cohérente.

In addition to producing food products, irrigated agroecosystems provide important services that contribute to societal well-being but are often not taken into account by policy-makers. This paper investigates how the public in Northeast Thailand values these services. A choice experiment approach was developed to elicit the implicit prices of these services. We also investigate heterogeneity of respondents using a latent class (LC) approach. The results indicated that individuals are willing to pay for irrigated agricultural services that provide drought mitigation, preserves water quality and environment, and rural landscapes (RL). However, we observed important willingness-to-pay (WTP) heterogeneity related to gender, age, and income. Our results suggest that a society's demand for the nonmarket services of irrigated agriculture especially drought mitigation, water quality, and RL is significant, even in a middle-income country in Southeast Asia. Therefore, agricultural policies should balance or trade-off between these different services. In short, results from this research could be applied as a useful informative component for the future development of irrigated agricultural policy.

AbstractIn order to better design more sustainable farming systems, and prepare for the development of multi‐criteria farm decision model, we investigate how farmers rank their main goals when making decisions. First, we identified the main goals used by farmers through in‐depth interviews with randomly selected farmers in which we used small games to elicit the main goals they are using to make farm‐level decisions. Then, we developed a best–worst scaling (BWS) experiment, in which farmers have to declare the "most" and the least "important" goals they use when making decisions. The experiment was conducted with 120 farmers. We first derive a ranking of the goals according to the population average, which showed the importance of rice self‐sufficiency and transmission of farm capital. We then use a scale‐adjusted latent class analysis. We identified four groups of homogenous preferences among farmers. The use of differentiated scale, a measure of choice inconsistencies, suggested different levels of certainty about the ranking, and the presence of more inconsistencies when asking the least important goal. While a large group focuses only on rice self‐sufficiency, and farm transmission, we also identified a group of optimizers, and risk‐averse farmers. Farmers of each group are likely to behave differently with regard to sustainable innovations. We also showed that some socio‐economic variables describing the farms and the households influenced the probabilities for farmers to belong to one of the four classes. Overall, we showed that BWS scaling experiments provide a rich set of information about the diversity of rankings. It also provides the set of tools to evaluate the consistency and quality of respondents' choices.

N° ISBN - 978-2-7380-1284-5 ; International audience ; From a set of 3 actual case-studies involving bioeconomic farm modelling, the objective of the paper is to draw lessons regarding the challenge of interdisciplinarity between biophysical and social science. The results of the case studies illustrate the benefit that can be expected from these bioeconomic studies. The paper then builds on these experiences in order to discuss issues arising from interdisciplinarity. Some of these issues can be overcome relatively simply by paying attention to the construction of mutual respect and trust within the team of scientists, or more generally by recognizing that if it is more difficult, then more means and more time should be devoted the job. But interdisciplinarity may bring issues of power that are more subtle to handle, although theoretical frameworks are available for doing so. Anyway, pretending to achieve interdisciplinary studies seamlessly, just thanks to the use of the right tools and human resources would most probably result in numerous scars at least in the memories of the participants.

N° ISBN - 978-2-7380-1284-5 ; International audience ; From a set of 3 actual case-studies involving bioeconomic farm modelling, the objective of the paper is to draw lessons regarding the challenge of interdisciplinarity between biophysical and social science. The results of the case studies illustrate the benefit that can be expected from these bioeconomic studies. The paper then builds on these experiences in order to discuss issues arising from interdisciplinarity. Some of these issues can be overcome relatively simply by paying attention to the construction of mutual respect and trust within the team of scientists, or more generally by recognizing that if it is more difficult, then more means and more time should be devoted the job. But interdisciplinarity may bring issues of power that are more subtle to handle, although theoretical frameworks are available for doing so. Anyway, pretending to achieve interdisciplinary studies seamlessly, just thanks to the use of the right tools and human resources would most probably result in numerous scars at least in the memories of the participants.

N° ISBN - 978-2-7380-1284-5 ; International audience ; From a set of 3 actual case-studies involving bioeconomic farm modelling, the objective of the paper is to draw lessons regarding the challenge of interdisciplinarity between biophysical and social science. The results of the case studies illustrate the benefit that can be expected from these bioeconomic studies. The paper then builds on these experiences in order to discuss issues arising from interdisciplinarity. Some of these issues can be overcome relatively simply by paying attention to the construction of mutual respect and trust within the team of scientists, or more generally by recognizing that if it is more difficult, then more means and more time should be devoted the job. But interdisciplinarity may bring issues of power that are more subtle to handle, although theoretical frameworks are available for doing so. Anyway, pretending to achieve interdisciplinary studies seamlessly, just thanks to the use of the right tools and human resources would most probably result in numerous scars at least in the memories of the participants.

International audience ; Un nombre croissant d'aquifères ont un déséquilibre marqué entre recharge et demande provoquant leur épuisement progressif. Souvent, la majorité des prélèvements sur ces nappes est imputable à l'agriculture. L'objectif est donc de réduire la consommation en eau des systèmes de production agricoles. L'eau souterraine est typiquement une ressource en propriété commune, et du fait des externalités, son utilisation est souvent inefficiente en l'absence d'une certaine forme de contrôle. Différents instruments de gestion peuvent être mis en place qui permettent de s'approcher de solutions efficaces et efficientes, mais dont l'impact en terme d'équité est très différentié. Dans ce papier, l'impact en termes de revenus de différentes politiques de gestion des aquifères sur plusieurs types d'utilisateurs différant par leur fonction de demande en eau est analysé, en prenant le cas des producteurs représentatifs du Bajío guanajuatense, au centre du Mexique. Elle montre qu'en fonction des solutions retenues, ce ne sont pas les mêmes acteurs qui devront assumer l'impact économique de la réduction de la consommation en eau. Les analyses conduisent à proposer la solution d'une tarification électrique uniforme avec remise fixe qui donne toute la flexibilité nécessaire pour créer un environnement incitant les producteurs aux économies d'eau, tout en évitant de ponctionner le secteur agricole dans son ensemble. Elle permet également, par le biais de la remise, des transferts au sein du secteur agricole entre les différents types de producteurs ou, à un niveau plus global, entre les différents secteurs de la société

International audience ; Un nombre croissant d'aquifères ont un déséquilibre marqué entre recharge et demande provoquant leur épuisement progressif. Souvent, la majorité des prélèvements sur ces nappes est imputable à l'agriculture. L'objectif est donc de réduire la consommation en eau des systèmes de production agricoles. L'eau souterraine est typiquement une ressource en propriété commune, et du fait des externalités, son utilisation est souvent inefficiente en l'absence d'une certaine forme de contrôle. Différents instruments de gestion peuvent être mis en place qui permettent de s'approcher de solutions efficaces et efficientes, mais dont l'impact en terme d'équité est très différentié. Dans ce papier, l'impact en termes de revenus de différentes politiques de gestion des aquifères sur plusieurs types d'utilisateurs différant par leur fonction de demande en eau est analysé, en prenant le cas des producteurs représentatifs du Bajío guanajuatense, au centre du Mexique. Elle montre qu'en fonction des solutions retenues, ce ne sont pas les mêmes acteurs qui devront assumer l'impact économique de la réduction de la consommation en eau. Les analyses conduisent à proposer la solution d'une tarification électrique uniforme avec remise fixe qui donne toute la flexibilité nécessaire pour créer un environnement incitant les producteurs aux économies d'eau, tout en évitant de ponctionner le secteur agricole dans son ensemble. Elle permet également, par le biais de la remise, des transferts au sein du secteur agricole entre les différents types de producteurs ou, à un niveau plus global, entre les différents secteurs de la société

Un nombre croissant d'aquifères ont un déséquilibre marqué entre recharge et demande provoquant leur épuisement progressif. Souvent, la majorité des prélèvements sur ces nappes est imputable à l'agriculture. L'objectif est donc de réduire la consommation en eau des systèmes de production agricoles. L'eau souterraine est typiquement une ressource en propriété commune, et du fait des externalités, son utilisation est souvent inefficiente en l'absence d'une certaine forme de contrôle. Différents instruments de gestion peuvent être mis en place qui permettent de s'approcher de solutions efficaces et efficientes, mais dont l'impact en terme d'équité est très différentié. Dans ce papier, l'impact en termes de revenus de différentes politiques de gestion des aquifères sur plusieurs types d'utilisateurs différant par leur fonction de demande en eau est analysé, en prenant le cas des producteurs représentatifs du Bajío guanajuatense, au centre du Mexique. Elle montre qu'en fonction des solutions retenues, ce ne sont pas les mêmes acteurs qui devront assumer l'impact économique de la réduction de la consommation en eau. Les analyses conduisent à proposer la solution d'une tarification électrique uniforme avec remise fixe qui donne toute la flexibilité nécessaire pour créer un environnement incitant les producteurs aux économies d'eau, tout en évitant de ponctionner le secteur agricole dans son ensemble. Elle permet également, par le biais de la remise, des transferts au sein du secteur agricole entre les différents types de producteurs ou, à un niveau plus global, entre les différents secteurs de la société.

International audience ; Un nombre croissant d'aquifères ont un déséquilibre marqué entre recharge et demande provoquant leur épuisement progressif. Souvent, la majorité des prélèvements sur ces nappes est imputable à l'agriculture. L'objectif est donc de réduire la consommation en eau des systèmes de production agricoles. L'eau souterraine est typiquement une ressource en propriété commune, et du fait des externalités, son utilisation est souvent inefficiente en l'absence d'une certaine forme de contrôle. Différents instruments de gestion peuvent être mis en place qui permettent de s'approcher de solutions efficaces et efficientes, mais dont l'impact en terme d'équité est très différentié. Dans ce papier, l'impact en termes de revenus de différentes politiques de gestion des aquifères sur plusieurs types d'utilisateurs différant par leur fonction de demande en eau est analysé, en prenant le cas des producteurs représentatifs du Bajío guanajuatense, au centre du Mexique. Elle montre qu'en fonction des solutions retenues, ce ne sont pas les mêmes acteurs qui devront assumer l'impact économique de la réduction de la consommation en eau. Les analyses conduisent à proposer la solution d'une tarification électrique uniforme avec remise fixe qui donne toute la flexibilité nécessaire pour créer un environnement incitant les producteurs aux économies d'eau, tout en évitant de ponctionner le secteur agricole dans son ensemble. Elle permet également, par le biais de la remise, des transferts au sein du secteur agricole entre les différents types de producteurs ou, à un niveau plus global, entre les différents secteurs de la société

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes present a new approach that creates a conditional benefit transfer between upland providers of environmental services and the downstream beneficiaries of these services. Such schemes can take the advantage of upland-lowland interactions in generating environmental benefits while improving the livelihoods of upper-catchment agricultural households. The past few years have witnessed a surge of interest in the development of PES schemes in Asia. The Vietnamese Government expressed recently its interest in starting such a scheme to protect fragile upper-catchments whose degradations are causing problems, among others, on hydro-electric infrastructures. Northern provinces of Vietnam are characterized by biophysical, social, and cultural diversity. The region suffers from severe environmental problems such as deforestation, soil degradation, and loss of biodiversity. As a result, the livelihoods of agricultural households may be unsustainable. Moreover, they are also producing negative externalities for lower parts of the countries. However, households in upper catchments are heterogeneous because they have unequal access to natural resources. The upper-catchments are generally composed of a narrow bottom-valley, where irrigated rice fields are found, and of surrounding sloping land with upland rice, maize and cassava. The differential access to those compartments of the watershed has some important consequences in terms of household farming practices and livelihood strategies. The proposed paper is organized in two parts. The first part reports farm household surveys and proposes a typology of farmers living in two typical small watersheds. The second, through a simplified model of farms analyses how the poorest households would respond to such a PES scheme. Results of farm surveys showed that access to lowland paddies is uneven among agricultural households. Even in situations of apparent abundance of water, an important share of the villagers had little access to water during the months where it would be critically needed to cultivate a second rice crop. Therefore, watershed governance has far-reaching consequences that need to be recognized. We developed a recursive dynamic model shifting cultivators that integrated the dynamics of soil fertility over time and farmers decisions in order to analyse their potential participations in PES schemes. We simulated farmers without paddy land, and without access to markets. The model predicted that unless in-kind grain transfers are feasible, studied agricultural households are unlikely to participate voluntarily into a land retirement program. Overall, there is no easy solution to tackle both environmental and welfare issues of poorest potential suppliers of environmental services in the upper-catchments of Northern provinces of Vietnam, especially when they do not have access to markets.

In Asia, there is a surge of interest in the development of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) programs. They represent a new approach that focuses directly on creating a conditional benefit transfer between providers and beneficiaries of environmental services. More specifically, in Vietnam, a Fund for the Protection and Development of Forestry has been recently established that puts in place the mechanisms for the payment of fees by downstream users of watershed services to finance forestry projects in the upper-catchments. This paper reviews the potential response of upland farming households to a PES scheme that rewards them to set aside part of land for the production of environmental services. We examine the viability of PES schemes targeted at agricultural households of the upper-catchments in Northern Vietnam. We focus our attention on households identified as the poorest in the upper-catchment areas, i.e. those with a small endowment of productive land, limited access to water for irrigation, and low access to markets. We find that farmers are unlikely to participate in a voluntary land retirement program unless they are ¿compensated¿ for the loss in food production and a ¿forced¿ set aside program is likely to generate an overall negative impact on both poverty and environmental protection. Development and dissemination of improved technologies that increase food yields is a complementary strategy to promote environmental protection.